



Australian Government

Australian Government response to the
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security
report:

*Review of the listing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
as a state sponsor of terrorism under the Criminal Code*

June 2026

Recommendation 1

The Committee recommends that the Government consider whether sufficient resources have been allocated to law enforcement and security agencies to enable them to appropriately respond to information about Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) activities in Australia, including in relation to financial flows, the display of prohibited symbols and intimidation and harassment by the IRGC of Australian residents who are critical of the Islamic Republic regime.

The Australian Government **notes** this recommendation and will continue to consider appropriate resource allocation for law enforcement and security agencies to respond to Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps activity in Australia.

The Australian Federal Police remains agile and flexible in the use and reprioritisation of resources. Australian Federal Police resources are focused on protecting the community and disrupting threats and crimes that undermine Australia's sovereignty, social cohesion, democracy, financial systems and future prosperity. The Australian Federal Police prioritises high value, high impact targets with a national security connection. Investigations into terrorism financing, prohibited symbols and intimidation and harassment of Australian residents by state sponsors of terrorism are taken very seriously by the Australian Federal Police. These investigations are complex and are underpinned by specialist capability such as intelligence, forensics and financial analysis.

The Government also maintains a list of prohibited state sponsor of terrorism symbols, including those of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which are publicly available on the Australian National Security website (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/).

Recommendation 2

To promote continued reporting by community of information about Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) activities in Australia, the Committee recommends that the Government consider how communication can be improved, including in relevant languages other than English, to provide assurance to the community that reports to the National Security Hotline are acted upon by relevant authorities.

The Australian Government **agrees** to this recommendation and will continue to consider any communication enhancements to promote community reporting of potential Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps activity in Australia through relevant channels.

Australia's National Security Hotline is the central point of contact to report concerns about possible signs of terrorism and foreign interference in our community. The Hotline operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, and a Translating and Interpreting Service is available to callers. Callers can remain anonymous, and every piece of information is treated seriously. Operators know what to do with information provided. Where necessary and permitted by law, they pass information on to law enforcement and security agencies for further analysis. The Hotline provides a reporting function and cannot provide advice or information on specific operational or intelligence matters, including the status or outcome of a caller's report.

The National Security Hotline Online Report is also available for individuals to complete an online form to report possible threats to national security, including possible terrorist and foreign interference activities. Individuals can choose to remain anonymous, and while it is currently only

available in English, the Department of Home Affairs (the Department) is working on offering this service in more languages. The webform can be found on the Australian National Security website (<https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-can-i-do/report-suspicious-behaviour/national-security-hotline-online-report>).

More information on the National Security Hotline is available on the Department of Home Affairs website (www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/national-security/security-coordination/national-security-hotline) or the Australian National Security website (www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/what-can-i-do/report-suspicious-behaviour).

The Department manages a network of Regional Directors, Counter Foreign Interference Partnerships officers and Community Liaison Officers who engage with a wide range of multicultural community stakeholders in all states and territories in Australia, providing a mechanism for information exchange.

The Department has also established an online Counter Foreign Interference Community Support Hub (Support Hub) available at www.cfi.gov.au. The Support Hub includes resources to assist communities to identify what activities constitute foreign interference and how to report foreign interference.

The Support Hub is a key Government initiative to combat foreign interference in Australia, including by encouraging communities to report suspected foreign interference.

The Support Hub includes a page on how to report foreign interference to the National Security Hotline and what happens after you make a report, including explaining National Security Hotline processes (www.cfi.gov.au/report). This page details that reports made to the National Security Hotline can be made anonymously and are passed to law enforcement and security agencies for consideration. The page also details that while individuals will not receive feedback or updates after making a report to protect the security of investigations, all information provided, no matter how small, may assist investigations.

The Department has worked with the community to codesign the Support Hub, tailoring it to the needs of everyday Australians seeking support when foreign interference presents a threat to their lives.

The Support Hub will expand in 2026 to include content tailored to various diaspora communities, including 23 language translations.

The Support Hub complements the Government's publication *Countering Foreign Interference in Australia: Working together towards a more secure Australia*, published in January 2025. The publication spells out the threat to Australia from foreign interference, how individuals and organisations can protect themselves, and how to report. This document has been published at homeaffairs.gov.au in 23 different languages.

The Department's work complements broader, ongoing community engagement across government, including through the Australian Federal Police.

The Australian Federal Police is focused on early identification of harm, working with community and partners to empower and inform crime prevention, social cohesion and resilience efforts. The Australian Federal Police is committed to continuously learning from and building on community

partnerships to ensure communities are safe, resilient and empowered, being aware and protected from threats before they occur.

Through its Community Liaison Teams, the Australian Federal Police continues to maintain a strong engagement with the community to help Australians by:

- tackling social problems such as crime, unemployment and antisocial or extremist behaviour
- addressing misunderstandings
- helping people have conversations about issues of concern
- Coordinating with the Department's CFI Engagement partnerships officers to provide advice and education to help communities respond to issues (e.g., www.afp.gov.au/crimes/espionage-and-foreign-interference has a fact sheet available in 41 languages)
- helping vulnerable and at-risk groups
- discussing situations as they emerge
- acting as a link between the community and law enforcement.

The Community Liaison Teams deliver information sessions and crime prevention education on serious issues that affect our culturally and linguistically diverse communities and diaspora. These engagements also focus on early identification of emerging global and national threats that may impact our social cohesion and prosperity.

Recommendation 3

The Committee recommends that, in enforcing criminal offences and implementing any migration decisions related to the listing of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a state sponsor of terrorism, Australian Government agencies distinguish between genuine members and supporters of the IRGC and persons who were involuntarily conscripted into the IRGC as part of compulsory service in Iran.

The Australian Government **agrees** to this recommendation and will continue to support agencies in distinguishing between genuine members and supporters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, and persons who were involuntarily conscripted into the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps for compulsory service in Iran.

Protections currently exist in the Criminal Code and, in enforcing any criminal offence, the Australian Federal Police (in consultation with Commonwealth and State partners) considers each case on its merits with regard to procedural and general fairness when deciding on appropriate treatments and investigative strategies, including whether to initiate a prosecution.

In enforcing criminal offences, the application of the offence will depend on the particular factual circumstances, and defences may also be available under the relevant legislation. For example, a person is not criminally responsible for an offence if they carry out the conduct under duress. In some instances, this may be applicable to conscription to an entity.

In relation to migration decisions, all non-citizens who wish to enter or remain in Australia must satisfy the character requirements of section 501 of the *Migration Act 1958*. A person can fail the character test for a number of reasons, including but not limited to:

- where a non-citizen has a substantial criminal record, or

- is suspected of associating with, or being a member of, a group involved in criminal conduct, or
- where the individual may have been assessed as a risk to Australia's national security.

Prior compulsory service in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps does not automatically result in visa refusal. All visa decisions are case by case, based on conduct, associations and security risk. Any visa refusal consideration on this basis would be subject to natural justice provisions.