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Executive summary

The Task

1. This report responds to directions from the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs and Border Protection) that an internal review (the Review) into the actions of Customs and Border Protection, including Border Protection Command (BPC) and its assigned Defence assets, relating to Search and Rescue 2013/3821 (SAR 2013/3821) be conducted.
2. The Review is not intended to be a substitute for any detailed external investigation or coronial inquiry. Its purpose is to ensure that any immediate operational policy or procedure issues found to be deficient are highlighted and rectified promptly.
3. The Review has been supported by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) and the Department of Defence (Defence).
4. In summary, the work of the Review involved four elements:
 - Collect all documents relating to the incident;
 - Prepare a chronology and narrative of the incident;
 - Identify the relevant policies, processes and procedures – determining whether they were applied, whether they were effective and whether any changes are required; and
 - Identify those issues requiring further analysis.
5. Senior officers from Customs and Border Protection and Defence verified the key events timeline and narrative to ensure the accuracy of events referred to in this report. The AMSA Chronology was also verified by a senior AMSA officer for accuracy.

The Narrative

6. The Review received in excess of 1,200 documents and related media from the relevant agencies. This material was used to generate a key events chronology and narrative of the incident (Chapter 2). A short two page summary of the key events of the incident appears on page 5.

Review of Policies, Processes and Procedures

7. The Review used two approaches in undertaking its assessment of policies, processes and procedures. The first was an audit like assessment as to whether there had been compliance with the relevant policies, processes and procedures.
8. The second and more substantial approach to this part of the Review of policies, process and procedures was the exploration of the key issues arising from the incident. These are discussed in more detail later in this document as part of the broader issues identified during the Review.
9. The Review found that Customs and Border Protection, including BPC, demonstrated a high level of compliance with all identified policies, processes and procedures. While some instances of minor non-compliance were observed, these did not materially affect the outcome in relation to this incident.



Acknowledgement

10. The Review would like to acknowledge BPC's Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre (AMSOC), Defence, Headquarters Joint Task Force 639 (HQJTF639) and the Customs and Border Protection Incident Coordination Team (ICT) for their significant contribution to this Review.



Summary of key events

Summary of key events for COI 0502 known as SAR 2013/3821

5 June

- At 17:43 a RAAF MPA sights COI 0502 25 nm north-west of Christmas Island.
- At 18:33 *Warramunga* tasked to proceed to last known position of COI 0502 and intercept.
- At 18:58 HQJTF639 advise RCC of initial sighting of COI 0502, and that they would continue with the coordination of enforcement activity for COI 0502, noting no concern for the vessels safety was raised at this time.

6 June

- At approximately 00:30 *Warramunga* arrives at last known position of COI 0502. At 00:57 *Warramunga* unable to locate COI 0502 at last known position.
- From approximately 00:57 on, *Warramunga* conducts an 11 nm spiral search from the last known position and searches on the track back to Christmas Island in an unsuccessful effort to relocate COI.
- At 07:30 *Warramunga* commences barrier patrol of the north-west and north-east approaches to Christmas Island in the event COI 0502 closed Christmas Island.
- At 10:10 AMSOC advise RCC that COI 0502 is unable to be relocated by *Warramunga* and that a RAAF MPA is scheduled to be in the area at 1330 today.
- From 13:15 – 17:01 RAAF MPA on surveillance tasking to relocate COI 0502.
- At 15:27 AMSOC task CNOG to coordinate onshore assistance from Customs and Border Protection staff on Christmas Island to search coastal areas for COI 0502.
- BPC calls for WoG support from 16:53 – 18:43.
- At 17:59 CNOG advise AMSOC that the search of coastal areas completed with nothing to report.
- At 18:40 HQJTF639 email RCC noting concern for COI 0502 and request RCC provide assistance with search area planning and net water movement modelling.
- At 19:10, following discussions with HQJTF639, *Warramunga* proceeds to last known position of COI 0502 in anticipation of a SAR being designated, arriving at 20:55 and commenced a search of the area north west of the vessels last known position
- At 19:57 HQJTF639 advises RCC that it feels that it is approaching an appropriate time to hand coordination of the incident to RCC.
- At 21:25 HQJTF639 ask RCC if they will take the lead, RCC respond that the incident is to remain a surveillance task.



7 June

- At 00:41 HQJTF639 advise RCC the radar contact bearing 117 at 6 kts was not the COI, and later at 02:03 HQJTF639 advise this is *Shanghai Spirit* not the COI.
- At 01:11 RCC provides *Warramunga* with updated drift patterns and search datum to support search area planning.
- At 03:37 Message to HQJTF639 , RCC does not hold a SAR phase at this time owing to the likelihood that it has drifted out of the initial surveillance area prior to arrival of assets on scene.
- At 08:30 Deputy Commander BPC Contacted the RCC's Manger SAR Operations to highlight concerns held for COI 0502.
- At 09:16 RCC declares an alert phase, designating SAR 2013/3821.
- At 14:58 RAAF MPA sight submerged debris and life jackets.
- At 16:02 RCC issues distress relay broadcast.
- At 17:24 BPC call for WoG support.
- At 20:49 RAAF MPA sights body in the water at the second debris field.
- At 21:23 *Warramunga* arrives on scene; cannot locate body, nil sign of life, but at 22:49 sights second life jacket and debris.

8 June

- At 15:10 Dash 8 sights first of seven bodies.
- At 16:05 *Warramunga* sighted four bodies, later updated to nine bodies at 16:29.
- At 17:05 BPC conclude WoG support.
- At 17:45 medical survival expert provides RCC with estimated Time Frame for Survival (TFFS); advising survival to the end of the day on Sunday 9 was considered possible but unlikely, while survival through the night of 9 June was not considered possible.

9 June

- At 00:41 *Warramunga* tasked by RCC to respond to SAR 3888.
- At 18:21 RCC signal HQJOC and AMSOC to request cancellation of Defence assets.
- At 18:50 CJOPS provides HQJTF639 with a release order for assets associated with SAR. 2013/3821.
- At 21:55 RCC broadcast a distress cancellation on GMDSS, releasing all assets from their SOLAS obligations, concluding SAR 2013/3821.





Recommendations

Recommendation 1

It is recommended that Customs and Border Protection, through BPC, engage with AMSA to consider a more integrated approach to managing incidents in circumstances where there are complementary responsibilities. The approach would seek to deliver a more integrated and seamless interface between maritime security operations and SAR activity while reducing the key communication challenges highlighted later in paragraph 136 of this report. If the merits of such an approach can be demonstrated, a business case should be developed for further consideration by the Customs and Border Protection and AMSA executive.

Recommendation 2

It is recommended that in advance of any outcome in relation to Recommendation 1, Customs and Border Protection, through BPC, engage with AMSA to further explore and agree arrangements for the escalation and coordination of maritime incidents to RCC. This consideration should also include more formal criteria for the notification of doubt or apprehension by BPC to RCC regarding the incident or event. The criteria and associated detail should be captured in an appropriate Protocol as agreed by the parties.

Recommendation 3

It is recommended, subject to the outcomes of Recommendation 1, that prior to any SAR declaration and where doubt or apprehension exists in relation to the safety of life at sea, BPC prescribe a lead point of contact for communication with RCC.

Recommendation 4

It is recommended that BPC consider the benefits of a modern automated case management system, which can manage multiple cases simultaneously, recording and identifying key information and decisions across BPC. If the benefits are proven, a business case should be developed and submitted for further consideration by the Customs and Border Protection Investment Review Committee. The Review notes that this could also form a package of work under Recommendation 7.

Recommendation 5

It is recommended that BPC's use of additional officers to capture and record relevant information in support of watch floor officers during significant events, is reviewed to ensure the arrangements are optimised.

Recommendation 6

It is recommended that BPC, subject to the outcomes of Recommendation 1, consider the merits of a permanent liaison officer or exchange program between BPC and RCC to support enhanced engagement and understanding of each agency's roles and responsibilities. If the benefits are proven, a business case should be developed for further consideration by the Customs and Border Protection and AMSA executive.





Recommendation 7

It is recommended that any future modernisation program consider rationalising the number of information and communication systems in use across BPC. The long term objective being the development of a common information and communication framework across BPC elements.

Recommendation 8

It is recommended that BPC reaffirm the policies, processes and procedures regarding the maintenance of accurate and complete records applicable to potential or actual SOLAS events and SAR incidents, in particular meetings where decisions or actions are agreed.



CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Terms of Reference

11. On 12 June, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Customs and Border Protection, Mr Michael Pezzullo, directed the Reviewing Officer, Mr Kingsley Woodford-Smith, to conduct an internal review into the actions of Customs and Border Protection (including BPC) and its assigned Defence assets relating to SAR 2013/3821.
12. The Minute of Direction, including the Terms of Reference, are attached at Annex A.

Constraints and Limitations

13. This examination of the response to this incident has been conducted, in a short timeframe, as a review rather than an in-depth inquiry. By examining the facts and circumstances surrounding the response to the incident, it is intended to provide a narrative of the incident from the time that the first information of the vessel was received to the point when search and recovery operations ceased (the period).
14. The Review drew from documentary material from all relevant Commonwealth Government sources, notably Customs and Border Protection, including BPC, Defence, Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the AMSA Chronology of events, with any relevant material appropriately verified by senior officials.
15. The Review also relied on the documentary material and answers provided by agencies in response to specific questions raised. The narrative developed for this Review outlines those events that are relevant to the Review, drawn from key documentary material. This was considered sufficient for the purposes of this Review and was not intended to be a conclusive finding of facts.
16. The Review took into account that the events could be the subject of a coronial investigation and therefore makes no findings about the conduct of individuals or agencies. The report identifies facts and circumstances surrounding the Customs and Border Protection, including BPC and its assigned Defence assets, response to SAR 2013/3821, which can be identified from the material provided.

