Communications Alliance submission

In response to the

Exposure Draft of the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2020 (and associated material)

26 November 2020
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1. Introduction

Communications Alliance welcomes the opportunity to provide a submission in response to the Exposure Draft of the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2020 (draft legislation) and associated material.

As with previous reforms in relation to Australia’s national security, the communications and data/cloud sectors are keen to assist Government to ensure that Australia’s critical infrastructure is secure and resilient in the face of natural disasters and other hazards, and appropriate processes are in place to cope with actual threats to and attacks on our sector’s critical infrastructure.

Our sector already has extensive experience in collaborating effectively with Government, security agencies and regulators across a number of regulatory and legislative instruments and frameworks, e.g. assistance provided to law enforcement agencies under the Telecommunications Act 1997, the protection of critical infrastructure, including supply chains, in accordance with the Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms, the Data Retention Regime and the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018, just to mention a few. Our sector also extensively engages with emergency services organisations and Federal Government and State/Territory departments in relation to natural disasters and the COVID-19 pandemic.

We are conscious that the protection of critical infrastructure is a national priority and, as such, must also be tackled through a collaborative and principles-based approach across all sectors and stakeholders. Overall, Australia’s cyber security policies ought to be guided by a number of principles. These policies should:

- Be risk-based, flexible, robust, embrace collaboration and promote innovation-friendly and technology-neutral solutions;
- Foster voluntary public private partnerships, as collaboration is and will continue to be essential to build effective cyber resilience;
- Draw on existing, interoperable and global best practices and voluntary industry standards and certifications that improve security while enabling growth in international commerce through digital means;
- Be based on principles rather than prescriptive measures; and
- Raise awareness to citizens, public and private sectors on how to lower their cyber security risk through proper online practices.

2. Process

As indicated by the Department of Home Affairs, the exposure draft legislation takes a deliberately broad approach to additional or enhanced national security obligations for eleven critical infrastructure sectors. As we understand it, the rationale for this approach is to allow for a more detailed analysis of existing legislative and regulatory requirements as they pertain to the respective sectors in a sub-ordinate process, and to, subsequently, only ‘switch on’ the obligations contained in the draft legislation on a sector or even asset-specific basis where gaps in already existing sector-specific requirements have been identified.

Where this is the case, the obligations contained in the draft legislation would be underpinned through more detailed rules which, so we have been assured, would be developed through highly cooperative and sector-specific processes.
While this approach may be appealing in theory, it makes it very difficult for our sector (and most other sectors, so we imagine) to provide detailed feedback at this stage in the process, because members are unable to develop an understanding of the actual obligation as they apply to their individual organisations and assets.

We also note that this approach stands or falls on the basis that there will be a genuinely cooperative process for any gap analysis and further rule development. Such a process must be allocated sufficient time and cannot be governed by unrealistically tight timeframes. Given the importance of the sector-specific rules for the success of the entire framework, we believe that the details of the foreshadowed consultative process for the co-design of those rules ought to be clearly spelled out and established. This should include objective criteria set out in the legislation for the making and amendment of sector-specific rules and an ability for affected entities to seek review of the way in which the rules apply to them and the critical infrastructure assets for which they are responsible.

However, irrespective of the difficulties highlighted above, we are concerned that the final framework could include overlapping and duplicative obligations for the communications sector in different pieces of legislation, such as the TSSR, Telecommunications Act 1997 and the Security of Critical Infrastructure Act 2018 (SOCI Act). At best, the result would be a framework with distinct obligations contained in various pieces of legislation and regulation – a situation which appears likely to create operational inefficiencies for all stakeholders involved.

Against this background, we offer the following high-level observations.

3. Breadth of obligations

Noting, the various ‘on-switches’ that may trigger different obligations, it would appear that all telecommunications Carriers/Carriage Service Providers (C/CSPs) and cloud/data providers are likely to be captured by the draft legislation. This, in combination with the very broad definitions of ‘data storage and processing provider/service’, creates extensive reach, consequent industry-wide compliance costs and potential for duplication of efforts across the sector.

