Australian Security Summit – Canberra
21 July 2015
Michael Pezzullo
Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection
Networked Societies/ Networked Security
E&OE
The global order and the states which constitute it are today more connected, networked and inter–dependent than ever before. This is a transformative state of affairs in human history, and one that has delivered the prospect of universal prosperity for humankind – and indeed the ‘end of history’ as Francis Fukuyama postulated in 1989. The only problem with this thesis is that security risks have also been transformed and are now also more distributed and networked across a global scale than ever before. In this address, I will seek to explain what I mean.
Historians will date the rise of the modern concept of ‘national security’ to the early 1990s, to the early years which followed the end of the Cold War. During the Cold War, ‘national security’ essentially concerned the security of the state against threats from other states, which meant the strategic, and indeed existential, struggle between the United States and its allies, against the Soviet Union and its allies. Terrorism, such as existed during this period, took place within the framework of the Cold War, often as a proxy struggle between forces aligned to either of the superpowers, or was localised to specific territorial and political grievances that occasioned little, if any, strategic consequences.
We have seen since the early 1990s:
- the geo–political revolution brought about by the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and its extended bloc of influence
- the geo–economic revolution brought about over the same period by the near vertical lift in GDP growth in China, which had its roots in China’s economic reforms of the late 1970s, but which kicked into gear in the early 1990s
- the wiring of the world, which again commenced on a global scale in the early 1990s with the rollout of personal computers, mobile phones and of course the Internet; and
- the expansion of global trade and investment over the same period, which saw the rapid proliferation of global supply chains, manufacturing networks and capital flows.
As a result of these changes, both in their own right and in combination, nation–states started to become ever more inter–connected and networked, such that webs of connections – be they connections of trade, investment, communications, transportation, financial services, labour and migration, travel and tourism, and more besides – emerged to constitute what we refer to as the phenomenon of ‘globalisation’, whereby the world has become networked in a way that has never been before seen in human history.
As a result, today national security is not concerned solely with states, and their relationships. For one thing, global networks, which are neutral phenomena, available to the good, bad and the indifferent, are able to be exploited on a global scale by non–state actors such as terrorist groups and transnational crime networks. Indeed, we have seen over the past several decades the growing influence of non–state actors which are able to access and employ capabilities which were once usually the preserve of states. They are contesting the authority of states by acquiring advanced technology and weapons, forming networks and communicating with one another across the globe, and arranging financial transactions in the shadows of the global financial system.
In the face of this radically transformed environment, where networks have replaced blocs, our thinking about policy responses to the new strategic landscape has had to change and evolve. The scope of national security has been broadened, and more tools of national power have been brought to bear on the new array of threats and risks. One of the main consequences has been that the dividing wall between ‘external security’ and ‘domestic security’ has broken down in many ways. State failure in one place can affect states on the other side of the globe, through people smuggling and illegal migration, the activities of transnational criminal networks which operate from ungoverned places, or by way of terrorist attacks which are planned and mounted from such places. Supply chains and airline routes traverse many states, crossing many borders, creating multiple points of vulnerability for criminals and terrorists to exploit.
National security practice itself is becoming increasingly networked and trans–governmental. We see this in the increased level of trans–governmental collaboration in areas such as customs and border protection, law enforcement and policing, immigration control, aviation, transport and maritime security, cyber security and financial transactions monitoring. Trans–governmental networks of agencies are increasingly exchanging information and collaborating, because networked threats require such networked responses.
We can see the inter–connected and cross–border character of national security at work in the areas of global trade, and border and transport security. We rely on the daily operation of sea cargo, air cargo and international postal systems for our economic, commercial and private prosperity. These have also become attack vectors for terrorist groups which seek to penetrate the global supply chain, for the purposes of striking our populations and infrastructure. Any approaches which limit themselves to reactive operations against these groups, and which do not also seek to secure the global supply chain through the creation of collaborative, trans–governmental defensive layers of transport and border security are likely to fail.
In this environment, there is a greater range of national security stakeholders – not all of whom are government agencies. The state remains the vital centre, but it does not possess a monopoly – either on the use of force or the mitigation of the risk of violence, or other adverse security outcomes. The private sector has an enormously important role to play in the networking of security measures.
