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Safeguarding Australia Conference – Canberra

13 May 2015

Michael Pezzullo
Secretary, Department of Immigration and Border Protection

Global Violent Extremism – Another Long War

E&OE

Tonight I’d like to deliver some remarks on violent extremism in general, over and above the obvious specific reference to the issue of the day, in terms of Islamist extremism as practiced by the Islamic State, ISIS, ISIL, or Daesh. I’d like to take a very long view, and indeed a historical and even philosophical view of the problem of violent extremism. Sometimes we can get caught up in the supposed uniqueness of the present and neglect the grand perspective of history. We’ve been here, frankly, before—many times. We’ve seen before the eternal enemy of liberty and reason, an enemy which emerged when liberal market–based society started to form in the 19th century, and when the fruits of industrialisation began to offer the prospects of a fuller, richer, life for all.

The first vignette of violent extremism that I’d like to discuss tonight is the violent anarchism which emerged in the late 19th century and continued until it dissipated in the early 20th century. The French called this form of violent extremism, or at least the tactics and the methodology employed by the anarchists of the period, the ‘propaganda of the deed.’ Amongst other things, which included bombings of cafes, opera performances, and the like, were assassinations—both regicides and political assassinations: the Czar of Russia in 1881, the President of the Republic of France in 1894, the Prime Minister of Spain in 1897, the Consort of the Emperor of Austria–Hungary in 1898, the King of Italy in 1900, the President of the United States in 1901, the King and his son, the Crown Prince, of Portugal in 1908, the Prime Minister of Russia in 1908, another Prime Minister of Spain in 1912, the King of Greece in 1913, and another Prime Minister of Spain in 1921. Could you imagine the chaos in our thinking, the chaos in our responses—the dysfunction in our responses—if these events were happening today? And yet, we got through it.

Bolshevism started as a radical terrorist movement—it was cellular and compartmentalised. And of course before Imperial Germany arranged for Lenin to return to pre–revolutionary Russia, it was very problematical, indeed highly uncertain, as to whether the Bolsheviks would even seize power temporarily, let alone establish a state. And so you saw a radical communist revolutionary movement eventually capture state power in 1917 through the ‘Vanguard Party’ and the establishment thereafter of a totalitarian state. And in the aftermath of the First World War, with the new Soviet state having sued for peace, the ‘red scare’ of Bolshevism was a very real threat to the global order that was emerging in the aftermath of that war, occasioned in part by the collapse of political order not only in Russia but also Imperial Germany, Austria–Hungary, and of course the Ottoman Empire.

Contemporaneously with Bolshevism, Fascism. We think of fascism as a state organisation. In fact, it was a radical revolutionary band of, in many cases, former soldiers or in some cases serving soldiers of the Italian Army and in other countries as well, soldiers and former soldiers who described themselves as radical socialists but with nationalist ideals. They bonded together based on their experiences in the trenches and their disdain for what they considered to be the settled bourgeois civilian lives to which they were returning.

Shortly thereafter, Nazism began to emerge. Because we often think in ahistorical terms, we tend to think of Nazism as a state. Of course, it eventually became that, but how did it start? It was a radical revolutionary movement, principally in the 1920s, that grew in strength through the 1920s and gained power in 1933 and along with Fascism in Italy and in other European countries, captured state power and thereafter established totalitarian power in Germany, just as Mussolini did in Italy at the same time.

We can come forward to the more modern era and look at the revolutionary communist organisations of the 1970s in Europe, the Red Army Faction and the like. Again, with the same apocalyptic visions and starting small as many of these other movements did. Some became states, some did not.

We can look at al–Qaeda which emerged in the 1980s in the aftermath, or at least during the course of, the Soviet invasion and operations in Afghanistan. It again started small, a revolutionary band, in this case with a distinct political ideology and a very hierarchical, although cellular, structure which was designed to wage war around the West, representing a very radical break with a more traditional Arab–Islamic socialism that had dominated many Arab countries during the Cold War, including to the extent of formal alliances with the Soviet Union.

