



Vietnamese Overseas Initiative for Conscience Empowerment  
**AUSTRALIA**

---

P.O. BOX 8 DALLAS VIC 3047

AUSTRALIA

ABN 15 625 886 946

Email: [contact@voiceaustralia.org](mailto:contact@voiceaustralia.org)

## Submission by VOICE Australia to the 2023-2030 Australian Cyber Security Strategy Discussion Paper

14 April 2023

We thank you for the opportunity of making this Submission. We applaud this sentiment in the Discussion Paper, "*Realising this vision will require that all Australians – regardless of when they were born, where they live, and what language they speak at home – know what practical actions they need to take..*" (our emphasis).

**VOICE Australia summarises our 3 points below, then will expand on them:**

1. People who do not speak English well, can be easy but also valuable cyber-attack targets
2. Each strategy which Australia settles on, should be examined from various angles, including language or integration
3. CALD community groups can be useful to the strategy

### 1. People who do not speak English well, can be easy but also valuable cyber-attack targets

**Case scenario 1: Consider the secretary of a small association of new migrants.** If he doesn't read much English, he might miss out on English-language guidance on cyber security, therefore he can be an easy target. If a foreign operation breaks into his computer and finds embarrassing information, it can blackmail him into serving its goals, eg. by spying or sabotage. Once in his computer, it can spearfish group members, similarly hacking them. If anyone of them lives under an Australian military flight path, during wartime they can be made to report when they see a plane, to forewarn the adversary's air defence. Thus, easy targets can also be valuable targets.

**Case scenario 2 (specific to Vietnam): When an overseas Vietnamese visits Vietnam,** perhaps because a family member is sick, if the authorities know that they are community activists then they almost always submit them to repeated police interrogations, usually polite but always threatening. There have been reports of them being pressured to act as spies for the Vietnamese authorities. The interrogating police also usually take their phones or laptops away before returning them. So, this is similar to above, except that here the crooks have physical access to devices to install hard-to-remove malware.

## 2. Each strategy which Australia settles on, should be examined from various angles, including language or integration

**Do you even know that it exists? Can you understand it?** Assume, for example, that part of the strategy is to improve ordinary people's understanding of attack surfaces, and some specific actions are to have printed materials, online advertisements, or online training. People who do not read English well might not know about these, and neither do people who due to illness or advanced age do not venture outside their small circles. By looking from this angle, the strategy will hopefully incorporate elements cognisant of their needs.

**Sometimes messages should be customised, not translated.** Take any 2 languages, and one is likely to find some concepts which are expressed by a word in one language but a phrase in the other, or find meanings usually expressed using one sentence structure in one language but another structure in the other. However, translations tend to keep the original sentence structure and force words to fit. For reasons such as these, many consumers of Vietnamese media in Australia have seen but not quite understood a few government messages. So, when officials commission for a message to go to various language communities, it's best to not think of the task as translating but as "How best to convey the points".

## 3. CALD community groups can be useful to the strategy

**Like all community groups, CALD ones are close to the people, but additionally** their members share a background and sometimes a language. Therefore, all community groups, including CALD ones, should be included in any strategy.

**Strategies involving mobilising the grassroots should consider CALD groups.** For example, if cybersecurity education sessions are created for grassroots groups, then include CALD ones. If a strategy targets business associations then target CALD business associations, too.

VOICE Australia thanks you for considering this Submission.

-End-