Methodology

17. Given the constraints and limitations detailed above, the following approach was taken to report against the Terms of Reference.
18. A Review team comprising a total of four officers from Customs and Border Protection and Defence was established on Friday 14 June. The Review team was supported by ICT.
19. The first step for the Review was to collect all the relevant documents and related media for the incident. Requests were sent to BPC, the Intelligence Division of Customs and Border Protection, AMSA, Defence and the AFP. All documents received by the Review were registered, allocated a reference number by the ICT and stored in a secure location in Customs and Border Protection offices.

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20. Upon receipt of the documents, the focus of the Review was separated into four elements: preparation of a key events chronology for the incident; preparation of a narrative for the incident; an assessment of policies, processes and procedures relevant to the incident; and exploration of the issues identified as requiring further investigation or analysis by the Review team.
 21. The key events timeline was developed following a review of each agency's chronology and relevant documents. Development of the narrative drew upon the key events timeline supported by the underlying source documents from each agency.
 22. A list of all relevant documents used to compile both the narrative and detailed chronology of events, including a list of copies of policies, processes and procedures applicable to the response to the incident are held in a separate companion document due to the classified nature of some of this material.
 23. The Review considered each of the identified policies, processes and procedures and then determined a prioritisation based on applicability to the response to the incident. An assessment was then made as to whether application of the document would have made a material difference to the outcome of the incident. Compliance with 'Very High' priority documents was carefully assessed on a clause by clause basis, with a reducing scale of scrutiny for High, Medium and Low priorities. The purpose of this assessment was to ascertain whether these policies, processes and procedures had been applied, taking into consideration their effectiveness and to identify opportunities for improvement.
 24. The Review team identified seven issues requiring further investigation. Each of these issues is addressed in a separate chapter of the report (Chapters 3-9).

Key source documents for the chronology and narrative

25. The narrative and chronology of key events, communications and actions was compiled from source documents and records provided by Customs and Border Protection, including BPC, Defence and AMSA.

Consultation

26. Prior to submission of the final version of this report, senior officers from relevant agencies were provided with a copy of the key events chronology and narrative for the incident. They were asked to verify the accuracy of the entries and if necessary, suggest amendments. A draft version of this report was also provided to stakeholders for comment. The narrative for SAR 2013/3821 appears at Chapter 2 of this report and includes a key events timeline.

Timings

27. All time references are to Australian Eastern Standard Time (AEST i.e. Coordinated Universal Time +10 hours), which is 3 hours ahead of local Christmas Island Time (CXT) (Coordinated Universal Time +7). Unless otherwise stipulated, all events identified in this report took place in 2013. Many of the events, notifications and communications referred to in the narrative of events are based on more than one source record. For example, the time of a single phone call may have been recorded and logged by the maker of the call, the receiver of the call and by electronic means. The recorded times of some calls vary by up to three minutes due to differences in time pieces, whether the time noted was at the beginning or end of a call and the duration of the call. For the purposes of developing the narrative of events, a single indicative time has been specified for any communication to best reflect the overall sequence of events.

Organisational arrangements - roles, responsibilities and relationships

28. The following section provides context to the actions of various agencies at the time of the incident, an understanding of the role and functions of key agencies and organisational elements involved in the incident, and the relationships between those agencies and elements.

Australian Customs and Border Protection Service

29. Customs and Border Protection plays a critical role in protecting the safety, security and commercial interests of Australians through border protection and ensuring the Australian community can embrace opportunities for economic growth and prosperity. Customs and Border Protection works closely with other Government and international agencies, in particular AFP, Biosecurity Australia, DIAC and Defence, to detect and deter unlawful movement of goods and people across the border. Customs and Border Protection is not a SAR coordination organisation, but its assets do respond to emergencies at sea in accordance with international obligations.

Customs and Border Protection Arrangements at Christmas Island


30. Customs and Border Protection delivers on this mission at Christmas Island through the Indian Ocean Territories Customs Service (referred to in this Report as Customs and Border Protection at Christmas Island) which covers both Christmas and Cocos (Keeling) Islands.

31. Customs and Border Protection at Christmas Island process commercial vessels that arrive at Christmas Island and Cocos (Keeling) Islands, which are predominately phosphate carriers, fuel tankers and supply vessels, along with regular small craft arrivals during the sailing season. In addition, Customs and Border Protection at Christmas Island also processes a weekly international passenger flight arrival from Malaysia, and monitors flights from the Australian mainland, including four Virgin Airlines flights per week, and numerous charter flights. All cargo arriving by air and sea is assessed on a risk-assessment basis. Christmas Island has an international mail exchange, which is attended by Customs and Border Protection at Christmas Island on a weekly basis for processing.

32. Customs and Border Protection at Christmas Island works closely with DIAC, Biosecurity Australia, AFP and other agencies with regards to the reception and processing associated with Irregular Maritime Arrivals (IMAs). Customs and Border Protection officers undertake the transfer of Potential Irregular Immigrants (PIIs) from Navy or Customs and Border Protection vessels (or the SIEV itself) and the initial processing on arrival at the island. Each arrival has subtle differences in terms of prevailing sea conditions for the transfer numbers of PIIs, on shore logistics etc. – procedures are regularly reviewed to ensure the overall operation is effective and as streamlined as possible. Following the transfer to shore, the PIIs are subject to baggage examination and scrutiny in the same way as any other arriving international passenger.

Border Protection Command

33. Border Protection Command is a multi-agency operational authority that is the Australian Government's lead agency for the planning, coordination and execution of awareness and response operations against a range of non-military security threats in Australia's maritime domain. BPC is staffed by personnel from Customs and Border Protection and the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to provide an effective, centralised command and control capability. BPC is the primary Government law enforcement organisation in the maritime domain, which is primarily the offshore areas within Australia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and extends to the area bounded by Australia's SAR zone. BPC is not a SAR organisation, but its assets do respond to emergencies at sea in accordance with international obligations.
34. Commander BPC (COMBPC) is an ADF two star officer, agreed between the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Customs and Border Protection, under an interdepartmental arrangement between Customs and Border Protection and the Department of Defence. COMBPC commands and manages BPC through BPC Headquarters in Canberra, which coordinates Custom and Border Protection assets via AMSOC. The same ADF officer is Commander Joint Task Force 639 (CJTF639) and is delegated operational control of ADF force elements assigned in support of the enduring WoG civil maritime security operation, known as Operation RESOLUTE. In this context, CJTF639 is responsible to CDF, through the Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS), for the command of JTF639 and employment of ADF assets assigned to the whole of government border protection operation. This is principally conducted through Headquarters JTF639 (HQJTF639) in Darwin. COMBPC therefore holds a unique position with dual reporting lines to the CEO of Customs and Border Protection and the CDF.



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35. In addition to his ADF command and control responsibilities as CJTF 639, COMBPC is also appointed as a Customs Officer for the purposes of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) to maintain a high level of liaison with, and manage resources provided from, a wide range of Government and non-government agencies to achieve border protection and civil maritime security effects. The authority to do so as COMBPC is derived from an instrument of delegation from the CEO Customs and Border Protection. In this context, COMBPC is responsible to CEO of Customs and Border Protection for the planning and execution of the Civil Maritime Surveillance Program and border protection requirements, including the day to day coordination of any response in support of these programs.
 36. Given the nature of the COMBPC/CJTF639 command and control arrangements, which inform the rest of this document, the generic acronym BPC will be used in relation to the tasking and employment of assets undertaking border protection duties, unless specifically designated otherwise.

Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre

37. AMSOC coordinates the planning and delivery of current operational activity for all Customs and Border Protection assets assigned to BPC. This includes deploying aerial surveillance and surface response assets, in collaboration with HQJTF639, to respond to civil maritime security threats. To facilitate its operations and cross management between agencies, AMSOC has embedded liaison officers from the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA), Biosecurity Australia, Customs National Operations Centre (CNOC) and, on occasion AMSA.
38. Located in Canberra, within BPC Headquarters, AMSOC is the primary focus for BPC operations when incidents arise.


Headquarters Joint Task Force 639

39. HQJTF639 coordinates the employment of ADF assets assigned to Operation RESOLUTE, which is the ADF contribution to the WoG approach to protect Australia's borders and offshore maritime interests. JTF639 has operational control of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) vessels, Royal Australian Air Force Maritime Patrol Aircraft (RAAF MPA) and land elements assigned to border protection duties. The Deputy Commander JTF639, based in HQJTF639 in Darwin, is responsible for routine day to day operations and command and control of JTF639 in support of BPC. This includes synchronising ADF Operation RESOLUTE assets with Customs and Border Protection assets to meet BPC's operational requirements. As such, HQJTF639 issues tactical level operational, administrative orders and instructions as required.

Surveillance and Response Planning

40. BPC's role is to detect, deter and intercept illegal activity in Australia's maritime domain. BPC is responsible for coordinating and controlling operations to protect Australia's national interests against eight civil maritime security threats:
- illegal exploitation of natural resources;
 - illegal activity in protected areas;
 - irregular maritime arrivals;
 - prohibited imports/exports;
 - maritime terrorism;
 - piracy;
 - compromise to Bio-security; and
 - marine pollution.
41. BPC is not a SAR organisation but its assets, like those of any private and commercial organisation, can be called upon to respond to emergencies at sea in accordance with international obligations.
42. The Australian maritime domain, including the Security Forces Authority Area for which BPC has responsibility, covers an area of 11 million square nautical miles (sq. nm) and equates to around 11% of the Earth's oceans. The Australian northern waters area, which BPC patrols for all eight civil maritime security threats, but most commonly encountering irregular maritime arrivals and illegal foreign fishing, is approximately 1.1 million sq. nm. (See following diagram).
43. The size of Australia's maritime domain does not allow for the persistent surveillance of all areas and threat axes all the time, rather BPC uses an intelligence led, risk based model, which provides the most effective utilisation of its available resources against known threats.
44. No country is capable of providing continuous impenetrable surveillance coverage. By way of example, the United States of America, with significantly more resources and a similar maritime zone, has not been able to prevent incursions onto its mainland. However, BPC has achieved and reported a 97.5% SIEV detection rate over the 2012/2013 financial year despite increased arrivals.
45. This reality is acknowledged by Government in that continuous surveillance of the Australian maritime domain is neither expected nor required from BPC.

