Speech to the National Security College, ANU
14 November 2013
Michael Pezzullo
Chief Executive Officer, Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
Australia’s Border Security: The Evolving Response
E&OE
Today, I would like to explore Australia's border security challenges and how the Australian Customs and Border Protection service is rapidly adapting to this new world environment.
My aim is to encourage us all to think more deeply about what our borders mean to Australia and gain an insight into the various challenges our nation faces in protecting them.
Managing the border
Managing the integrity of the border is essential to the protection and prosperity of the community and the economy.
The border is a strategic national asset, and a very valuable one which should be actively managed and developed as such.
How borders are managed can foster or impede lawful trade and travel.
Border control points, systems and processes sit astride supply chains and travel pathways.
The very design of these points, systems and processes can add to economic competitiveness and productivity, by fostering rapid movement and border entry or exit.
Or they can detract from competitiveness and productivity by impeding movement, entry and exit, and diminishing the efficiency of our national infrastructure.
Fostering legitimate trade and travel, while remaining vigilant for national security, law enforcement and community protection purposes, while also using border controls as an extension of economic revenue and industry policy, are not contradictory policy objectives.
They are intrinsically integrated and connected functions of state.
Defining borders
It is my belief that in order to properly think about borders, we need to take a step back and reflect about how we think about national security.
Today, national security is not solely concerned with states, and their relationships.
Non-traditional security challenges
We have seen over the past several decades the rise of what some term 'non-traditional' national security challenges, many of which are inter-related and cross-cutting.
These are not solely the province of relations between states. Rather they involve varying combinations of state and non-state actors.
We have already seen the growing influence of non-state actors which are able to access capabilities (including weapons) which were once usually the preserve of states.
Globalisation and the information revolution are affording these non-state groups the tools to form powerful cross-border networks.
These are contesting the authority of states by acquiring advanced technology and weapons (including through global black markets), forming networks and communicating with one another across the globe, and arranging financial transactions in the shadows of the global financial system.
In the face of this radically transformed environment, which essentially emerged after the Cold War, thinking about policy responses to the new strategic landscape has had to change and evolve.
The scope of national security strategy has been broadened, and more tools of national power have been brought to bear on the new array of threats and risks.
Response to challenges
Our responses to these challenges have had to become more wide-ranging and integrated because their causes, modalities and consequences are multi-dimensional and inter-connected.
One of the main consequences that we are dealing with has been that the dividing wall between 'external security' and 'domestic security' has broken down in many ways.
State failure in one place can affect states on the other side of the globe, through irregular or illegal migration, the activities of large transnational criminal networks which operate from these ungoverned places, or by way of terrorist attacks which are planned and mounted from such places.
Similarly supply chains and airline routes traverse many states, creating multiple points of vulnerability and access for criminals and terrorists.
“Borderless" national security practice
National security practice itself is becoming increasingly borderless, or rather transgovernmental, at least amongst like-minded states.
We see this in the increased level of cross-border collaboration in areas such as customs and border protection, law enforcement and policing, immigration controls, aviation, transport and maritime security, cyber security and financial transactions monitoring.
Transgovernmental collaboration is becoming the norm across a range of strategic pathologies – such as terrorism, proliferation, cyber intrusions, people smuggling and drug trafficking, to name five major areas.
Transgovernmental networks of government agencies are increasingly exchanging information and collaborating, either in joint mission-specific task forces, or by way of more enduring arrangements.
Networked threats require such networked responses.
Through these approaches, the reach of the state is actually being extended to deal with diffused threats and risks.
We can see the inter-connected and cross-border character of national security at work in the area of global trade, and border and transport security.
We rely on the daily operation of sea cargo, air cargo and international postal systems for our economic, commercial and indeed private prosperity.
These have also become attack vectors for terrorist groups which seek to penetrate the global supply chain, for the purposes of striking our cities, population and infrastructure.
Any approach to counter-terrorism which limits itself to reactive criminal investigations against these groups, and which does not also seek to secure the global supply chain through the creation of collaborative, transgovernmental defensive layers of transport and border security is likely to fail.
There is a greater range of national security stakeholders today - not all of whom are government agencies.
The state remains the vital centre, but it does not possess a monopoly - either on the use of force or the mitigation of the risk of violence, or other adverse security outcomes.
A greater range of actors than ever before are affecting and, in some cases, undermining the state's ability to protect the rights, property, liberty and welfare of its citizens.
National security professionals especially need to be very clear in their thinking about these deep strategic currents, and in particular the nature of the global order.