The legislation should consider whether certain types of providers or services can be excluded from the obligation at the outset, rather than accepting default inclusion of all C/CSPs (and subsequent ‘on-switches’ via asset categories or systems of national significance (SoNS)). This could be done through nominating specific C/CSPs (as occurs in regard to the notification obligations of Telecommunications Sector Security Reforms (TSSR) regime) or by exempting certain types of C/CSPs (e.g. as a function of size/subscriber/type of customer/numbers). Similar treatment could be considered for cloud/data sector providers.

The definition of ‘asset’ is very broad – in fact the ‘definition’ is a non-exhaustive list of items that may be considered an asset instead of a clear definition of the term. Importantly, the term ‘critical telecommunications asset’ is almost as broad in that the only criteria of such a classification are ownership or operation by a C/CSP, or ‘use [of the asset] in connection with the supply of a carriage service’. While we agree that it is indeed the use that is likely to determine the criticality of an asset (among other things), the requirement of a mere ‘use in connection with the supply of a carriage service’ casts the net so wide that almost every asset in our sector is, by definition, a critical telecommunications asset.

This ought to be addressed by determining an appropriate threshold for criticality similar to the threshold set in section 9(3) of the current SOCI Act which lists a number of criteria that
the Minister must satisfy him/herself of prior to declaring an asset as critical that is not yet part of the listed critical infrastructure assets.

Without further limitation on the types of assets that can be subject to (yet to be developed) rules, it will be difficult for our sector to be confident that duplication will or even can be avoided during the rule-making process.

4. Duplication/costs and operation of parallel regimes

Industry notes the August consultation paper had flagged an intention for a positive security obligation (PSO) to be implemented through “sector-specific standards proportionate to risk”. The draft legislation imposes three types of (separate) PSO for critical infrastructure assets of responsible entities, where the asset is subject to rules made under section 61 of the SOCI Act or the asset has been subject to a declaration as per section 51 of that Act. Where such rules (or a declaration) have been made, it appears that a C/CSP is required to maintain and annually report against risk management program(s) which encompass all infrastructure assets of a C/CSP. This, in and by itself, is a substantial compliance burden with attendant costs.

In addition, nominated C/CSPs have the option (under TSSR) to develop and submit an annual security capability plans or to incrementally notify any planned changes to infrastructure that could compromise their capacity to comply with the security obligation of section 313 of the Telecommunications Act 1997. That is, the regime envisages either an annual plan or incremental notifications, but not both. Given that the characteristics of a security capability plan appear analogous to the description of critical infrastructure risk management plan as set out in the draft legislation, a consistent approach which would avoid substantial duplication of effort for both providers and the Critical Infrastructure Centre would be to remove the TSSR notification obligation for critical infrastructure providers which are subject to the PSO and the requirement to develop, maintain, keep up to date and report annually against a critical infrastructure risk management plan. The potential co-existence of the new PSO, especially the proposed risk management programs, and the TSSR obligation in relation to capability plans and notification would likely create an unnecessarily heavy compliance burden, overlap and duplication which Government sought to avoid:

Aspects of the PSO are already captured by the section 313 requirements of the Telecommunications Act 1997 to do one’s best to prevent unauthorised access to and interference with networks and facilities owned or operated by a C/CSP. It appears that this higher order requirement now has been overlaid with additional (as we believe unnecessary) prescription through the draft CI SoNS legislation requirement (where ‘switched on’) for a risk management plan and associated reporting.

C/CSPs have undertaken substantial (and costly) work to comply with the TSSR obligations, i.e. obligations which are the Critical Infrastructure Centre describes as follows:

“Security obligation: All carriers, carriage service providers and carriage service intermediaries are required to do their best to protect networks and facilities from unauthorised access and interference – this includes maintaining ‘competent supervision’ and ‘effective control’ over telecommunications networks and facilities owned or operated by them.

1 Department of Home Affairs, Protecting Critical Infrastructure and Systems of National Significance Consultation Paper, August 2020, p10
Notification obligation: Carriers and nominated carriage service providers are required to notify government of planned changes to their networks and services that could compromise their ability to comply with the security obligation.”

Given that C/CSPs have an obligation to keep networks secure, maintain ‘competent supervision’ and ‘effective control’ and to notify Government (and receive approval) of any potential changes that may compromise this ability, it appears that another obligation to maintain risk management programs is duplicative of the efforts that C/CSPs already must have in place in order to be able to comply with the TSSR/section 313 requirements. In other words, if critical infrastructure assets are already secured to a C/CSP’s best ability, why is another – or indeed similar/identical – layer of risk management required?

