

From: Stanislaw Pitucha
To: [Assistance Bill Consultation](#)
Subject: Comments on the bill
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I find the bill proposal very dangerous for three reasons:

1. Despite numerous mentions of "no backdoors", this is exactly what the bill is proposing. It avoids the persistent backdoor by asking companies to provide one on request. This extra step doesn't change the situation - this is weakening the overall system compared to a situation where such action is technically impossible.
2. We already know that even well controlled systems of privacy invasion will be abused. This is confirmed to have happened in a larger and likely more developed system in NSA. (<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-surveillance-watchdog/nsa-staff-used-spy-tools-on-spouses-ex-lovers-watchdog-idUSBRE98Q14G20130927>) The mere existence of the system where requests for removing layers of security is possible will cause people to abuse it - whether they work for the tech company or for law enforcement. This will impact innocent people in vulnerable position.
3. As we learned from existing reports on terrorism investigations, it's failed opsec that catches the suspects. For example, while law enforcement agencies were calling for less encryption after terrorist attacks in Paris, we learned that a lot of communication was made in the clear. (<https://theintercept.com/2015/11/18/signs-point-to-unencrypted-communications-between-terror-suspects/>) On the other hand, people with actual, deep understanding of encryption can use public materials and achieve encryption which does not depend on any service/hardware provider in particular and cannot be impacted by the proposed bill.