Now, all of these movements over a century or more from the 1880s and beyond have contained revolutionary elements coupled with real or imagined, and in some cases deluded, global strategies of violent extremism which are all based on the desire to compete, in more recent decades at least, with a Western Liberal capitalist order with a view to the establishment of an alternative new order. In each case, the foot soldiers were largely violently antisocial and in some cases pathologically neutral as to the suffering that their violence would occasion, as compared with what I want to argue are universal cultural norms and certainly the ones that we practise here. In nearly all cases, there was anger with the established order.

In all of these movements we have to examine the psychological idea that social psychologists call the ‘locus of control.’ In Western thinking, and in cultural practice that has evolved over 500 years, the emphasis is given to the role of self–control, self–determination, the exercise of conscience, the exercise of reason to a greater or lesser degree. Political strategies in Western policies emphasise the creation of greater opportunities for individuals to take full advantage of their talents and their gifts or to grow or enhance these gifts. At its best, we see an emphasis in these cultures and societies on education and empowerment and a privileging of individual choice in the best sense of that phrase. But in the revolutionary movements that I’ve been describing that have challenged the Western global order over the last century or more, the locus of control, in social psychological terms, is radically offset. It is centred on the collective will and the propagation of blame for the ills of the group on external forces including ‘the West’, ‘capitalism’, ‘the Jews’, the ‘oppression of Islam’, however understood, and so on and so forth.

So in that frame, let’s look at the rise of ISIL, or ISIS, or Daesh. Your deliberations during this conference today and I’m sure tomorrow will focus on the active, deliberate strategy this group is pursuing to reach out to sympathisers and supporters to create—or at least attempt to create—a mass movement on a global scale, quite unlike organisations such as the Taliban in Afghanistan or Boko Haram in Nigeria, which are localised, although increasingly sympathetic and somewhat associated with ISIL.

It pursues a strategy which is a combination of a ‘home strategy’ of acquiring and controlling territory and a ‘far strategy’ of taking the campaign to Western countries as well as other regions such as East Africa. Of course, unlike all of those movements that I’ve mentioned before, mass radicalisation has been attempted and enabled by the internet, emanating outwards from the so–called home base of Iraq and Syria and nearby regions, and the use of technology is being used to promote and glamourise the struggle, so–called, on a global basis.

But there’s also a call to arms in the opposite direction. Fighters are being called to Iraq and Syria on a scale probably not seen since the Spanish Civil War in the 1930s. Many of the people who decide to undertake that journey have lived, are living, and unless interventions are undertaken will continue to live, very compartmentalised lives and frankly in most cases exhibit rather compartmentalised values which are radically different from those of the wider society in which they live, and which has offered them so much.

So what are these people against? They’re against individualism, they’re against democracy and associated political freedoms, they’re against cultural freedom, they’re against a market–based model of economic liberty, they’re certainly against the freedom of religion, and any form of secularism, and they’re most certainly against gender equality and social inclusion. What are they for? Well, our old enemy is back. The same ancient enemy that started to emerge in the 19th century as reason, liberty, democracy and freedom started to be organised and coalesced into what we today describe as the ’Western order.’ They stand for an alternative political order, the submission of the individual to the greater collective will, and the subjugation of individual conscience and liberty.

And so, even in our own societies, regrettably, individuals—often young men, but young women as well, and sometimes not so young individuals—are disaffected. Perhaps they’re disaffected due to the way that they’ve been treated because of their distinctive names, their physical appearance perhaps, their dress and what they perceive to be a stigmatised culture and, indeed, religion—that of Islam. Islamist extremism that attracts them is not Islam. Islam is a great world religion followed peacefully by over one billion Muslims worldwide. During Europe’s Dark Ages—nearly a millennium—Islam kept alive the flame of knowledge, inquiry, and reason. But for its scholars, much ancient knowledge and records would be unknown to us in our own cultural tradition.

Today’s Muslim leaders, elders, scholars, opinion–makers, and religious leaders are our key allies in the campaign against Islamist extremism. Never forget, the Arabic–Islamic expression ‘As–salamu alaykum’ means ‘peace be upon you’, and be upon us. Islam is entirely compatible with Australia’s values and our way of life.