Without a coherent way of organising our view of the global order, our responses to national security issues are likely to be fragmented and merely tactical.
If a coherent view of the global order is crucial to our understanding of national security, is there a construct which might make sense?
In my view a normative and empirical construct which helps us to think about the global order is the idea of modernity.
Modernity is characterised by the maximization of opportunities for citizens and civil society.
It has to be protected from its enemies by like-minded societies which are willing to pay the price of doing so.
This is because modernity is the antithesis of authoritarian models of social and political organisation, and indeed threatens them with the promise of civil society and the expansion of freedom for citizens.
Modernity creates a transparent, rules-based order within and across societies.
It entails open societies and markets, freedom of speech in public discourse, transparency and accountability in public and corporate institutions, the protection of universal human rights, the promotion of democratic practices, the integrity of legal and regulatory frameworks (including independent judiciaries and regulatory authorities) and adherence to the rule of law, to uphold liberties and rights.
Modernity also creates, and relies upon, global interdependence, and adherence to rules-based behaviour at the international level – from the resolution of trade disputes and territorial boundaries disputes, to the aversion of war and the making of peace.
Australia has long subscribed to the view that a functioning, rules-based global order is a vital prerequisite for creating a secure, stable and predictable environment in which states, companies and citizens can interact, to mutual advantage.
Well-ordered global commons enable the movement and transfer of people, information, goods and money.
These global commons are critically dependent on the operation of agreed rule sets and international norms.
The principal global commons of interest to us today are the maritime, air, space and cyber domains.
These form the 'connective tissue' of the global order which enables the operation of global supply chains, trade and energy flows, travel, telecommunications, and financial transfers
The enormity of our borders
As I reflected earlier in this speech, Australia's border is a strategic national asset, and while national security is itself becoming borderless in the context of like-minded states, we must acknowledge the enormity of our task at hand.
Two challenges: Trade and size
We are faced with two dual and evolving challenges – The rapidly increasingly volumes of trade exchanged at our borders, and the enormous size of the borders we must protect.
It is with this thought in mind I would like you to consider the increasing volumes of trade that we collectively face.
By 2017, we are facing an 85 per cent increase in air cargo, a 20 per cent increase in containerised sea cargo and a 25 per cent increase in international traveller numbers.
While we face increasingly large volumes, trade patterns will also continue to become less predictable as goods are sourced and delivered through more complex supply chains.
Less predictable patterns mean we need new capabilities to assess and mitigate the risks to the border.
In addition supply chains are becoming more dynamic. New and emerging complexities can obscure the true point of origin of goods, and make determining the intent behind cross-border movements a much more challenging task.
The true value of goods can also be more difficult to determine, posing both a risk to the competitiveness of Australian industry and government revenues.
The way Australians are doing business is also changing, with the internet continuing to drive growth and complexity in trade and travel.
As a result, our client base will continue to expand—not only with more companies importing more goods but also with consumers buying online from foreign suppliers.
The growth in this trade, led by a few clicks of the mouse, is therefore a major security issue for the future.
Beyond the ports
And beyond our seaports and airports is a massive border, largely unpopulated, spanning three oceans and taking in extreme natural environments.
We do not simply protect one land and sea border, rather our obligations extend to millions of square kilometres whether it be protecting our assets or saving the lives of those stranded at sea.
The threats
Border Protection Command is empowered to help defend Australia against eight distinct marine security threats recognised by the Australian Government.
These are the illegal exploitation of natural resources; illegal maritime arrivals; illegal activity in protected areas; prohibited imports and exports; maritime terrorism; piracy, robbery or violence at sea; compromise to bio-security; and marine pollution.
Of these distinct threats, four key global issues are expected to influence future policy and resources of the Border Protection Command.
These are the increasing interest in oil and gas reserves - of which many are found in deeper waters, further offshore and more difficult to protect; The growth in maritime transport of goods and services; The increase in displaced persons and more illegal maritime arrivals in Australia; and the increasing pressure on world food supplies – with potential impacts such as those demonstrated with illegal foreign fishing within Australia's EEZ.
Regional and international maritime security partnerships
BPC actively engages with neighbouring countries in our region with a strong focus on long term relationships and delivering co-operation and information sharing arrangements.
Indonesia continues to play a valued role in our efforts to secure our maritime borders, separate to any political tensions that may be reported in the media.
Our relationship with Indonesia is deep and enduring and is one that is based on mutual respect and shared aspirations.
BPC continues to strengthen civil maritime security ties with Indonesia through co-ordinated patrol activities, forums and defence exercises.