Lest I be misunderstood, a more networked world is a positive good for humankind, by a significant margin, and well worth the attendant risk of networked threats. I prefer to call this state of human evolution ‘modernity’. The more networked world which modernity is bringing into being will maximize opportunities for citizens in global civil society, as networks require and create transparent, rules–based orders within, and between, societies. Modernity entails open societies and markets, freedom of speech in public discourse, transparency and accountability in public and corporate institutions, the promotion of democratic practices, the integrity of legal and regulatory frameworks (including independent judiciaries and regulatory authorities) and adherence to the rule of law, to uphold liberties and rights. Modernity also creates, and relies upon, global interdependence, and adherence to rules–based behaviour at the international level, amongst states – from the resolution of trade disputes and territorial boundaries, to the aversion of war and the making of peace. Australia has long subscribed to the view that a functioning, rules–based global order is a vital prerequisite for creating a secure and stable environment in which states, companies and citizens can interact, to mutual advantage.
An example of the workings and benefits of modernity is the creation of well–ordered global commons which enable the movement and transfer of people, information, goods and money. These global commons are critically dependent on the operation of agreed rule sets and international norms. The principal global commons are the maritime, air, space and cyber domains. These form the ‘connective tissue’ of the global order which enables the operation of global supply chains, trade and energy flows, travel, telecommunications, and financial transfers.
Such global order does not spring into existence as a natural phenomena, and nor is its continued existence pre–ordained and immutable. Such an order has to be formed and sustained through human agency and practice. It requires the establishment of a set of rules and norms for managing human affairs across borders, and widespread adherence to those rules and norms. It also requires mechanisms for managing those rules and norms, and a means for ensuring compliance and, where necessary, enforcement. Without the means of compliance and enforcement, the foundations of the global order would crumble because when rules are not enforced they are no longer relevant, and the order they prescribe becomes problematic. The infrastructure of the commons of the global order, that I have just described, has to be secured and defended, and states party to the global order, who enjoy the benefits of trade, commerce and so, must be willing to engage in trans–governmental networks of security to achieve this objective.
Thus far, I have largely spoken of states or nation–states as if they were singular actors and entities. Of course, they are also societies, which are constituted by their populaces. If the boundary between ‘external security’ and ‘domestic security’ has broken down in recent decades, and states have become more networked, then how might the internal structure and composition of nation–states affect national security? Self–evidently, if modernity is characterised by the global inter–dependence of trade, commerce and other networks, then it follows that our societies are inter–dependent and in varying and differing ways ‘trans–national’.
It used to be the case that national security was assumed to be founded on the internal social and cultural cohesion of the states which formed the international system of power which prevailed at any one time. In today’s world of trans–national networks of trade, commerce, travel and labour mobility, this assumption is of necessity breaking down. Indeed,
multicultural societies such as Australia challenge the very idea that citizens of a nation–state have to share a singular identity which is grounded in tribe or ethnicity; faith or creed; or even historical culture. Often in the past, ‘the state’ has been tied in a nexus with ‘the nation’, where the latter has been sometimes been defined along ‘blood’ or ‘race’ lines. The Australia of earlier times was defined in these terms (when we practised the ‘White Australia’ policy) and this conditioned public policy and programmes, until the 1970s.
In humanity’s evolution towards modernity, societies will increasingly separate race or cultural identifiers from the political order of the nation–state, and especially from how the nation–state organises the standing of its citizens before the law, and the rule of law; how public policy decisions are made, enacted, implemented and overseen; and generally how power is distributed and balanced.
In a state of modernity, as citizens we live our lives in
civil society, where we are recognised, respected, protected and empowered to live as we please, within the law. This is the sphere of our private lives, our beliefs, our customs, traditions and practices, our family lives, our network of friendships and social connections, and the domain of commerce and work. Civil society is the ultimate expression of our relational character as human beings.
It is the State (in Georg Hegel’s usage, which means more than ‘the government’) which produces and enforces the framing rules of these civic associations, and acts as their guardian and underwriter. The State is the realm of public institutions, and collective decision–making through the rule of deliberation, debate and reason. A properly formed and functional State creates the space for civil society, and the freedoms that come with civil society, without dictating how it is that we should live (subject only to law).
It follows that one of the functions of the State, at least in a world of sovereign nation–states, is to mark out the territory of the State, protect that territory and manage its borders.
Absent this right of control and capacity for control, there is no State, and hence no civil society within the State.
It also follows that within the sphere of the State, we should avoid a confederation of separate communities, however defined, whether by religion, ethnicity or other orientation. Diversity and modes of cultural expression, which belong to the sphere of civil society, should always be subjected to the rules of civic association, which find their expression in the structure and framework of the State. As such, diversity cannot and should not be a policy end in itself, but rather should be seen as a legitimate expression of the human reality that our identity as individuals, and as social beings, is not bequeathed or dictated by the State, but is grounded in our personal experience, outlook and ancestry, which are located in civil society.