However, these individuals who are prone to be radicalised, who are disaffected for whatever reason, can start to exhibit, and are starting to exhibit in some cases, an extreme religiosity—often rapidly acquired. It’s got nothing to do with Islam. It’s a method of coping with, as best as we can understand, (and each case is individual and varied) social alienation, marginalisation, anger, resentment, and victimhood. It is probably best understood as a social and psychological frame of reference and state of being, which can be quickly politicised into a virulent identification with an anti–Western ideology, and potentially—not always, but potentially—a pathway therefore to terrorism. And if the sense of victimhood is sufficiently entrenched and visceral, Islamist extremism—not Islam—offers an identity and a pathway for expressing self, overcoming alienation, and connecting to a supposedly greater global struggle informed by the narrative of the oppression that connects Gaza, Iraq, Afghanistan, the oppression of Muslims the world over, and so on.

So, how do we counter this phenomenon? Government programs are crucial—I’m from the Government, of course I would say that—but they’re not sufficient, especially given the deep social–psychological dynamics which appear to be at work. We need community leaders and community groups to get involved, along with friends and families. News and media organisations have got a particular responsibility to avoid glamourising violent extremism through responsible reporting. Online service providers have a responsibility in relation to dealing with extremist content.

All actors who are on the good side of this argument need to stress and model a commitment to participation in civil society, and to peaceful democratic processes. Now, we are a very successful society in this regard. We’ve had a targeted and strategically managed immigration program for the best part of 70 years. Multiculturalism, which had its advent in the 1970s, after the long–overdue dismantling of the White Australia policy, which progressively took place from the mid–1960s up until the mid–1970s, is a beacon. It’s our best weapon.

Community leaders play a critical role therefore in using this weapon—this weapon of the mind—in dissuading young Australians from travelling to, for instance, conflict zones to fight, and the Australian Government is committed in supporting them in this work. And counter–radicalisation, of course at the level of the individual, needs to be very precisely targeted. The identification of at–risk individuals and planned interventions equally need to be targeted. De–radicalisation programs, of which best practice is beginning to emerge across a number of states, will necessarily involve a combination of different approaches around mentoring and coaching, counselling, education, employment support, leadership modelling, and the like.

Tonight being the Wednesday after the Budget that is always delivered on a Tuesday, it would be remiss of me to not quickly summarise therefore some of the key relevant budget measures that the Attorney–General, on behalf of the Australian Government, last night announced. There’s an increased emphasis and investment in Countering Violent Extremism programs, or CVE, in dollar terms now amounting to over $40 million over four years.

The Government restated last night in the Budget a central element of its counter–terrorism policy, that preventing radicalisation is just as important if not more so than thwarting terrorist plots before they are realised. And it’s important that anyone who is in danger of becoming radicalised is diverted onto a different path as early as possible, before they harm themselves or others.

The Government restated in its announcement last night that the people who are most likely to be able to get through to someone at risk will be someone that they trust—parents, friends, teachers, community leaders, scholars, and others.

There was a particular announcement in relation to challenging terrorist propaganda, especially online. Just as parents and families have gained greater understanding over time of the dangers posed by online sexual predators, there needs to be an increased awareness of the threat from online terrorist predators.

Unfortunately, the downside of what is otherwise a very positive phenomenon—the internet—is that anyone with a computer can encourage others to undertake reprehensible acts of hate and violence. And it is—as we’ve seen just seen in recent days—particularly concerning that some very young people, in some cases people who would have been only two or three years old when the Twin Towers came down, that these young people have been impressionably groomed, and becoming targets of this hate and violence online, and its promotion online. So, this propaganda is reaching directly into our homes and into our family environments through the internet.

Now there are of course a range of offenses available if the evidentiary standards can be established that have been passed by the Parliament in recent times that can be applied to the promotion of violence which is perpetuated on the Internet and through social media but that is a sometimes a very high bar to jump and as always with prosecutions that follow criminal investigations, a tool that is one amongst many.

I’m pleased to be able to remind the audience from last night’s Budget announcement that the Government is funding community organisations and intending to fund more to produce material—online content particularly—that challenges the appeal of extremist narratives and promotes Australia’s inclusive, positive values. The Government intends to principally work through my colleagues in the Department of the Attorney–General with social media, specialists and others to research the way in which extremists are using the online environment and identify options to counter them effectively.