These include:
- Joint enforcement activities and patrols between BPC and the Indonesian maritime security coordinating agency BAKORKAMLA to intercept suspected illegal maritime arrivals;
- Co-ordinated fishing patrols leading to strong deterrent effects on Indonesian vessel operators illegally fishing in Australian waters;
- Participation in the Australia-Indonesia Fisheries Surveillance Forums (AIFSF) – the most recent held in 2012 in Lombok, Indonesia with both parties agreeing to test enhanced information sharing arrangements to improve mutual maritime domain awareness;
- High level ADF and Indonesian navy (IDN) joint exercises to address illegal activity adjacent to the Australia EEZ and understanding between the two forces.
BPC also participates in a range of regional and international intra-governmental activities, including the Australia-Indonesia Fishing Surveillance Forum, Maritime Security Desktop Exercises and ReCAAP – the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia.
Operation Sovereign Borders
Border control is one of the most sensitive and complex areas of policymaking, in particular when it involves human life.
The current political context is characterised by the need to demonstrate resolve at a high level.
It also serves the expectations of the electorate that a policy setting will be tougher and strengthened, to overcome any concerns about the capacity for successful border control.
With the commencement of Operation Sovereign Borders and the high political priority placed on people smuggling by the new Government, we have entered a new policy era.
The start of OSB
Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB) formally commenced on 18 September 2013 following the swearing-in of the Abbott Government.
The objective of the policy is to assert Australia's sovereignty over our borders by defeating maritime people smuggling through preventing and deterring potential illegal immigrants from attempting to enter Australia by sea.
This will strengthen Australia's immigration system by restoring public confidence in the migration programme and enabling the priorities for humanitarian resettlement to be set by the elected government and not by foreign criminal syndicates.
The objective is most simply expressed as “stopping the boats", however achieving this is a complex task.
The effort to defeat maritime people smuggling must be sustained.
The syndicates targeting Australia are as complex, fluid and opportunistic as any other transnational organised criminal entities and so sustained pressure at multiple points of their operations is necessary to dismantle them.
We cannot afford to relax our vigilance or give them space to recover, nor can they be effectively defeated by targeting only the easiest targets that present themselves.
There are five broad streams of activity under OSB:
Firstly,
international engagement, centring on our key relationship with Indonesia, but also PNG, Nauru, Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Thailand. OSB engagement must be complementary to Australia's other foreign policy objectives and will be coordinated by the Joint Agency Task Force HQ.
Offshore activities centre on the ability to deter, disrupt, detect and intercept people smuggling ventures.
This covers a range of areas including law enforcement and intelligence cooperation with regional partners, the aerial and on-water operations delivered through Border Protection Command and the management of a capable and resilient offshore detention network.
Onshore activities centre on combating the Australia-based promotion or support for people smuggling.
This will involve the disruption of onshore people smugglers, the collection of intelligence about their operations and public messaging to deter people from becoming involved in or giving support to smuggling.
Legislative arrangements are necessary to ensure that OSB can meet its obligations under Australian and international law.
Revised policy settings, underpinned by appropriate legislation, need to be of an enduring nature and able to continue to support counter-people smuggling activity even after the envisaged normalisation of activity.
Lastly,
good governance measures are needed to permit the Joint Agency Task Force to perform its role to direct and coordinate activity under the OSB umbrella, with a view to eventually handing over these responsibilities to normalised arrangements within the relevant departments.
Maritime people smuggling
Maritime people smuggling to Australia exists only because of the belief a product is there to be bought – namely, passage to Australia.
Every element of the Operation Sovereign Borders policy suite is designed to take this product away, either by ensuring that suspected illegal entry vessels do not reach Australia at all, or by leaving those that have made it to Australia with no guarantee of being able to stay here.
In this sense, the reintroduction of Temporary Protection Visas, and the Regional Resettlement Arrangements with Nauru and Papua New Guinea are relevant.Coordination across Government is also vitally important.
Combating people smuggling is a whole-of-government effort involving the work of the military and law enforcement agencies, regulatory departments and our intelligence services.
Joint Agency Task Force
Bringing all this effort together in a coordinated fashion is a key reason for the establishment of the Joint Agency Task Force (JATF).
The OSB JATF has been established to efficiently coordinate whole-of-government resources in response to people smuggling and protecting Australia's borders.
There is also an international dimension here, as it is important to coordinate with our regional partners to combat what is a regional problem and a threat to the sovereignty of transit countries.
Consistency of messaging is essential to emphasise the determination of the Australian Government to control its own borders and to defeat the people smugglers.