Australia's Maritime Jurisdiction





Surveillance and Response Asset Deployment

46. BPC assets are finite. BPC asset disposition is informed by the BPC mandate to respond to, mitigate or eliminate risk posed by eight civil maritime security threats across the entire Australian maritime domain.
47. Asset disposition is an intelligence led, risk based decision, which also needs to take account of operational realities. This involves consideration of the two dimensions of risk – consequence and likelihood. BPC assets are not deployed on the basis of a SAR mandate, but rather to meet the requirements of a civil maritime security law enforcement mandate.
48. The interception of irregular maritime arrivals is one priority in the context of a range of civil maritime security responsibilities within the BPC mandate. For example, positioning assets concurrently on all of the high threat axes in addition to BPC's other civil maritime security activities, such as maintaining response vessels in Torres Strait, fully engages BPC's assets.
49. The operational priority with regards to IMA's, was and remains the prevention of mainland arrivals over possible arrivals at an offshore excised place.

Operational Capability

50. In the normal course of events BPC has seven Bay Class Customs and Border Protection vessels, up to seven RAN Minor War Vessels (MWV), sometimes supplemented by a RAN Major Fleet Unit (MFU i.e. a Hydrographic Survey Ship, Frigate or larger size ship) and three contracted vessels assigned to it. This provides an appropriate mix of capability and responsiveness. Not all BPC assigned vessels are capable of being deployed to the outer limits of the area of operation. In particular, the Bay Class are restricted from operating out to Christmas Island, particularly during the cyclone season, due to their limited range and fuel holding requirements.
51. In terms of general sea keeping capabilities, these assets are capable of responding to most threats in the maritime domain. However, the area they need to cover involves long distances and water craft of the size required for off-shore patrols have relatively low speeds of advance. The Armidale Class Patrol Boats (ACPB) which form the RANs MWV fleet, have a maximum speed of 25 knots, which equates to 50 kilometres per hour (km/hr.) and an economical operational speed of 12 knots which equates to 24 km/hr. At its maximum speed, it takes an ACPB approximately 16 hours to get from its base in Darwin to Ashmore Islands. However, at this speed the vessel's endurance (time at sea), as for all BPC assigned vessels, is severely reduced. As such, to maximise their endurance at sea ACPBs transit and patrol at the economical operational speed of 12 knots, which takes 34 hours for the journey from Darwin to Ashmore Islands.
52. Similarly, while the aircraft assigned to BPC provide an appropriate mix of capability, the fuel that can be carried by an aircraft and mandatory air crew rest periods can affect deployability and endurance. As a deployment location, Christmas Island is at the outer limits of the capabilities of the Dash-8. In instances when weather related fuel holdings are in force at Christmas Island aerodrome, Dash-8s are not capable of operating to or from mainland airfields. Typically, that precludes deployments to Christmas Island during the months of the year associated with monsoonal weather conditions.



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53. Where deployments by Dash 8 are possible, they are typically of five days duration, with the first and last days devoted to the relocation (transit) of the aircraft. Advance notice is required for these deployments.
 54. The RAAF provides three Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) for tasking by BPC. These aircraft are designed for long-range surveillance and therefore are often used for longer endurance flights. They have a maximum endurance of approximately 15 hours in favourable conditions and general mission planning allows 10-12 hours endurance.
 55. As such, the RAAF MPA can be used to conduct surveillance from their operational base in Darwin out to Christmas Island, undertake approximately a three hour surveillance program in the Christmas Island approaches and then recover to Cocos (Keeling) Islands.
 56. Fuel availability and runway issues at both Christmas Island and Cocos (Keeling) Islands have an impact on the ability to maintain sustained surveillance activities in the area.

Department of Defence

57. Defence's primary focus is to protect and advance Australia's strategic interests by providing military forces and supporting those forces in the defence of Australia and its strategic interests. To achieve this, Defence prepares for and conducts military operations and other tasks as directed by Government.

Joint Operations

58. Chief of Joint Operations (CJOPS) plans, controls and conducts campaigns, operations, joint exercises, and other activities on behalf of the Chief of the Defence Force. Joint Operations Command (JOC) includes Northern Command (NORCOM), along with the Joint Task Forces raised for operations. CJOPS is also the ADF's SAR Authority.

Australian Maritime Safety Authority – Rescue Coordination Centre (RCC)

59. Australia's maritime and aviation SAR operations for the Australian Search and Rescue Region (SRR) are coordinated by RCC Australia. AMSA is responsible for the promotion of maritime safety, protection of the environment from ship-sourced pollution and other environmental damage caused by shipping, and provision of a national maritime and aviation SAR service. Australia is a signatory to several international agreements governing SAR, pollution response and emergency response to shipping incidents. AMSA fulfils Australia's obligations for SAR and maritime emergency incidents through RCC Australia, which is a 24/7, 365 day per year operational centre.



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CHAPTER 2: Narrative for the maritime incident north-west off Christmas Island 5 – 9 June

BPC operational activity 3 – 5 June in the lead up to SAR 2013/3821

60. In the period leading up to SAR 2013/3821, BPC was managing a significant level of operational activity across the west and north of Australia. Operational activity included support to RCC in eight separate SAR incidents across both the Indonesian and Australian SRRs. At the same time, BPC continued to manage the civil maritime surveillance and response program, resulting in the detection of additional Contacts of Interest (COI) and a further six SIEV arrivals with a total of 447 PIIIs, the latter requiring the coordination of transport and reception arrangements.

Assets assigned to border protection duties 5 June 2013

61. As part of Operation RESOLUTE, two RAN operational response vessels (ORV's) were assigned to BPC on station at Christmas Island; the ACBP, HMAS Glenelg (*Glenelg*) and Anzac Class Frigate, HMAS Warramunga (*Warramunga*). One RAAF MPA was scheduled for surveillance within the Christmas Island area.

Weather

62. Over the period of the incident 5 – 9 June, the weather conditions north-west of Christmas Island in the vicinity of the last known position of COI 0502, the vessel subject of SAR 2013/3821, remained relatively constant. A broad low pressure system existed over the area, generating winds of 15 to 20 knots from a south easterly direction.

63. The weather forecast was for partly cloudy to cloudy skies with isolated showers each day. Visibility was to 10 km, reducing 4 – 6 kms in moderate precipitation on 8 June. The sea state was assessed as slight to moderate with a rating of 3-4 with waves varying in height from 0.5 to 2.5 metres.

First sighting of the Contact of Interest

64. At 17:43 on 5 June, the RAAF MPA sighted an Indonesian Type IV Fishing Vessel while on aerial surveillance north-west of Christmas Island. It was described as having a blue hull, red and white stripes and a white super structure with a minimum of 55 persons on board (POB). The vessel was approximately 25 nautical miles (nm) north-west of Christmas Island and was designated as COI 0502, (see image page 20).



65. The RAAF MPA also reported that the vessel appeared to be in a seaworthy condition with the persons observed on the decks waving, some wearing life jackets. Weather conditions at the time of detection were reported as slight to moderate with a sea state of 3 – 4.
66. At the time of the first sighting, *Glennelg* was transferring 90 potential irregular immigrants (PIIs) to Christmas Island following support to earlier SAR activities and *Warramunga* was readying SIEV 733 to be towed from its mooring in Flying Fish Cove to be destroyed in open waters north of Christmas Island. This tasking was a consequence of concerns held for the seaworthiness of SIEV 733 and the potential for her to founder in close proximity to Christmas Island, resulting in an adverse environmental impact and navigational hazard to the harbour.

Notification

67. The initial sighting of COI 0502 was reported by the RAAF MPA to HQJTF639 at 18:02 and *Warramunga* at 18:08.
68. At 18:33 HQJTF639 reported the sighting of COI 0502 to AMSOC and at 18:58 HQJTF639 placed a telephone call to RCC to report the sighting in order for RCC to maintain an awareness of the level of maritime activity in the area. HQJTF639 further advised that they would continue with the coordination of activity to relocate COI 0502, noting no concern for the vessels safety was raised at this time.
69. At 18:39 AMSOC issued SIEV SMS notification to relevant stakeholders, followed by the first AMSOC situation report (SITREP) at 19:01.



Initial response

70. At 18:33 *Warramunga* was tasked by HQJTF639 to relocate COI 0502 following the destruction of SIEV 733. The destruction of SIEV 733 was expedited by *Warramunga* and was completed at 23:28, at which time *Warramunga* proceeded to the last known position of COI 0502.
71. At approximately 00:30 on 6 June *Warramunga* arrived in the vicinity of the last known position of COI 0502, reporting at 00:57 that she was unable to relocate her. *Warramunga* did detect Merchant Vessel (MV) *Shanghai Spirit*, which was located within 5nm of the COI's last known position. VHF Communications with the MV *Shanghai Spirit* indicated they had not seen any small contacts in the vicinity of the COI's last known position. *Warramunga* then commenced an expanding spiral search of 11nm around COI 0502's last known position, taking into account the direction of drift she was likely to have experienced since the initial sighting.
72. Having not relocated COI 0502 at the conclusion of the spiral search, *Warramunga* commenced a search from the last known position back towards Christmas Island in a further effort to relocate the COI in case she had moved closer to Christmas Island after her initial detection. At 08:09 on 6 June *Warramunga* reported that COI had not been relocated and as of 07:30 had established a barrier patrol of the north-west and north-east approaches to Christmas Island. This was done to provide *Warramunga* with the highest probability of detecting COI 0502 should she approach Christmas Island. Figure 1 depicts the movements of *Warramunga* from the time she completed the destruction of SIEV 733 to the completion of her search on the morning of 6 June.