Assuming that the critical infrastructure asset subject to the rules of the SOCI Act that trigger the obligations to develop and maintain a risk management plan apply to a type of asset that forms part of all C/CSPs’ infrastructures, the requirement for any C/CSP to effectively audit and report against all of a C/CSP’s infrastructure, instead of developing capability plans or incrementally providing notification of changes to infrastructure where this may compromise the capacity to comply with the security obligations of section 313 by nominated CSPs, appears to create further duplication.

If a PSO, including an obligation to maintain and report against critical infrastructure risk management plans, was indeed to be applied to all C/CSPs (as appears likely due to the breadth of the definitions of asset and critical telecommunications asset), then it appears that the TSSR capability plan/notification requirements would be duplicative and, therefore, should be rescinded. That is, section 314A of the Telecommunications Act 1997 and the associated provisions which support its operation ought to be removed from that Act.

Alternatively, the SOCI Act could include a requirement that the Communications Access Co-ordinator (CAC) provide an exemption to a responsible entity from the TSSR notification requirements of section 314A(1) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 where the Minister has determined (under the SOCI Act) that the entity’s asset will be subject to the PSO (risk management program). Section 314A(5A) of the Telecommunications Act 1997 already contains powers for the CAC to grant such exemptions.

We also caution against the sheer volume of information that Government would be required to process if it actually wanted to assess the material that C/CSPs have already produced – which would be further augmented where a PSO has been notified – as part of their standard risk management processes.

Lastly, we note that the Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy 2020 indicated that enhanced threat sharing between security agencies and industry, i.e. threat sharing in both directions, forms a key component of the Strategy. We believe that it is timely to add a threat sharing obligation for security agencies analogous to the requirements placed on critical infrastructure owners.

5. Cost of compliance

We encourage Government to set out a legislative basis for limiting and/or apportioning the costs of compliance with notices and directions in a manner that is scalable to the size of the entity. Cost recovery should also be available for entities in certain circumstances where costs are incurred (e.g. as a result of damage to property or systems) due to Government intervention. We consider it important that the critical infrastructure reforms preserve the

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2 As accessed on 26 November 2020: https://cicentre.gov.au/tss/about

CA Submission to the Exposure Draft of the Security Legislation Amendment (Critical Infrastructure) Bill 2020
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principle of cost recovery, which is well established under the Telecommunications Act 1997, for example where C/CSPs provide assistance under section 313 of that Act.

6. Systems of National Significance – definition and secrecy requirements

Industry struggles to understand which parts of their infrastructure (if any) would be considered a SoNS. Given that all C/CSPs and cloud/data providers appear to be covered by the legislation, it does not appear possible to exclude certain infrastructure or systems from the ‘catalogue of potential options’. In the case of the telecommunications industry, there is an extensive range of both communications and supporting IT systems at a variety of layers across both mobile and fixed line networks and content layers, all of which may be directly or indirectly involved in the provision of ‘business critical data’ which could trigger a notification.

The criteria of ‘interconnectedness’ and that a SoNS must be a ‘system’ do not offer much guidance, as neither term is defined in the draft legislation and their common sense or dictionary definitions are very broad and/or variable depending on the perspective of the person considering the matter. The terms do not take into consideration the complexities of the telecommunications industry.

The proposed 28-day notice and consultation period for a declaration of an asset as a SoNS is rather short and, consequently, we recommend that the Minister and Department engage with the respective asset owner as early as possible (and well before the formal notice period) in order to allow all stakeholders to gain a detailed understanding of the highly technical and specialised nature of the infrastructure system under consideration.

Moreover, we are still unsure whether the arrangements for authorisation and disclosure of the existing section 41 of the SOCI Act are sufficient for our sector:

The definition of ‘protected information’ includes “a document or information that records or is the fact that an asset is declared under section 51 to be a critical infrastructure asset”. Section 41 of the SOCI Act allows disclosure of protected information “if the entity makes the record, or uses or discloses the information, for the purposes of: (a) exercising the entity’s powers, or performing the entity’s functions or duties, under this Act; or (b) otherwise ensuring compliance with a provision of this Act.” The note accompanying this section indicates that “This section is an authorisation for the purposes of other laws, including the Australian Privacy Principles.”