Today, we have come to accept after nearly 40 years of Australian practice in the multicultural space that in the sphere of the State we nurture and engender social participation, shared national values and community solidarity, while being mutually respectful and tolerant of our diverse identities, as they are expressed in civil society. Our policy emphasis in terms of diversity and social cohesion should be on continuing to ensure that Australians respect one another regardless of our cultural, racial or religious differences, and that all can participate equitably in Australian society, with a full appreciation of the rights and responsibilities that come with membership of that society.
Taking these ideas of ‘civil society’ and ‘the State’ together, we can conclude that the nation–state cannot be an arbitrary construct which is a geographical zone which happens to be inhabited at any one time by randomly selected individuals who lack any prior connections and social relationships. It is not a blank slate that can be completely re–made every generation. The very idea of the nation–state implies continuities in terms of our common public identity, and the durability and strength of our institutions, as well as expectations of mutual regard, trust and recognition, and allegiance.
And yet, in our networked world, we are perfectly entitled to inhabit and live relationally in sub–national networks of identities which are located in civil society – at any one time, we are members of a family and a clan, a locality and a region, an ethnic group, most likely a religious group or a faith (of some description), a profession or a trade and so on.
In our networked world, we increasingly also inhabit and live relationally in supra–national networks of identities, especially in the world of globalised production, labour mobility, study and travel. Think for instance of research scientists from many countries collaborating on a common scientific problem, assisted by modern means of communication, travel and data exchange, of which their predecessors could only have dreamt. As global engagement, mobility and communications increase, so will the reach and diversity of our sub–national and supra–national identities.
But for so long as nation–states represent the fundamental building block of the global order, we need to acknowledge that for all of the legitimate sub–national and supra–national identities that Australians can and do express as members of a networked society, we still owe allegiance to a common political order which, in Australia’s case, has been built over more than two centuries of national development.
Australia has a positive story to tell the world in relation to strong social cohesion, well–supported multiculturalism and a long tradition of orderly migration which has typically had strong levels of public confidence and support. Of course, we have to be mindful of on–going issues in some quarters, regarding racism and discrimination; signs of negative attitudes towards Australians of Muslim faith; the rise of radical right–wing extremist groups; lower levels of social cohesion in areas of higher migrant concentration; and, of course, disengagement, marginalisation and potential radicalisation of some young Australians.
We have to be especially alert to the long–term trends which are the consequence of globalisation, and transnational mobility and communications: for instance, with high levels of mobility amongst skilled migrants, and increasing levels of temporary migration, our traditional ‘settlement–based’ model to migrant integration will have to adapt. Earlier periods of isolation from family, friends, culture and language compelled migrants to integrate. The ‘global engagement’ social model which has been brought about by globalisation could, if we are not careful, perversely see the accelerated emergence of virtual transnational communities which are actually built around ancient bonds of race, ethnicity, religion, language and so on, and a parallel disengagement from civil society. At the extreme, such virtual communities could see a fraying of allegiance to the nation–state.
We have to be watchful of these trends, without in any way being alarmed. In Australia, we have a cohesive civil society, which is built upon a foundational social and political order which is durable and resilient, and which protects and enables that cohesive civil society.
My Department plays an important role in how Australia will manage these issues in the future. The mission of mass migration that was set for the department in 1945 has been long accomplished. More than the settlement of migrants, our departmental mission now in a networked world is:
to protect Australia’s border and manage the movement of people and goods across it. This new mission came into effect on 1 July 2015, when the new integrated Department of Immigration and Border Protection came into being, which includes as an integral element the Australian Border Force. The department is now responsible for immigration and citizenship (but not settlement services or multicultural policy and programmes), customs and border protection, and Australia’s maritime security.
Our vision is to be Australia’s
trusted global gateway. On occasions, at times of heightened threat such as caused by terrorism or pandemics, we will need to act as the gatekeepers and as necessary protect our borders by all lawful means. But the daily default operating mode of the Department will be to act as the conduit of Australia’s open engagement with the networked world around us, whether for the purposes of trade, travel, or migration – for time limited purposes, or for tomorrow’s settlers.
In today’s world, where societies are more networked than at any previous time in history, and where the practice of national security is much more concerned with securing networks which criss–cross national borders, than it is with the security of walled blocs called ‘states’, such a department would have to have been created from scratch had it not been able to be formed by way of the amalgamation of the nation’s former immigration and customs functions. For our part, we reported for duty at midnight on 30 June 2015 and commenced our ceaseless vigil over an open and connected Australia. Our priority mission is clear:
to protect Australia, always.
But we also know that Australia would not be true to itself if it ever again sought to wall itself in, against a strange and alien world. That is why, from day one, we have been thinking and acting in terms of securing networks rather than walls, keeping Australian open rather than closed. When you protect something, you always have to be true to that which you protect. It is imperative that national security professionals engrave that over the doors of their offices.