COI 0502 (SAR 2013/3821) Initial Sighting and BPC Responses 05 – 06 June




Figure 1: The movements of *Warramunga* from the time she completed the destruction of SIEV 733 (at 23:38 5 June) to the completion of her search on the morning of 6 June.

The escalation of concern when COI 0502 could not be relocated

73. At 10:10 on 6 June AMSOC contacted RCC to advise that *Warramunga* had not relocated the COI and that a RAAF MPA had been tasked to conduct further aerial surveillance of COI 0502's last known position and was due into the search area at approximately 13:30 that afternoon.
74. Between approximately 13:15 and 17:01 the RAAF MPA undertook search activity in and around COI 0502's last known position. This included the approaches to and the coastal area around Christmas Island, including to the south and east should the vessel have inadvertently missed Christmas Island or passed en route to another destination on the mainland.
75. At 15:27 AMSOC contacted CNOC to request coordination of onshore assistance from Customs and Border Protection officers on Christmas Island to search coastal areas for COI 0502 should it have arrived at Christmas Island prior to the *Warramunga* taking up its barrier patrol.
76. At 16:53 BPC requested WoG support to determine whether any other Australian agency had relevant information that would assist in relocating COI 0502. The WoG request did not produce any new information to assist with the relocation of COI 0502.
77. CNOC confirmed with AMSOC at 17:59 that the accessible coastal strips on Christmas Island had been searched with nil sightings and nothing to report. It was noted that the most westerly vantage point of the island had not been cleared due to poor road conditions.
78. On the evening of 6 June, BPC had heightened concern for COI 0502 given the initial response including air, sea and land assets had not been able to relocate her. At 18:40 HQJTF639 contacted RCC noting concern for COI 0502 and provided an account of all search efforts undertaken by BPC. HQJTF639 further advised RCC that *Warramunga* would be returning to the COI's last known position and was devising a search pattern based on that position, net water movement drift modelling and environmental conditions. HQJTF639 also advised the RAAF MPA would be undertaking surveillance the following day and requested RCC provide assistance with search area planning and net water movement modelling.
79. At 19:10, following discussion with HQJTF639, *Warramunga* proceeded to COI 0502's last known position in anticipation of SAR tasking, arriving at 20:55, and commenced a search of the area north-west of the last known position.
80. At 20:35 RCC advised HQJTF639 that planning for a search area was progressing and a drift model would be provided for consideration as soon as possible. RCC also requested the timing of scheduled RAAF MPA visual and radar searches and weather conditions to assist refining this modelling.
81. At 01:11 on 7 June, search area and drift pattern information was provided directly to *Warramunga* from RCC to support the relocation of COI 0502. Further discussion continued throughout the night between RCC and HQJTF639; notably at 03:37 RCC confirmed no SAR had been declared due to the likelihood that COI 0502 had drifted outside of the surveillance area prior to the arrival of assets on scene. RCC is in agreement with HQNORCOM plans to deploy a RAAF MPA to conduct surveillance for this COI under JTF 639 tasking. Figure 2 provides an overview of the initial search areas undertaken by *Warramunga* and the RAAF MPA and also includes RCC net water movement drift modelling.

COI 0502 (SAR 2013/3821) BPC Activity 6 – 7 June (Pre-SAR)




Figure 3: BPC search activity 6-7 June.

████████████████████

82. At 08:30 on 7 June, Deputy Commander BPC contacted RCC's Manger SAR Operations around concerns held for the missing COI. At 08:51 RCC's Manger SAR Operations advised Deputy Commander BPC that AMSOC would shortly receive a call from RCC to confirm they would take lead coordination of the incident. RCC indicated they would be seeking access to both RAAF MPA and Dash 8 assets to assist in the SAR efforts. BPC indicated there would be no impediment to this request, as both were already planned for surveillance activity to relocate COI 0502.

RCC Declares a SAR Alert Phase

83. At 09:16 on 7 June RCC declared a SAR "alert phase" and the SAR activity for COI 0502 was subsequently referred to as SAR 2013/3821.
84. A request for Defence assets to provide assistance to SAR activities was made by RCC to CJOPS at 09:33. The following assets on border protection duties were assigned to SAR 2013/3821: *Warramunga*, RAAF MPA and a BPC Dash 8 aircraft.
85. At 12:34 the RAAF MPA commenced SAR tasking and at 14:58 the RAAF MPA located partially submerged debris approximately 74 nm west-north-west of Christmas Island. When this was reported, *Warramunga* was approximately one hour away and immediately began to close this position.
86. As a result of the RAAF MPA sighting the debris, RCC issued a distress relay broadcast at 16:02, seeking assistance from Merchant Vessels in the region, and the tasking of a second RAAF MPA on standby from Cocos (Keeling) Islands.
87. At 20:20 the second RAAF MPA on tasking identified a second debris field approximately 10nm south of where the initial debris was located and later at 20:49 the RAAF MPA sighted one body and several life jackets. The RAAF MPA marked this position with flares and proceeded off task due to endurance limitations. *Warramunga* closed this position and was able to recover a life jacket and blue debris, however, due to failing light and departure of RAAF MPA support, she was unable to locate and recover the body. *Warramunga* continued to search for survivors in this area as a priority task.
88. As SAR activities continued throughout 7 June, *Warramunga* was designated as the On Scene Commander (OSC) and coordinated the search activity of the two Merchant Vessels who had responded to the RCC SAR broadcast (MV *Athinea* and MV *Safmarine Makutu*) overnight and during 8 June.
89. After arriving back on station, during the afternoon of 8 June, the RAAF MPA and the Customs and Border Protection Dash 8 again sighted debris and then bodies, which were closely followed by additional sightings of debris and bodies by *Warramunga* and the Merchant Vessels.
90. Over the course of the next 24 hours, the assets assigned to the SAR efforts along with the MV *Athinea* and MV *Safmarine Makutu* continued to identify debris, life jackets and deceased persons in the search area.

COI 0502 (SAR 2013/3821) BPC Activity 7 JUN (After SAR declared)




Figure 4: BPC search activity 7 June after commencement of SAR 2013/ 3821.



Cessation of the Search and Rescue

91. At 13:32 on 8 June RCC provided details of the incident to a forensic medical subject matter expert, including the likely immersion time of the COI 0502, calculated by RCC to be around the time of initial sighting. At 17:45 the medical expert responded to RCC with an estimated Time Frame for Survival (TFFS). Survival to the end of the day (up to sunset) on Sunday 9 June was considered possible but unlikely, and survival through the night of 9 June was not considered possible.
92. At 00:41 on 9 June *Warramunga* was detached from SAR 2013/3821 and tasked by HQJTF639 to proceed to support SAR 2013/3888. This left the two Merchant Vessels as the only surface assets available to support SAR 2013/3821. Despite their commercial schedules, both ships did so willingly and competently.
93. Throughout 9 June the search for COI 0502 continued with RCC coordinating the activities of the two Merchant Vessels, the RAAF MPA and the Customs and Border Protection Dash 8. Towards sunset three further bodies were sighted by the Dash 8 bringing the total of deceased bodies sighted to approximately 14¹. Despite a concentrated effort by surface and air assets, no survivors were located.
94. At sunset on 9 June, the TFFS provided by the medical expert passed without any sign of survivors from COI 0502. As evidenced by *Warramunga* being re-tasked early on 9 June, there was considerable other SIEV and SAR activity concurrent with the search for COI 0502 across the BPC area of operations.
95. Accordingly, with limited capability for effective searching in darkness and the need to dedicate resources to other equally life threatening SAR operations, at 18:21 on 9 June RCC signalled to HQJOC the decision to suspend the search. Shortly thereafter, CJOPS issued an order to HQJTF639 releasing assets from SAR 2013/3821. At 21:55 RCC broadcast a “Distress Cancellation” releasing all assets from their SOLAS obligation and SAR 2013/3821 concluded.

¹ At the time of writing a definitive number of bodies sighted during SAR 2013/3821 had not yet been determined.



COI 0502 (SAR 2013/3821) BPC Activity 8 - 9 JUN (After SAR declared)




Figure 5: BPC search activity 8-9 June.



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CHAPTER 3: Prior knowledge of the arrival of COI 0502

Findings

- The Review found that BPC's [REDACTED] SIEV Arrival Matrix for 5 June did note a possible arrival in the area of Christmas Island for that day. The correlation of COI 0502 against known intelligence holdings was completed on 24 June but at the time of writing this report the details of the vessel, crew and passengers remain unknown.
- The Review found the intelligence assessments provided by the Customs and Border Protection PSIAT helped inform the posture of BPC assets on the day of 5 June, which ultimately led to the detection of COI 0502 as part of planned maritime surveillance activity.
- The Review found that the handling of intelligence and other relevant information in the lead up to this incident was appropriately managed.

Intelligence and other relevant information in the lead up to this incident

96. The Customs and Border Protection People Smuggling Intelligence Analysis Team (PSIAT) coordinates the WoG process that assesses daily the maritime people smuggling threat picture to Australia based on all available sources. It considers actions occurring both within and beyond Australia.
97. A [REDACTED] daily assessment is disseminated to a broad audience including the heads of relevant Commonwealth agencies, Customs and Border Protection executive, and designated overseas diplomatic posts. This product is then drawn upon by the Border Protection Command Intelligence Centre (BPCIC) to develop a separate product that specifically relates to those aspects directly relevant to operations in Australia's maritime domain to allow BPC to position assets in response to the relevant intelligence.
98. The BPC intelligence product derived from the work of the PSIAT helped inform the posture of BPC assets on the day of 5 June, which ultimately led to the detection of COI 0502 north-west of Christmas Island as part of planned maritime surveillance activity.
99. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] activities to correlate COI 0502 against known intelligence holdings was completed on 24 June but at the time of writing this Report the details of the vessel, crew and passengers remain unknown. However we note more detail may arise in the future as a result of further consultation with other Commonwealth agencies.
100. The Review found that the handling and dissemination of intelligence and other relevant information was managed in an efficient and timely manner.