Smugglers are skilled marketers, engaging in counter-messaging and distortion of facts in order to deceive their clients.
Any apparent inconsistency in Australian policy is a gift to their misinformation activities so the agencies involved in Operation Sovereign Borders must speak with one voice.
International relations
Whether it be with our close neighbours in the Pacific, or our significant economic partner China where I am travelling next week, concrete international collaboration in Customs and Border Protection is central to our role protecting the borders.
Just this week, I've finalised the arrangement for two ACBPS officers to be posted to US Customs and Border Protection, strengthening intelligence capabilities and arrangements between our countries.
I also met with our partners at the Canada Border Service Agency where it was agreed to develop a programme of joint activity.
Australia is engaged with what is known as the Border Five, created some years ago by the Customs administrations of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States to discuss and partner on customs issues of interest and priority.
Through the Border Five we are working to strengthen border controls, share best practice through joint initiatives and information sharing, and leverage partnerships to increase efficiency.
Current activities include the development of a strategic roadmap to guide the group's future activities in five key areas: intelligence, integrity, risk management and performance measures, technology, and trade facilitation.
As the current Chair of the Border Five, the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service will play a key role in driving the work of the group over the next 12 months.
Furthermore, last year Australia and the United States signed a Joint Statement Regarding the Development of a Framework for Cooperative International Targeting and Assessment.
I must also mention Australia's closest and most comprehensive bilateral relationship with New Zealand.
The Service has a long-standing, mutual strategic partnership with our key counterpart agency, the New Zealand Customs Service.
Our bilateral work program delivers on the customs related elements of our respective Governments commitments under the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement.
Our long-term goal under that agreement is the creation of a trans-Tasman Single Economic Market – in effect which would involve a seamless border. Such a concept requires mutual understanding of, and an integrated approach to, border risk.
We are working with our New Zealand counterparts to exchange and protect sensitive information and intelligence relative to this mutual goal.
We already share a deep level of understanding, maturity and trust and a high level of compatibility in the way we approach and mange border risk.
These ties with New Zealand will only get closer in the coming years.
Customs Reform: The future
Our close partners share the challenges of increased volume of trade and traveller movements, the complexity of supply chains and travel routes and the threat of sophisticated criminal activities.
All contribute to the clear need for a comprehensive programme of reform.
Incremental changes and tinkering at the edges will not cut it – we need to undertake a complete transformation; an all-consuming reform of the way we operate and the way we do business.
Earlier this year, I launched the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service Blueprint for Reform 2013-2018, which is a five year blueprint that provides the roadmap for our root-and-branch reform.
It is my contention that the Service does a good job today, but I believe that we can do better.
Indeed, we must do better given the challenges ahead and the world I just described.
The realities that we are already facing at the border mean that we must continue to take the initiative in developing innovative systems and tools, as well as the skills and professional competencies of our officers.
We cannot hope to meet the challenges of the future by simply scaling operations to meet demand; that is not a financially viable solution.
We need to develop innovative ways of meeting future challenges.As we seek to improve and tighten our border controls and capabilities, we face the reality that criminal enterprises will continue to seek new ways to move people and goods across the Australian border.
Globalisation has converged with the power of the internet for instance.
Reform: Trade
From a trading perspective, this means there will be more illicit transactions that knock out the middle man, and bypass traditional organised crime structures.
Today, consumers are already able to purchase illicit goods from anywhere in the world, and have them delivered to their door in the mail - and organised crime activities are not just limited to illicit drug markets.
Criminals are involved in a range of activities across the border environment, which include revenue evasion, tobacco smuggling, money laundering, people smuggling, firearms trafficking, and trade in performance and image-enhancing drugs.
The tactics of our adversaries are as much a part of the border environment as the increasing volumes of cargo and travellers; and we cannot be blind to this reality.
So against this backdrop, allow me to sketch out some of the key features of our Blueprint as they relate to the model of the border which I outlined in the first half of this presentation.
The Blueprint itself is predicated on new thinking about borders. It takes the view, as I said earlier, that the border is a space, rather than a barrier, and is made up of multiple supply chains.
There are also multiple actors in that space, the vast majority of which evidence, experience and intelligence tell us are willingly compliant traders and travellers who just want to go about their business in the fastest, most efficient way.
So the Blueprint sets out a vision where traders will increasingly experience a more navigable border clearance process, whereby the impediment effect of border checks is increasingly reduced for the vast majority of traders based on their willingness to comply and on enhanced border intelligence processes.
