

**From:** Andrew  
**To:** [Assistance Bill Consultation](#)  
**Subject:** Feedback for The Assistance and Access Bill 2018  
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As an Australian citizen, I disagree with the scope and intent of the proposed powers under the Assistance and Access Bill. Even giving the full benefit of the doubt that a Technical Capability Notice will not allow parties to compel a company to manufacture a "systemic weakness" (notwithstanding the existence and technical details of some such weakness may be known but not publicly disclosed due to patch cycles/vendor coordination), the mere existence of powers to "[modify] or [substitute] a target service" and "[conceal] the fact that agencies have undertaken a covert operation" undermines the trust and goodwill that the Australian people have in the function of their electronic devices. If the Australian Government insists on enacting such capabilities it will at its very least cause fewer and fewer members of the public to keep their devices up to date, undermining the security and integrity of the network as a whole. Furthermore, it will impact visits from overseas nationals: I know that I myself have personally turned down a number of opportunities to travel to the United States in the past few years due to concerns including the slight chance of phones and laptops being confiscated and attempted to be read.

If there is an honest desire to be reasonable and proportionate, the Government should consider additional investment in cyber security research coupled with a pre-agreed policy of disclosure to vendors or the public after a short period of time, say 90 days.

Regards,  
Andrew Haigh