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CHAPTER 4: Appropriateness of the initial response by BPC to relocate COI 0502

Findings

- The Review found that BPC's initial response to task *Warramunga* to relocate COI 0502, prior to RCC declaring an Alert Phase and taking responsibility for the coordination and management of SAR activity, was appropriate. This finding also takes into account the BPC asset tasking and disposition at the time of sighting COI 0502, the level of information known about the condition of the vessel and sea state. Importantly, the vessel was not observed as being in distress or in any immediate danger.
- The Review found that BPC's subsequent escalation of the response utilising the RAAF MPA to relocate COI 0502 on 6 June was also appropriate and proportionate to the growing level of concern held by BPC for the safety of COI 0502.
- The Review found that the re-tasking of the RAAF MPA on 6 June, which is able to electronically and visually search large areas of sea in a single mission, could have been reasonably expected to relocate COI 0502 based on the available information at the time.
- The Review found that BPC demonstrated an appropriate and timely approach to relocate the vessel.
- The Review more broadly found, that throughout the period appropriate efforts to relocate and search for COI 0502 were made utilising coordinated methods and highly capable ships and aircraft.

BPC Initial Response

101. Following the initial sighting of COI 0502 by the RAAF MPA at 17:43 on 5 June, BPC tasked *Warramunga* at 18:33 to relocate the COI in anticipation of boarding her as part of a routine maritime surface response.
102. At the time of this tasking *Gleneig* was transferring 90 PILs to Christmas Island following its support to earlier SAR activities and *Warramunga* was preparing SIEV 733 to be towed from its mooring in Flying Fish Cove to be destroyed in open waters north of Christmas Island. *Warramunga's* tasking priority was a consequence of concerns held for the seaworthiness of SIEV 733 and the potential for her to founder in close proximity to Christmas Island, resulting in an adverse environmental impact and navigational hazard to the harbour and potentially disrupting important refuelling operations at Christmas Island.
103. While BPC always allocates the highest priority to the preservation of life, there was no indication COI 0502 was in distress or any immediate danger. The availability of assets, concern for the foundering of SIEV 733, the apparent seaworthiness of COI 0502 as well as the prevailing moderate sea state and weather conditions at the time, support the appropriateness of the decision by BPC to task *Warramunga* to relocate COI 0502 following the destruction of SIEV 733.



104. While the destruction of SIEV 733 had been expedited, *Warramunga* arrived in the vicinity of the last known position of COI 0502 at approximately 00:30 on 6 June. Upon arrival, *Warramunga* contacted the MV *Shanghai Spirit*, a 12,000 Tonne Bulk Carrier, which was detected drifting in the general vicinity of the COI's last known position. It was ascertained that the MV *Shanghai Spirit* had been drifting in the area awaiting a berth at Christmas Island, where she proceeded to on 7 June. When contacted by *Warramunga*, MV *Shanghai Spirit* indicated that she had not seen any small vessels in the vicinity of the COIs last known position.
105. Having been unable to relocate COI 0502, *Warramunga* then commenced an expanding spiral search of 11nm around COI 0502's last known position taking into account the direction of drift she was likely to have experienced since the initial sighting. If the vessel had remained drifting in the area since its initial sighting by the RAAF MPA, based on a drift rate of approximately one knot (as advised by RCC), *Warramunga* could have reasonably expected to have relocated COI 0502.²
106. At the conclusion of the spiral search, having not located COI 0502, *Warramunga* then commenced a search from its last known position back towards Christmas Island in a further effort to relocate the COI in case she had moved closer to Christmas Island after her initial detection. At 08:09 on 6 June *Warramunga* reported that COI had not been relocated and as of 07:30 had established a barrier patrol of the north-west and north-east approaches to Christmas Island. This was done to provide *Warramunga* with the highest probability of detecting COI 0502 should she attempt to close the island from the north.
107. In considering the available information at the time, the Review considers that *Warramunga's* search along the approach to Christmas Island from the COI's last known position and commencement of a barrier patrol were reasonable courses of action in anticipating the arrival and interception of COI 0502. The Review also acknowledges that while *Warramunga's* initial attempts to relocate COI 0502 were unsuccessful, it was not unreasonable for her to expect that COI 0502 would be located by the RAAF MPA later in the day. The Review considered this based on the fact the RAAF MPA is noted as having a more effective capability for broad area maritime search given its sophisticated radar and electro-optic suite and its ability to cover large areas of ocean in a single mission.
108. The Review considers that the initial response by BPC to utilise *Warramunga* to relocate COI 0502, was appropriate when considering the BPC asset tasking and disposition at the time, including the information provided by the RAAF MPA which indicated the vessel was in a seaworthy state in moderate seas. The Review also acknowledges the appropriateness and efforts of *Warramunga's* Ship's Company to use all available means in attempting to relocate COI 0502, including their use of electro-optic devices, radar, night vision equipment and other visual detection capabilities as well as the use of alternative search techniques such as the spiral and track line search patterns.
109. The Review also noted that when initially sighted, COI 0502 appeared to be stopped and considered whether this should have raised concern for the safety of this vessel. Advice from BPC senior officers indicates that stopping by itself does not raise immediate concern for the safety of a vessel. For example, some vessels will drift at night to sequence daylight arrivals at places such as Christmas Island, while others will stop to attract attention of passing aircraft and vessels to ensure their detection. The most compelling information regarding COI 0502's integrity remains that of the RAAF MPA's initial observation that the vessel was seaworthy at the time of the initial sighting.

² While the Review notes advice from RCC that it was likely COI 0502 drifted outside the initial surveillance area for 6 June, prior to the arrival of assets on scene, at the time of writing it is not clear what this is based upon. Preliminary analysis by the Review indicates the COI would have been in the search area had it remained drifting.



BPC Escalating Response

110. Having not relocated COI 0502, BPC undertook to re-task the scheduled 6 June RAAF MPA to patrol the areas around Christmas Island specifically to relocate her. Between 13:15 and 17:01 the RAAF MPA conducted visual and radar searches around a 30 nm radius of Christmas Island, 30 nm radius around COI 0502's last known position and along a direction of 117 degrees out to 140nm from the COI's last known position. This surveillance plan took into account the potential for COI 0502 to have inadvertently missed the island during the night or to have sailed past Christmas Island bound for a destination on the Australian mainland.
111. At 15:27 BPC contacted CNOC to request coordination of onshore assistance from Customs and Border Protection officers based on Christmas Island to search coastal areas for COI 0502 should it have arrived at Christmas Island prior to *Warramunga* taking up its barrier patrol. CNOC confirmed at 17:59 that the accessible coastal strips on Christmas Island had been cleared with nil sightings and nothing to report. It was noted that the most westerly vantage point of the island had not been cleared due to poor road conditions.
112. At 16:53 BPC requested WoG support to determine whether any other relevant information existed that would assist in relocating COI 0502. The WoG request did not produce any new information to assist with the relocation of COI 0502.
113. The Review found that after the initial sighting of COI 0502 on 5 June, the subsequent inability to relocate it by *Warramunga* in the early hours of 6 June, and the subsequent search by the RAAF MPA later that afternoon, there was an increasing degree of concern within BPC for the safety of this vessel. The Review considered this concern was appropriately conveyed to the RCC through the course of the day as BPC's apprehension for the safety of COI 0502 grew.
114. Overall, the Review found that the liaison with RCC, the search of Christmas Island and surrounding approaches by sea, land and air assets, and the request for WoG support to determine whether any other Commonwealth agency had relevant information that would assist in relocating COI 0502, demonstrated a proactive and determined approach to relocate this vessel.

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CHAPTER 5: Transition from Contact of Interest to the focus of SAR 2013/3821

Findings

- The Review found that on 6 and 7 June, BPC appropriately communicated its increasing level of apprehension to RCC on several occasions in the lead up to RCC's SAR declaration at 9:16 on 7 June.
- The Review found that BPC's increasing concern was a consequence of its air, sea and land search, including WoG consultation, being unable to relocate COI 0502.
- The Review found varying levels of expectation between BPC and RCC as to when concern for a vessel, the subject of routine civil maritime security activity, transitions to a SAR activity coordinated by RCC.
- The Review found there was no doubt about which agency had the lead coordination during the initial attempts to relocate COI 0502 over 5 -7 June and when RCC was coordinating SAR activity from 7 June.
- The Review found the varying levels of expectation did not materially impact on the outcomes of this incident given the support from RCC and the operational activity applied by BPC to relocate this vessel.

Pre-SAR Communications with RCC

115. Between the initial sighting of COI 0502 on 5 June and when RCC formally declared a SAR Alert on 7 June, there were numerous exchanges of information between RCC and the two main components of BPC, AMSOC and HQJTF639. These communications ranged from informing RCC of the first sighting of COI 0502, through to seeking their support for search planning and ultimately the acceptance of SAR responsibility by RCC.
116. The Review noted that on the evening of 6 June when the RAAF MPA, land search and WoG consultation had not located COI 0502, a reasonable level of doubt or apprehension was held by BPC in relation to the safety of COI 0502.
117. While the Review acknowledges the initial response to locate COI 0502 by BPC, with support from the RCC, was appropriate, the Review notes that BPC had an expectation that the transition of this incident may have occurred earlier. While the Review recognises that AMSA is the only relevant SAR authority competent to assess information in a potential distress situation, the further exploration of this issue between BPC and AMSA would ensure a more comprehensive understanding of the expectations and criteria for the transition of these responsibilities, particularly in situations where there is a growing level of apprehension in relation to a SOLAS type situation. The Review notes that AMSA and BPC have already commenced work to develop appropriate guidance material.
118. The Review further considered, given the rise in SAR incidents involving IMAs and being cognisant of the findings and recommendations in chapter 8, that there is also merit in exploring a more integrated approach between BPC and RCC in managing incidents where there are complementary responsibilities. While this more integrated approach could take many forms, the ability to collocate officers would enhance coordination and decision making. This would provide a more integrated interface between civil maritime security operations and SAR activity, while removing many of the key communication challenges also highlighted in chapter 8.