We seek clarification that the non-disclosure provisions for protected information, including information of the fact that an asset has been declared a critical infrastructure asset and/or a SoNS, do not impede operational effectiveness and efficiency of the respective responsible entities. Entities will need to be able to (subject to relevant confidentiality agreements etc.) disclose the existence of a SoNS declaration to a limited number of parties, e.g. third parties that provide services in relation to the SoNS, vendors, etc. in order to be able to appropriately protect the SoNS and to prioritise assets and activities accordingly.

While the need to disclose such information may arise as a direct result of compliance with the SOCI Act (in which case section 41 appears to permit disclosure), this need may also arise during the course of ordinary business operations and ought to be permitted subject to appropriate confidentiality requirements.

Similarly, it would appear inefficient (or even ineffective) for suppliers of services to SoNS to be ‘kept in the dark’ of the importance of the services that they render in a national security context.
This approach also seems to conflict with the recently proposed transparency principles set out in Government’s Critical Technology Supply Chain Principles, and in particular the advice to entities that “understanding your suppliers and networks ensures your organisation is aware of these [security] risks, can identify bottlenecks, and then determine alternative sources of critical inputs when needed.” Industry would appreciate further guidance on how these two aspects are envisioned to operate alongside each other.

7. System information software notice

Section 30DJ allows the Secretary to require the owner of a SoNS to “install a specified computer program on the computer”, to maintain that program and keep it continuously connected to the internet.

As SoNS may not necessarily clearly segregate network and system data from other data, including data that relates to customer activities, customers’ use of products and services, network data relating to end-users etc., such security monitoring software may unintentionally also scan data that ought not be subject to such activity.

The operation of such software on a SoNS may also be inconsistent with the requirements and prohibitions of overseas legislation, including the EU and US, and the laws of other jurisdictions may apply to the specific global provider of a service. This is particularly true for providers of cloud solutions.

Furthermore, the adoption of third-party software in a cloud environment without appropriate security reviews and procedures may be increasing security risk rather than mitigating the risk.

Importantly, it ought to be understood that the roll-out of such software and its continued operation may be very costly. These costs ought to be borne by Government and must not be considered as a ‘cost of doing business’ for SoNS.

At a minimum, the scope of the system information software notice requirement should be narrowed to exclude providers of cloud services and operators of cloud data centres.

8. Rule-making/amendment powers

Section 61 of the SOCI Act allows the Minister for Home Affairs to make, by legislative instrument, rules required or permitted by the Act or rules “necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to [the] Act”. The proposed new Section 30AL of the SOCI Act stipulates a 14 day consultation period (which commences with publication of the draft rules on the Department’s website) which does not apply if the Minister is “satisfied that there is an imminent threat that a hazard will have a significant relevant impact on a critical infrastructure asset” or where such a hazard had or is having such an effect.

These consultation requirements are not appropriate for the following reasons:

The retrospective consideration of hazards in combination with the ability to forgo consultation on the grounds that a hazard had a significant relevant impact in the past effectively means that the Minister could make a rule without consultation so long as the rule covers a type of hazard that previously had the required impact. The provision ought to be amended to ensure, at the very least, that a retrospective consideration of a hazard cannot

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3 Australian Government, Critical Technology Supply Chain Principles: A call for views, p10, September 2020
constitute grounds for dispensing with the consultation requirement. It is hard to see how a past event would create an urgency that would justify this measure.

The consultation period of 14 days is manifestly too short to allow for a cooperative and meaningful consultation on what are likely to be detailed rules which may require a high degree of technical expertise for a considerate analysis. We note that under Part 6, s117(3) of the Telecommunications Act, industry bodies developing registered codes are required to publicly consult for no fewer than 30 days. In the case of technical standards (which are more likely to be similar in nature and consultation needs to the rules contemplated under the SOCI Act), section 378(5) of the Telecommunications Act stipulates that only a period of at least 60 days constitutes “an adequate opportunity to make representations”. Consequently, we request that the consultation period of section 30AB of the draft legislation be extended to 60 days.

Independent of the above, we note that section 125AA of the Telecommunications Act already provides for an opportunity for the Minister of Communications, Cyber Safety and the Arts to direct the regulator, the Australian Communications and Media Authority (ACMA), to make standards. Where so directed, the ACMA must determine a standard in compliance with the details of the direction given by the Minister.