Transforming intelligence
How we collect, analyse and use intelligence will transform our organisation in the near future and central to that is the recognition of the border as a live, dynamic operating system – not one that can be regulated by a public agency standing afar.
Live operating environments, whether we are talking about the battlefield, urban crime zones, or physical ports of entry, need first class command and control systems.
Strategic Border Command
The Strategic Border Command will have access to advanced real-time intelligence, communications and surveillance systems to monitor and manage the border on an integrated, real-time 24/7 basis.
For that reason, under Reform, we will create a Strategic Border Command.
The Command will have the national authority and tools to coordinate the flexible deployment of Customs and Border Protection resources against risks to the border.
The Command will direct the work of Customs and Border Protection regional border commands, which will be formed on state and territory lines.
An exception to this is the offshore maritime domain, where maritime border protection will continue to be delivered by the joint command arrangements we have put in place over several decades with Defence department and the ADF.
Our people are the key Enhancing the skills and capabilities of our uniformed workforce is just as critical as introducing relevant command and control structures.We will strengthen capability and leadership skills through enhanced recruitment processes, active career management, and structured professional development, such as you would expect to find in a disciplined, uniformed service.
Staff engagement and consultation with other stakeholders will be crucial to this endeavour, and we are heavily engaged in this process at the moment.Sophisticated intelligence systems and capabilities will also be crucial to this future state.
We are building a new National Border Targeting Centre to better identify high-risk international travellers and cargo through increased data integration and improved analysis capability.
The Centre's initial focus will be on improving the Service's internal targeting processes and capabilities, and designing a multi-agency operating model for coordinating border intelligence.
The Centre will deliver a significant capability boost and will build the foundation that we need to create a leading edge intelligence-led targeting system.
A second phase of this activity will establish a dedicated facility to hold multiple agencies under the one roof.
This will enable joint planning of border operations, supported by improved cross-agency data integration and data sharing.
Through the National Border Targeting Centre we will work closely with border management, intelligence, law enforcement and regulatory agencies with border interests around the world.
Facilitating trusted trade
By fostering legitimate trade and travel we directly support the economic success and competitiveness of Australia.
We are committed to transforming the border experience for legitimate traders across the air and maritime domains.
Delivering this outcome will require a partnership approach and a shared responsibility.
Our aim is for legitimate traders to partner with us to experience an easily understood and simplified border clearance process in which the number and speed of border checks is reduced based on enhanced intelligence.
The trusted trader programme will focus on border risks, leveraging information and complementing programmes focused on air cargo security risks.
The programme will also take into account existing global standards such as the World Customs Organization's SAFE Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Trade.
The Service is currently assessing the value of a range of trusted trader arrangements, including arrangements utilising trusted technologies.
The range of approaches under assessment includes Public-to-Private (P2P) partnership approaches based on trust, clear accountabilities, shared responsibilities and, where appropriate, supported by trusted technology.
Digital foundations of a new security paradigm
We will also be working towards enabling full digital interaction for stakeholders to conduct their border-related activities.
This will mean that all documents, application processes and related decisions will be available online.
Again partnerships will be important here, we will work with Australia Post and other stakeholders to implement this approach; as currently border processing in the international mail environment, including revenue collection, is largely manual.
And whether at a major port, or the most remote Northern tip of the Torres Strait, real-time intelligence, using mobile technology will become the norm for our 5000 strong border officers and greatly aid the future intelligence capabilities of the Service.
With our defence partners, we are trialling new cost effective surveillance technologies for our remote areas, including unmanned aerial vehicles.
We will also look at new advanced analytics and situational awareness systems, while maximising opportunities to automate our risk analysis, profiling and targeting activities;This will allow us to focus our efforts on producing high-value analysis and assessments to support better decision making.
A stronger and smarter compliance approach
One of our priorities in recent years has been strengthening the cargo supply chain against infiltration by serious and organised crime.
I make no apologies for seeking to impose new controls or strengthen existing controls where it is necessary to protect the Australian community from demonstrable harm.
Legitimate traders and travellers will be our partners as we work together to secure both our economic prosperity and our national security.
Our ability to work in a trusted partnership with industry will form the cornerstone of future successes.
Conclusion
The modern border is a strategic national asset, and a crucial function of state which directly impacts on a sovereign state's security and its economy.
Our maritime zone must equally be protected and quality intelligence, industry engagement and quality inter-agency and inter-country relationships will play an important role in this.
Given the global economy, the international nature of trade and travel and of criminal organisations, sovereign states can no longer work in isolation to defend their borders and maritime domains.
The new way of thinking about border control is one of collaboration, and sovereign states working together to defend their borders.