119. The Review considers that the current AMSOC I&G BPC *Transfer of SAR Coordination to AMSA* could be expanded to include more formal criteria for the notification of doubt or apprehension by BPC to AMSA in relation to IMAs.

Recommendation 1

It is recommended that Customs and Border Protection, through BPC, engage with AMSA to consider a more integrated approach to managing incidents in circumstances where there are complementary responsibilities. The approach would seek to deliver a more integrated and seamless interface between maritime security operations and SAR activity while reducing the key communication challenges highlighted later in paragraph 136 of this report. If the merits of such an approach can be demonstrated, a business case should be developed for further consideration by the Customs and Border Protection and AMSA executive.

Recommendation 2

It is recommended that in advance of any outcome in relation to Recommendation 1, Customs and Border Protection, through BPC, engage with AMSA to further explore and agree arrangements for the escalation and coordination of maritime incidents to RCC. This consideration should also include more formal criteria for the notification of doubt or apprehension by BPC to AMSA regarding the incident or event. The criteria and associated detail should be captured in an appropriate Protocol as agreed by the parties.



CHAPTER 6: What happened to COI 0502 and was it the source of debris and bodies located during SAR 2013/3821?

Findings

- The Review found no formal identification of the debris and bodies observed as part of SAR 2013/3821 was made by BPC or RCC. Therefore, the Review is unable to make any definitive statement as to the origin of the debris or bodies, including the ultimate fate of COI 0502.
- The Review speculates that the source of the debris and bodies is possibly that of COI 0502 based only on RCC SAR planning data and the location of the debris and bodies observed within this area.
- The Review found at the time of writing this report there has been no other information forthcoming to indicate that COI 0502 or some other vessel was the source of the debris and bodies located on 7 and 8 June.

120. On the information available at the time of writing this report, the Review is unable to determine with any level of certainty the actions of this vessel following its sighting by the RAAF MPA and whether in fact the debris and bodies located as part of SAR 2013/3821 are linked.
121. The task of determining whether COI 0502 was the source of the debris and bodies was made difficult in that no survivors were found, no bodies were recovered and no significant wreckage was able to be recovered for any later identification.
122. The inability to recover any wreckage or bodies also meant it was not possible to make any conclusive statement as to the cause of this sinking and the attendant loss of life.
123. The only possible link or correlation of the debris and bodies with that of COI 0502 is made from the search planning of RCC. The search area developed by RCC, which was based on time, the last known position of COI 0502 and net water movement drift modelling, plotted an area of probability for the detection of three types of objects; a vessel similar to COI 0502, wreckage and persons drifting. This modelling ultimately led to the detection of the debris and bodies within this area of probability.
124. While the Review notes the possible link between the debris and COI 0502, at the time of writing this report there has been no information to indicate that COI 0502 or some other specific vessel was the source of the debris and bodies.
125. The Review notes that while attempting to provide some insight as to the fate of COI 0502, it is not the appropriate or competent authority to make any formal or qualified assessment.

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CHAPTER 7: Non-recovery of bodies

Findings

- The Review found that the focus on locating survivors over the recovery of bodies was an appropriate course of action.
- The Review noted that the rationale for not recovering bodies took into account the posturing of resources for ongoing activities to prevent further loss of life. It also included the practical challenges involved with recovery activities based upon the likelihood of the deceased still being afloat, the condition of the deceased, and the potential impact on mission capability.

126. Over the period of 7 and 8 June a number of bodies were sighted as part of the SAR 2013/3821 incident.
127. The Review found that the decision or inability to recover the human remains observed during SAR 2013/3821 took into account the ongoing SAR effort, competing priorities, available resources and safety considerations for the BPC and other personnel involved.
128. Following the sighting of the first body on 7 June by the RAAF MPA, *Warramunga* closed the area with the intention of recovering the body, however with the onset of darkness *Warramunga* was unable to relocate the body.
129. On 8 June a Customs and Border Protection Dash 8 aircraft sighted seven bodies and later that afternoon *Warramunga* sighted nine bodies. During the period when the reports of these sightings were being made, the key priority was to continue with the search for survivors, given that the estimated TFFS was only just over a day away which meant it was still realistic at the time to find survivors.
130. A further consideration, evidenced from that day's sightings, indicated that many of the bodies were in an advanced state of decomposition, and were likely to have been in a friable condition, which accorded with the immersion time of approximately 72 hours. Any recovery effort would have to be conducted by *Warramunga*'s Rigid Hull Inflatable Boats (RHIBs) and would have been a very time consuming, and any recovery efforts would have been a difficult evolution that would have prevented the ship from continuing to actively search for survivors.
131. Following the cessation of SAR activities on 9 June, BPC undertook a further surveillance flight on 12 June in an attempt to relocate any bodies, in particular, to determine whether further efforts at body recovery should be pursued. While the RAAF MPA sighted one body on its first surveillance pass, the body could not be relocated on subsequent passes.
132. Ultimately, the response to other SAR activities and BPC's priority to prevent any further loss of life meant there was no further specific surveillance activity or attempts at recovery of bodies observed as part of SAR 2013/3821.



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CHAPTER 8: Information flows

Findings

- The Review found that in general, procedures and processes relating to the exchange of information were complied with and appropriate to the SAR 2013/3821 incident.
- The Review found that the composite nature of BPC presents opportunities to enhance the sharing of information both within the BPC structure and with key stakeholders.

Communications

133. BPC is a multi-agency maritime law enforcement authority, which in concert with other Government agencies and stakeholders, undertakes the composite tasking of assets and resources from both Defence and Customs and Border Protection. In coordinating and managing information and assets BPC is reliant on effective communications between agencies and is cognisant of each agencies requirements to comply with their parent organisation's protocols and where necessary, protocols tailored to meet the specific requirements of BPC operations.

Information flow within BPC and with RCC

134. Throughout the operational activity associated with COI 0502 and SAR 2013/3821 the flow of information between the RCC, AMSOC, HQJTF639, and maritime and air assets involved was generally effective and facilitated timely and appropriate decision making.
135. The Review did note that a number of key challenges were inherent in managing the flow and interpretation of information across such a diverse and distributed network of agencies, headquarters and assets. During the incident, the AMSOC supervisor was required to utilise up to seven different systems to obtain and disseminate information in a timely manner within BPC and with other stakeholders. The complexity of managing information across this diverse range of systems increases the risk of miscommunication and misinterpretation of information.
136. The key communication challenges can largely be attributed to the physical separation of entities and the differing means of communication (largely system driven) across the various organisations and assets, as well as the balance between operational decision making and appropriate recording of information in a high tempo, multi-dimensional environment.
137. Over the course of the operational activity, the Review noted some of these key challenges were realised and on a number of occasions information was either misinterpreted or reinterpreted incorrectly between AMSOC, HQJTF639 and RCC. While these issues were generally corrected and there was no material impact on the outcomes, the Review noted this as an area for further consideration by BPC.
138. The Review considered that there are three areas which would benefit from a more detailed examination by BPC to support enhanced information management and incident coordination across BPC and with other agencies such as RCC:
- In the lead up to the declaration of SAR 2013/3821, the Review noted a number of communications from both AMSOC and HQJTF639 to RCC in relation to the relocation of and growing concern for COI 0502. The Review considered in cases such as COI 0502, a lead point of contact across BPC into RCC would better optimise the communication between BPC and RCC in advance of any SAR declaration.

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- Given the exceptionally high operational tempo and with information managed across a diverse network of stakeholders, the ability to capture and share information and decisions quickly and accurately is essential. A modern automated case management system which can manage multiple cases simultaneously, recording and identifying key information and decisions, would provide a single point of truth accessible across BPC.

In the absence of such a system, BPC should review the current coordination and information management arrangements between AMSOC and HQJTF639 to ensure an integrated view of all relevant information and decisions is available to appropriate decision makers. This review should also include BPC's use of additional officers during high tempo operations to capture and record relevant information in support of watch floor officers.

- The Review also noted that a dedicated liaison officer/exchange program between BPC and RCC would support a greater level of understanding and knowledge of each agency's roles and responsibilities, further enhancing the engagement and flow of information.

Recommendation 3

It is recommended, subject to the outcomes of recommendation 1, that prior to any SAR declaration and where doubt or apprehension exists in relation to the safety of life at sea, BPC prescribe a lead point of contact for communication with RCC.

Recommendation 4

It is recommended that BPC consider the benefits of a modern automated case management system, which can manage multiple cases simultaneously, recording and identifying key information and decisions across BPC. If the benefits are proven, a business case should be developed and submitted for further consideration by the Customs and Border Protection Investment Review Committee. The Review notes that this could also form a package of work under Recommendation 7.

Recommendation 5

It is recommended that BPC's use of additional officers to capture and record relevant information in support of watch floor officers during significant events, is reviewed to ensure the arrangements are optimised.

Recommendation 6

It is recommended that BPC, subject to the outcomes of recommendation 1, consider the merits of permanent liaison officer or exchange program between BPC and RCC to support enhanced engagement and understanding of each agency's roles and responsibilities. If the benefits are proven, a business case should be developed for further consideration by the Customs and Border Protection and AMSA executive.

Recommendation 7

It is recommended that any future modernisation program consider rationalising the number of information and communication systems in use across BPC. The long term objective being the development of a common information and communication framework across BPC elements.

CHAPTER 9: Assessment against policies, processes and procedures

Findings

- The Review found that in general, BPC was compliant with the identified policies, processes and procedures.
- The Review found that there was some minor non-compliance, however this was not material to the management of the incident or the outcome.