We believe that the existing standards, making powers by the portfolio Minister ought to be the primary means by which ‘rules’ pertaining to the sector ought to be made as it is likely that the industry regulator’s expertise in relation to the operation of the industry is well suited – in cooperation with the Department of Home Affairs – to translate the desired outcomes into practical, efficient and effective industry regulations.

9. Definition of National Security

Section 5 of the SOCI Act defines national security as “Australia’s defence, security or international relations”. This definition is broad and does not limit national security to any specific activities. However, the definition of national security is key to the operation of the draft legislation, including the rule-making powers, the Ministerial declaration powers and the far-reaching directions powers. Importantly, the Explanatory Document cites national security concerns as the primary reason for exempting the Ministerial authorisations under Part 3A of the draft legislation from judicial review under the Administrative Decisions Judicial Review Act 1977.\(^4\)

Given the wide scope of the current national security definition and the intrusive nature of the powers (and attendant penalties for non-compliance), we urge Government to adopt a more narrow definition which ties national security to specific activities, conducts and interests. The current definition of national security under section 90.4 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 might provide a useful approach. Alternative, it is also worth noting that section 5 of the SOCI Act already includes a definition of security which references the definition of the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (ASIO Act). The latter, in turn, includes more specificity on the activities that could be considered a threat to Australia’s security. Therefore, the ASIO Act definition of security would also be preferable to the definition of national security of section 5 of the SOCI Act. In fact, it is hard to see why a separate definition of national security is required given the existing (and referenced) definition of security in the ASIO Act.

If the definition of national security was to be retained, at the very least the individual terms that make up the definition of national security, i.e. ‘defence’, ‘security’ and ‘international relations’, should be defined within the legislation rather than be left to their ordinary meaning. In this context, section 10 of the National Security Information (Criminal and Civil Proceedings) Act 2004 may offer a useful reference point which would also provide consistency with Australia’s commitments to the United Nations Norms of Responsible State Behaviour in Cyberspace.⁵

10. Ministerial authorisations and directions powers

The draft legislation allows the Minister to authorise agencies to direct responsible entities, under certain conditions, to provide information, perform a certain action and for agencies to intervene in the operations of a critical infrastructure asset.

Given the far-reaching nature of these directions powers, the criteria that the Minister must consider prior to making authorisations ought to set a high threshold and ought to be comprehensive.

We raise the following concerns with the current draft legislation in this regard:

Similar to the considerations contained in the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 and/or section 315B of the Telecommunications Act 1997, these considerations ought to include, in addition to the considerations already included in the draft legislation:

- the legitimate expectations of the Australian community relating to privacy and cyber security;
- whether the action proposed for a direction constitutes the least intrusive means of dealing with the cyber incident;
- the relative impact to other entities that may be adversely affected by the direction to the responsible entity; and
- the legitimate interests of the responsible entity to whom the direction relates, including the costs, in complying with any direction, that would be likely to be incurred by the responsible entity.

Importantly, the Minister ought only to be permitted to consider authorising a direction unless he/she has received an adverse security assessment in relation to the incident and the asset under consideration. The adverse security assessment in turn ought to be a key item for the Minister to have regard to when contemplating the making of an authorisation.

It also appears that the authorisation/directions powers, as currently drafted, do not expressly consider a process of exchange on the technical feasibility – and potential unintended consequences – of requests between the Minister/agency and the respective entities, especially with respect to intervention directions.

We note that technical feasibility and other matters form part of the criteria that the Minister has to consider prior to giving his direction. However, we believe the process could be improved by including an express requirement to give the entity an opportunity to either comply with a direction and/or to respond with potential objections. Only once this process

has taken its course, should the Minister be allowed to authorise a direction (subject to other requirements being fulfilled).