The Government has also committed a further $14 million specifically to a program known as Living Safe Together which supports both individuals and communities to address the radicalisation of a small number of Australians in favour of violent, extremist ideologies, and builds on experience and previous work as well as the growing body of international best practice.

As I said earlier, the radicalisation process is unique to each person and responses therefore need to be very flexible and meet both the individuals’ needs and that of the community. Tailored individual plans need to connect services such as mentoring and coaching, counselling, education and the other matters that I mentioned earlier. These plans by definition cannot work without the support of the community—and in particular in the current environment—the active involvement of leaders in the Muslim community who as I said earlier are our allies in this struggle. State and territory governments are also key partners, as are of course professional health and other community service providers.

Let me conclude, where I started, rather philosophically. What will win out in the end? Well what will win out will be what has always won out. Any antisocial sense of exclusion tending to violence can be quickly extinguished by offering people prone to such tendencies strong employment prospects, an economic stake, social mobility, leading those individuals away who are becoming or have become alienated to a more positive view of social cohesion, a positive view of the dignity of each human life, and of course ultimately the beacon I spoke of earlier of freedom and individual liberty.

We have increasingly—in what used to be called ‘the West’ but is really a global community of like–minded nations that one day will no longer need to be called ‘the West’—seen off anarchists, communists, fascists, the Nazis and, whilst the jury’s still somewhat out, I would argue that we have seen off the first wave of Islamist extremist terror in the form of the rigidly hierarchical pre–internet version of al–Qaeda.

Now while our efforts have to be targeted very specifically, for the reasons set out above, regarding the psychological dysfunction in operation at the level of certain individuals, at the collective level we should not shy from, and indeed we should do everything in our power to promote, the superiority of our value system and our system of political, social and economic organisation which is based on freedom. We have to live these values through the respect for individual choices made within the law, equality of opportunity, the respect for diversity and gender equality and through tolerance as well as the active promotion of social cohesion.

We have history on our side, and I mean it in the sense that Fukuyama meant in his book The End of History, and I contrast this with Huntington’s concept of the clash of civilisations in another book that was published shortly thereafter. Fukuyama never then, nor since, ever contended that ‘events would cease’ or that the ‘end time of history’ would be without tribulation which could, he said in various interviews since, last for decades, or even longer. His original contention remains, and his contention was, that the western–originated liberal democratic system, when coupled with the market system for the production and distribution of goods and services, would be and indeed is the end state of human ideological evolution and that is what he meant by the ‘end of history.’

The late Samuel Huntington by contrast wrote a very useful guidebook for the end times of history in The Clash of Civilisations—illustrating issues of strategy and operational dynamics and tactics that are nevertheless less useful in terms of providing an assessment to underpin policy. Ask yourself this question if you doubt that proposition—do we intend to reduce to a moral equivalence an Islamist extremist theocracy and liberal democracy? If we intend to reduce it to a moral equivalence then why did we fight the Kaiser? The Fascists? The Nazis? Why didn’t we flinch against the Bolsheviks, when they became the Soviets? Why did we go after al–Qaeda other than that they went after us?

Ideological and counter–ideological work has to be central to the task before us, and it is often neglected when, even in such an esteemed audience, we get technical practitioners together who are experts in all of the strategies, operations and tactics to achieve the goal—but what’s the goal? What of course always sits above strategy, operations and tactics? It is policy and policy is ultimately driven by values.

I’ll end this talk tonight on what I would consider probably to be very unusual paraphrase for a Secretary serving the Commonwealth Government to utilise. I’m going to paraphrase a famous—indeed probably one of the most substantial Marxist intellectuals of the 20th century—Antonio Gramsci. In contrast the current attitude that we ought to adopt in these proceedings with Gramsci’s well known proposition. Gramsci said in one of his prison letters ‘I’m a pessimist because of my intellect, but I’m an optimist because of my will.’ I think we have grounds to go better than Gramsci. We should be optimists because of our intellect and optimists because of our will. Thank you very much.