Introduction

139. The Review's Terms of Reference paragraphs 9 c, d, e, and f require that the relevant policies, processes and procedures applicable to Customs and Border Protection, including BPC, be identified and an assessment made as to whether they were applied during the incident (Annex A). The Review was also tasked to ascertain whether the relevant policies, processes and procedures were effective and whether any changes should be made to improve the response to any future similar occurrences.
140. The Review requested that BPC provide all relevant policies, processes and procedures applicable to the initial actions, follow up activity and support to SAR operations. The Review also noted reference to RCC in the BPC documents, however it is beyond the scope of this Review to assess AMSA policies, processes and procedures. Those policies, processes and procedures considered relevant are listed in the companion document.
141. The Review considered each of the identified policies, processes and procedures and prioritised their relevance to the response to this incident according to applicability. There are a great number of policies, processes and procedures which have varying degrees of relevance to incidents such as this. In order to assess whether the application of a document or set of protocols would have made a material difference to the outcome of this incident they were rated as having a very high, high or medium to low relevance.
142. Given the time frames specified for completing the Review, measured against the volume of data to be reviewed, the Review applied differing levels of scrutiny according to the rating applied to the policy, process or procedure. Compliance with very high priority documents were assessed on a clause by clause basis with a reduced level of scrutiny for the remainder.
143. The Review also had the opportunity to discuss relevant policies, processes and procedures with only a limited number of officers from BPC and in doing so, were generally able to conclude that they had a sound understanding of the relevant policies, processes and procedures.
144. The Review noted that the guiding principles for agencies engaged in maritime SAR activities are found in the National Search and Rescue Manual (NATSARMAN). It is a key document for the RCC and many of the procedures and frameworks outlined in the NATSARMAN are referenced or reflected, sometimes verbatim in BPC documents policies, processes and procedures that were rated as very high in relevance.
145. Overall, these documents prescribe well proven, standardised and in some cases, revised procedures designed to provide the most effective and timely response practices, authority chains, compliant with international and Australian Law.



Very high importance policies, processes and procedures

146. The policies, processes and procedures assessed as having very high relevance had a direct bearing on the expected responses to the incident which has become known as SAR 2013/3821. The level of compliance with the key requirements from these documents directly influenced the responses and support in attempting to relocate COI 0502.
147. The Review found that there was a high degree of compliance with these very high importance policies, processes and procedures. While there was some minor non-compliance, this was not material to the management of the incident or the outcome. In general, the policies, processes and procedures gave clear guidance on the flow of information related to what are termed SOLAS situations or to situations in which a vessel had become subject of concern. They were also clear on the roles and responsibilities of BPC in regards to the information being passed through to the RCC.
148. The speed with which authorities respond to SOLAS situations and SAR operations is critical to the outcome. Equally, the ability to recognise, at an early stage, a developing situation and then take the appropriate action is crucial. The policy documents which address these issues were written with the aim of ensuring that potential SOLAS situations are identified quickly and information is passed on to RCC with appropriate priority.
149. From the time at which COI 0502 was first sighted, any information produced by BPC was recorded and dealt with appropriately. When the vessel could not be relocated, BPC's concern was also appropriately conveyed to RCC.
150. The *Protocols for SOLAS and SAR Operations* expand on the documents mentioned above and goes into some detail in respect of the roles and responsibilities of BPC regarding the pre-SAR flow of information and for those during an 'on going incident'. The document concludes by stating; "However, the processes described in this document are at the discretion of the decision makers and should a situation quickly change then the decision makers need to exercise their experience and knowledge to ensure the most appropriate outcome is achieved". This is particularly appropriate given the complex and ever changing operating environment.
151. The Protocols give no guidance as to the how information should be interpreted other than to state that information should not be 'filtered for relevance' before being passed to RCC. No guidance is given in respect of the sense of urgency with which the information should be conveyed, although in this case there was evidence of communication regarding concerns about the vessels between BPC and RCC as the situation unfolded.
152. The key policy documents related to SOLAS / SAR incidents all state clearly the importance of maintaining contemporaneously recorded accurate, complete and factual recording of events. The Review found that generally there was compliance by Customs and Border Protection, including BPC, with this principle.

High importance policies, processes and procedures

153. BPC have a large number of instructions and guidelines associated with maritime SAR operations. The Review examined these documents by reading through each one and assessing them against the activities that were taking place at key points of the incident. The key parts of the policies or procedures were checked, referenced and assessed for compliance against supporting documentation. The Review found that there was a high degree of compliance with these policy documents.





154. The Review noted the documented arrangement between Australia and Indonesia for *The Co-ordination of Search and Rescue Services* outlines the protocols in respect of SAR operations taking place in the respective SRR. In general terms, it is rated as being of high relevance in the normal operating environment, however in this incident due to the location and circumstances there was no direct Indonesian involvement other than notification to BASARNAS of the incident by RCC.
155. A number of the BPC documents, such as '*Suspected Irregular Entry Vessels (SIEV) / Contact of Interest (COI) Actions*' and '*BPC transfer of SAR Coordination to AMSA*', relate to the operational deployment of assets and communications and detail steps to be taken, resources to be used and the formatting of messages and signals. Other documents, such as '*Commercial Shipping Rescuing Persons at Sea*' and '*Identifying the Most Appropriate Resource*', are rated of high relevance to this incident but are documents more focussed on RCC functions and activities.

Medium and low importance policies, processes and procedures

156. A number of the policies, processes and procedures were rated as being low to medium in importance to this incident. They included documents of a general nature with only limited relevance to the Review.
157. The Review assessed that within some of these policies, processes and procedures there were specific parts that could have been relevant to this event. In examining these, the Review found they had been applied.

Additional policies, processes and procedures

158. The Review was tasked with assessing whether or not additional policies, processes and procedures should be developed to benefit the response to future incidents.
159. The Review found that the existing policies, processes and procedures already outline the areas of critical concern, particularly in relation to vessels in distress, in sufficient detail. The co-ordination of effort between agencies in the period leading up to the SAR being declared by RCC, while compliant with the relevant policies, processes and procedures in relation to information flow could benefit further review and is already captured in recommendation 2.
160. The Review also found that there may be a need for BPC to reaffirm the policies, processes and procedures regarding the maintenance of accurate and complete records applicable to potential or actual SOLAS events and SAR incidents, in particular meetings where decisions or actions are agreed.
161. The need to check the veracity of key pieces of information is also of critical importance. The Review found that there were instances where information had been dealt with appropriately but the information itself was ambiguous or inaccurate. However, there was no evidence that these instances materially changed the outcome, although the potential for confusion or misunderstanding existed.
162. The Review noted that BPC has recognised the importance of record keeping, and has utilised Customs and Border Protection internal audit processes to undertake a more broad assessment of records management within BPC.





Recommendation 8

It is recommended that BPC reaffirm the policies, processes and procedures regarding the maintenance of accurate and complete records applicable to potential or actual SOLAS events and SAR incidents, in particular meetings where decisions or actions are agreed.



Annex A: Minute of Direction



Australian Government
Australian Customs and
Border Protection Service

CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

MINUTE PAPER

To: National Manager (Investigations)

Copy: Deputy Chief Executive Officer (Border Enforcement)
Commander Border Protection Command

Internal Review relating to Customs and Border Protection (including Border Protection Command) Actions Relating to SAR 2013/3821

Pursuant to your appointment as an officer of the Australian Customs and Border Protection service, you are directed to conduct an internal review into the actions of the Customs and Border Protection Service, including Border Protection Command and its assigned Defence assets, relating to SAR 2013/3821.

This internal review is not intended to be a substitute for any detailed external investigation or coronial inquiry. Its purpose is to ensure that any immediate operational policy or procedure issues are highlighted and rectified promptly.

The primary purpose of the internal review is to produce a narrative of the events, verified by Senior Officials. The narrative is to cover the period 5 June 2013, (or earlier if there is evidence of when the vessel now known as SAR 2013/3821 was first identified), to when Customs and Border Protection, including BPC and its assigned Defence assets, ceased search and rescue and recovery operations. This internal review is to identify the effectiveness of internal policy, processes or procedures used to respond to the incident, with a view to recommending whether any immediate remedial changes are required.

The full Terms of Reference for your review are **attached**.

You are to provide an interim report on your review to me, via the Deputy Chief Executive Officer (Border Enforcement), on or before 14 July 2013. However, if in the course of the review you form the view that meeting this timeframe would compromise the integrity of your report, you are to seek advice from me about an appropriate amendment to the timeframe. The due date for the final report will be advised after receipt and assessment of the interim report.

To assist you in the conduct of the internal review, administrative and other support arrangements have been established and Defence will provide a second in charge at the rank of Colonel (E).

[REDACTED]

In conducting your review and preparing your report, you should be cognizant of the potential for parallel investigations (including Coronial or Parliamentary inquiries) to be conducted in relation to the incident and are to take all reasonable measures to ensure that there is no conflict between this, and those inquiries.

Appropriate measures should also be taken to ensure that any privileged or confidential material (including national security or intelligence material) is appropriately handled, including the preparation of confidential or classified annexures to the final report.



Michael Pezzullo
Chief Executive Officer

12 June 2013

MARITIME INCIDENT OF 5 – 9 JUNE 2013 OFF CHRISTMAS ISLAND

TERMS OF REFERENCE

Introduction

1. On 5 June 2013 a vessel was detected 28 nautical miles north-west of Christmas Island by an RAAF P3 Orion aircraft.
2. Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Customs and Border Protection) assigned Defence assets to relocate the vessel) over the period 5 to 7 June 2013 with assistance from the Australian Maritime Safety Authority (AMSA) from the evening of 6 June 2013.
3. The vessel was not relocated as part of these surveillance activities and on the morning of 7 June 2013 AMSA assumed coordination of the search and rescue (SAR) activities related to this vessel and assigned the number SAR 2013/3821.
4. AMSA coordinated the search and rescue (SAR) response using assets provided by Customs and Border Protection, Defence, AMSA, civil aircraft and merchant ships from 7 June to 9 June.
5. Over the period 7 – 9 June 2013 aircraft and ships sighted debris and deceased persons.
6. AMSA released all aircraft and ships from SAR activities related to this vessel at the end of the day's searching on 9 June 2013. No survivors were located during the SAR effort.
7. Under the Minute of Direction, you are directed to conduct an internal review into the actions of Customs and Border Protection including Border Protection Command (BPC) during the incident to identify lessons learned and any immediate remedial actions that need to be made to current policy, process or procedures.