Importantly, it is not clear from the draft legislation to what extent the Minister has received specific details about the type of actions or interventions that are believed to be required prior to making the Ministerial Authorisation. Without sufficient detail, including technical specifics, as to what is being contemplated, the effectiveness of consultation with the respective entity (as required prior to the making of a Ministerial Authorisation) will be very limited. It is concerning that the draft legislation appears to allow for a ‘blank cheque’ (within the constraints of the matters that the Minister needs to consider prior to making an authorisation) for agencies to request far reaching actions or intervene with the operations of an asset. The draft legislation ought to be amended to expressly require security agencies to provide the Minister with a detailed technical ‘plan’ as to how they propose to address a specific incident and why this ‘plan’ is suggested above other available options, that this ‘plan’ be shared during the mandatory consultation and that the direction be very specific and limited to the means included in the ‘plan’ that has been put to the Minister.

We are also conscious of potential diverging views between the Minister/agencies and responsible entity subject to a direction as to whether a responsible entity was “unwilling or unable take all reasonable steps to resolve the incident!": a responsible entity may well be willing and able, in its view, to resolve the incident but would do so through means that agencies may find inappropriate, or resolve the incident to an extent that agencies may consider ‘incomplete’ or not satisfactory. While this inherent tension will be difficult to resolve without independent review of proposed authorisations/directions (refer to our comments further below), we believe that more detailed and express consultation requirements with respect to technical feasibility and increased requirements on the specificity of authorisations would assist with ameliorating some of these concerns.

We also raise concern that the consultation requirement contained in section 30AD is significantly weakened by the limitation that such consultation is not required if the delay introduced through consultation would frustrate the effectiveness of the Ministerial authorisation. It is easy to see that almost any consultation would introduce delay and that delay may reduce the effectiveness of an action given the time critical nature of many incidents. As drafted, even a short delay and marginal reduction in effectiveness would allow the Minister to proceed without consultation. Therefore, we recommend that the threshold for this limitation be raised by requiring that a ‘substantial delay’ would ‘substantially frustrate the effectiveness’ or words to a similar effect.

11. Independent assessment/judicial review

The draft legislation exempts decision under Part 3A of the SOCI Act from potential judicial review under the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977. While intervention directions – but not the information gathering directions and action directions – require approval of the Prime Minister and the Defence Minister, we are concerned that the framework as proposed does not include appropriate safeguards for independency and review.

In our view, it would be beneficial for the authorisations to be subject to ex-ante (and speedy) review by an independent body. This could be achieved through the implementation of the recommendation made by the Independent National Security Legislation Monitor (INSLM) in its Report TRUST BUT VERIFY, A report concerning the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 and related matters to establish an Investigative Powers Commission – it appears that the
underlying issues and powers contemplated in the draft legislation and already granted by the Telecommunications and Other Legislation Amendment (Assistance and Access) Act 2018 are very similar in nature and would warrant a similar approach.

Including an adverse security assessment as a prerequisite for all Ministerial authorisations of directions would also allow the responsible entity to apply for review through the Security Appeals Division of the Australian Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and would align the SOCI Act with the existing requirements of Part 14 of the Telecommunications Act 1997.

12. Sign-off of risk management programs

Section 30AG provides that where a risk management program is in place, the responsible entity of the critical infrastructure asset to which the program pertains must provide a report to the Secretary of Home Affairs, or relevant Commonwealth regulator, within 30 days of the end of the financial year.

Section 30AG(2)(f) further requires each member of the board, council or other governing body to sign the annual report.

Recognising that Australia’s Cyber Security Strategy 2020 seeks to raise awareness of cyber security related matters at an executive and board level, it is not clear why the respective requirement to sign off on risk management programs ought to go beyond the common requirement of board approval – which does not have to be unanimous – and subsequent signature through the chair of the board, if this is deemed necessary.

It appears that such a process would be more practical and in line with standard processes while still achieving the desired aim of raising awareness.
13. Conclusion

Communications Alliance looks forward to continued engagement with the Department of Home Affairs and other relevant stakeholders on this important topic.

We share Government’s desire to create a robust, effective and efficient framework that appropriately protects Australia’s critical infrastructure and systems of national significance.

To the largest extent possible and only to the extent required, this framework ought to build on and enhance existing legislative frameworks and industry efforts. A thorough and evidence-based gap analysis is required to ensure the reforms are not duplicative or, worse, contradicting existing frameworks.

Our members stand ready to work with Government and all other relevant stakeholders to create a practical, effective and proportionate framework in a realistic timeframe.

For any questions relating to this submission please contact Christiane Gillespie-Jones on [redacted] or at [redacted].