

**From:** Daniel Rodgers-Pryor  
**To:** [Assistance Bill Consultation](#)  
**Subject:** Assistance Bill Feedback Submission  
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Hi,

I would like to register my objection — in the strongest possible terms — to the proposed Assistance and Access Bill.

In my role as Chief Technology Officer at a young, successful Australian technology company (Stile Education), I am exceptionally well placed to understand the nature of encrypted communication technologies. I can say confidently that there is no way to only expose the communications of bad actors without leaving the vast majority of honest citizens vulnerable. Although the proposed bill explicitly claims to exclude backdoors, it will be impossible for it to secure its stated goals in any other way, and the extreme provisions for secrecy that it provides will hide these backdoors-in-all-but-name from the very security researchers and software engineers who we depend on to keep our digital infrastructure secure.

As a wealthy country, we have far more to lose from weakened digital security than most others. Our banks, planes, cars houses, medical implants, appliances etc. are all vulnerable to digital attack. Securing this infrastructure is immensely difficult, even in an open environment where code may be freely inspected and quickly repaired. By demanding that secret, backdoors and exceptions be installed to facilitate enhanced surveillance, the proposed bill will turn the ongoing struggle to secure this infrastructure into a ineluctably doomed death march. If any part of a codebase is legally protected from scrutiny — especially any part concerning critical security features like encryption — then it will become effectively impossible to secure the resulting system.

The threat posed by terrorism and crime is extremely small compared to the threat posed by scaleable class breaks ([https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/01/class\\_breaks.html](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2017/01/class_breaks.html)) against the digital systems within our physical infrastructure. The government ought to be protecting us from digital threats rather than exposing us to them for easy political gain.

And all of that is to say nothing of the egregious cost to civil freedoms should such extreme surveillance as enabled by the proposed bill become commonplace.

In summary, I implore you to withdraw the proposed legislation and focus of securing our vital digital infrastructure rather than undermining it.

Regards,

Daniel Rodgers-Pryor