Review Task

8. You are to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the response to the incident by Customs and Border Protection from the period 5 June 2013, (or earlier if there is evidence of when the vessel was first identified) to when operational activities associated with the vessel ceased ('the period').
9. In relation to operational matters, you are to:
 - a. establish a suitable team from within Customs and Border Protection and BPC, supported where necessary by suitable available external personnel;
 - b. having regard to appropriate security classifications, produce a narrative of events including a chronology of all significant events drawn from all available sources for the period, appropriately verified by relevant Senior Officials;

- [REDACTED]
- c. identify the relevant policies, processes and procedures applicable to Customs and Border Protection and BPC response to the incident;
 - d. ascertain whether the relevant Customs and Border Protection and BPC policies, processes and procedures were applied during the incident;
 - e. ascertain whether the relevant Customs and Border Protection and BPC policies, processes and procedures were effective in responding to the incident; and
 - f. identify whether any immediate remedial changes to policies, processes and procedures should be considered to improve the response to similar occurrences.
10. In relation to information and intelligence matters, you are to:
 - a. review and examine the chronology of events relating to Customs and Border Protection and Defence's awareness of the vessel during the incident; and
 - b. identify the handling of intelligence (if any) and other relevant information in the lead up to the incident.
 11. Having regard to the findings derived from the above information and subsequent analysis, you are to:
 - a. identify any issues that require further investigation or analysis; and
 - b. identify any lessons learned.
 12. The following agencies and departments may be involved as key stakeholders: Customs and Border Protection, Australian Federal Police, AMSA, Defence and Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet. However during your review you may determine that consultation with other agencies is required.
 13. AMSA has advised that it will conduct debriefs with agencies and SAR units that participated in the SAR incident in accordance with the National SAR Manual. AMSA will make the outcomes of debrief processes available to the review if requested, subject to considerations of information privacy principles.
 14. AMSA has agreed to provide a chronology of significant events in the SAR response to be attached to the review and referenced as appropriate.
 15. You are to engage with AMSA to identify any other material (other than the chronology and the outcomes of the debrief processes which have been agreed) that may be relevant to the review.
 16. In conducting your review and preparing your report, you should be cognisant of the potential for parallel investigations (including Coronial or Parliamentary inquiries) to be conducted in relation to the incident and are to take all reasonable measures to ensure that there is no conflict between this Internal Review, and those potential inquiries. In particular, no finding is to be made in relation to whether any person has or has not committed a criminal offence or into the manner and cause of death of any person. If at any stage during the course of your inquiry you or your investigating team form the view that a

[REDACTED]

person is likely to have committed a criminal or disciplinary offence or a breach of the APS Code of Conduct, further advice should be sought from me.

Interim report

17. You are to prepare and deliver an interim report on or before 14 July 2013 outlining, to the extent possible:
 - a. The agencies or other parties consulted;
 - b. A finding as to the relevant facts (as determined at that time);
 - c. Preliminary recommendations; and
 - d. Further inquiries to be undertaken by the review.

Final Report

18. The following documents are to accompany your final report:
 - a. my Minute of Direction;
 - b. a list of all relevant documents used to compile both the narrative and detailed chronology of events; and
 - c. a list of copies of relevant policies, processes and procedures applicable to the response to the incident.
19. Appropriate measures are to be taken to ensure that any privileged or confidential material (including national security or intelligence material) (if any) is appropriately handled, including the preparation of confidential or classified annexures to the final report.



Michael Pezzullo
Chief Executive Officer

14 June 2013

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Annex B: Capabilities and Limitations

ANZAC Class Frigate	
Vessel involved	HMAS <i>Warramunga</i>
Role in COI 0502 and SAR 2013/3821	Responded to intercept COI, assisted in relocation and SAR activities
Flag	Royal Australian Navy
Type	Frigate Helicopter (FFH)
Launched	1998
Length	118 metres
Beam	14.8 metres
Speed	27 knots
Maximum Range	6000 nautical miles
Displacement	3,600 tonnes
Crew	174
Surveillance Sensors	Search and Navigations radar, Electro Optical System, Radar Warning System, Radio Frequency Direction Finding





Armidale class patrol boat	
Vessel involved	HMAS <i>Gleneig</i>
Role in COI 0502 and SAR 2013/3821	Barrier Patrols of Christmas Island
Flag	Royal Australian Navy
Type	Patrol Boat
Launched	2008
Length	56.8 metres
Beam	9.5 metres
Speed	25 knots
Maximum Range	3000 nautical miles
Displacement	270 tonnes
Crew	21
Surveillance Sensors	Search and Navigations radar, Electro Optical System, Radar Warning System, Radio Frequency Direction Finding





MV Shanghai Spirit	
Vessel type	Bulk Carrier
IMO	9326328
MMSI	477007200
Callsign	VRD04
Flag	Hong Kong
Role	Vessel located in the vicinity of last known position of COI 0502
Year Built	2005
Length	140 metres
Beam	25 metres
Speed	18 knots
Gross Tonnage	11,751 tons
Capacity	18,828 DWT





MV Athinea	
Vessel type	Oil Tanker
IMO	9291248
MMSI	240420000
Callsign	SVQG
Flag	Greece
Role	Responded to SAR 2013/3821
Year Built	2006
Length	248 metres
Beam	43 metres
Speed	14 knots
Gross Tonnage	60,007 tonnes
Capacity	107,160 DWT





MV Safmarine Makutu	
Vessel type	Container ship
IMO	9318319
MMSI	566625000
Callsign	9V6784
Flag	Singapore
Role	Responded to SAR 2013/3821
Year Built	2007
Length	292 metres
Beam	32 metres
Speed	18 knots
Gross Tonnage	50686 tonnes
Capacity	61,407 DWT





Customs and Border Protection Dash-8 315	
Role	Assisted in SAR 2013/3821
Standard Crew	4
Passenger	4
Surveillance Altitude	1000-2500 ft.
Surveillance Speed	195 knots
Typical Fuel Burn	1400 lbs. per hour
Maximum Fuel Load	10 244 lbs. + 2500lbs (internal tanks)
Operational Reserve	1200 lbs.
Fuel Type	Jet A1 (AVTUR)
Typical Flight time	Approx. 7 hours
Systems	Surveillance Radar which can handle large numbers of contacts, stabilised electro-optical turret with Infrared and high definition TV camera, navigations and comprehensive communications equipment.





RAAF AP-3C Maritime Patrol Aircraft	
Role	Identified COI 0502, tasked in subsequent relocation search and assisted in SAR 2013/3821 aerial surveillance
Standard Crew	10-12
Transit Altitude	Up to 33,000 ft.
Transit Air speed	340 knots
Surveillance Altitude	500 – 5000 ft.
Surveillance Speed	220 – 340 knots
Surveillance Distance	4000 nautical miles
Endurance	12 + hours
Sensor Suite	Radar, Electro-optical system, acoustics, magnetic anomaly detector





AMSA Dornier 328-120 turboprop aircraft	
Role	Assisted in SAR 2013/3821
Speed	600 km/hour
Range	Approx. 2500 km
Ceiling	31,000ft
Capabilities	Day and night visual search Direction finding and homing to distress beacons Day and night deployment of emergency supplies such as radios, marker buoys, life rafts, pumps, survival kits and water
Sensors	Maritime search radar, forward looking infrared, night vision goggles, satellite phones, Automatic Identification System (AIS) to track vessels.



Annex C: Glossary of Terms

ACBPS	Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
ADF	Australian Defence Force
AFP	Australian Federal Police
AEST	Australian Eastern Standard Time
AMIFC	Australian Maritime Intelligence Fusion Cell
AMSA	Australian Maritime Safety Authority
AMSOC	Australian Maritime Security Operations Centre
BASARNAS	Indonesian Search and Rescue Agency
BPC	Border Protection Command
BPCIC	Border Protection Command Intelligence Centre
CI	Christmas Island
CNOC	Customs National Operations Centre
CO	Commanding Officer
COI	Contact of Interest
COMBPC	Commander Border Protection Command
CZ	Contiguous Zone
DCOMBPC	Deputy Commander Border Protection Command
DM	District Manager
E&I	Enforcement and Investigations Division
EEZ	Exclusive Economic Zone
EOP	Enforcement Operations Officer
ETA	Estimated Time of Arrival
FFC	Flying Fish Cove
GMDSS	Global Maritime Distress and Safety System
HMAS	Her Majesty's Australian Ship
HQJOC	Headquarters Joint Operations Command
HQJTF	Headquarters Joint Task Force
I&G	Instructions and Guidelines
ICC	Incident Coordination Centre
IFF	Illegal Foreign Fishing
IMA	Irregular Maritime Arrival
LKP	Last known position
MPA	Maritime Patrol Aircraft
MOSD	Maritime Operations Support Division
MV	Merchant Vessel
NATSARMAN	National Search and Rescue Manual
NM	Nautical miles
OGA	Other government agencies
OH&S	Occupational Health and Safety
ORV	Operational Response Vessel
OSC	On Scene Coordinator
PII	Potential Irregular Immigrants
POB	Persons on Board
PSIAT	People Smuggling Intelligence Analysis Team
RAAF	Royal Australian Air Force
RCC	Rescue Coordination Centre
SAR	Search and Rescue
SIEV	Suspected Irregular Entry Vessel
SITREP	Situation Report
SOLAS	Safety of Life at Sea
SRR	Search and Rescue Region
TFFS	Time Frame for Survival
UHF	Ultra High Frequency
VHF	Very High Frequency