



AAUS Submission:

Department of Home Affairs (DHA) Consultation on Proposed Approaches to Australia's Drone Security

25 May 2026

Executive Summary

The Australian Association for Uncrewed Systems (AAUS) welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback on the Australian Government's "Drone Security Public Consultation Paper 2026". AAUS is the peak national industry body representing Australia's uncrewed systems sector across civil, commercial, research and government applications.

AAUS operates numerous member advisory groups and we gratefully acknowledge input from our Cybersecurity, Military UAS and RPAS Operators advisory groups relating to the content in this response.

AAUS supports the Government's objective of improving Australia's drone security framework to address emerging misuse and national security risks while continuing to enable innovation, economic productivity and socially beneficial drone operations. We agree that Australia's policy settings must evolve as drones become more capable, accessible and integrated into critical sectors of the economy.

AAUS believes that effective drone security policy must:

- Be risk-based and proportionate;
- Differentiate between compliant and non-compliant operators;
- Avoid unnecessary burden on legitimate operators and innovators;
- Align with existing aviation safety frameworks wherever possible;
- Be technologically neutral and scalable; and
- Support a thriving sovereign Australian uncrewed systems capability.

General Position

AAUS acknowledges the growing security concerns associated with the misuse of drones near airports, prisons, critical infrastructure, public events and other sensitive locations.

However, Australia's regulatory approach must carefully distinguish between:

- deliberate malicious misuse,
- negligent or uninformed operation, and
- legitimate commercial and recreational activity.

Most commercial operators already operate under extensive aviation safety obligations through the regulatory framework administered by Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA). Additional security requirements should therefore complement, rather than duplicate or conflict with, existing aviation regulations.

AAUS supports the consultation paper's proposed principles-based approach and strongly encourages the Government to ensure future measures remain adaptable to rapid technological evolution.

1. Proactive Management of Growing Drone Threats

AAUS supports a proactive and intelligence-led approach to drone security.

The uncrewed systems ecosystem is evolving rapidly, including:

- increasing autonomy,
- swarm capability,
- long-range BVLOS operations,
- maritime and ground-based uncrewed systems,
- integration with AI-enabled decision systems, and
- increasing accessibility of low-cost systems.

Security frameworks must therefore move beyond purely aviation-centric models and consider broader cross-domain threats.

However, AAUS cautions against introducing blanket restrictions or overly broad powers that could unintentionally inhibit legitimate commercial activity, emergency response capability, research and development, or sovereign manufacturing growth.

AAUS recommends:

- a risk-tiered regulatory approach,
- prioritisation of high-consequence locations and events,
- stronger coordination between security agencies and aviation regulators,
- improved intelligence sharing with industry, and
- ongoing consultation with the uncrewed systems sector.

2. Counter-Drone Capabilities

AAUS supports the development of clear legislative authority and governance arrangements for lawful counter-drone activities.

Australia currently faces fragmented arrangements regarding the detection, identification, mitigation and countering of malicious or unsafe drone operations.

AAUS supports a nationally consistent framework that clearly defines:

- authorised users,
- approved technologies,
- operational limitations,
- evidence requirements,
- safety obligations,
- training and competency requirements, and
- oversight mechanisms.

Importantly, counter-drone activities must not create greater aviation or public safety risks than the threat itself.

AAUS recommends:

- nationally standardised operational procedures,
- mandated training and certification for counter-drone operators,
- robust spectrum and electromagnetic interference protections,
- clear protections for lawful operators,
- strong auditing and accountability arrangements, and
- ongoing testing and validation of counter-drone technologies in Australian operational environments.

AAUS also notes that counter-drone technologies can negatively impact compliant operators if detection systems are inaccurate or if mitigation techniques are applied inappropriately.

Accordingly, there should be strong evidentiary thresholds and proportionality tests before mitigation measures are deployed.

Responses to Consultation Questions

Consultation Question in blue

AAUS response in black

What safeguards or oversight do you think are important to ensure counter-drone technologies are used safely, proportionately, and appropriately?

AAUS supports a nationally consistent framework that clearly defines:

- authorised users,
- approved technologies,
- operational limitations,
- evidence requirements,
- safety obligations,
- training and competency requirements, and
- oversight mechanisms.

Importantly, counter-drone activities must not create greater aviation or public safety risks than the threat itself.

AAUS recommends:

- nationally standardised operational procedures,
- mandated training and certification for counter-drone operators,
- robust spectrum and electromagnetic interference protections,
- clear protections for lawful operators,
- strong auditing and accountability arrangements, and
- ongoing testing and validation of counter-drone technologies in Australian operational environments.

AAUS also notes that counter-drone technologies can negatively impact compliant operators if detection systems are inaccurate or if mitigation techniques are applied inappropriately.

Accordingly, there should be strong evidentiary thresholds and proportionality tests before mitigation measures are deployed.

Who should be authorised (with appropriate training and approvals) to deploy drone detection or counter-drone technologies?

AAUS considers that a clear distinction should be made between **drone detection technologies** and **active counter-drone technologies**.

AAUS does not believe that the deployment or use of passive drone detection systems should be heavily restricted through legislation. Detection systems, in and of themselves, generally do not pose a direct risk to the community or aviation safety. In many respects, they are analogous to existing aviation situational awareness tools used in crewed aviation, such as ADS-B feeds and publicly accessible flight tracking platforms like Flightradar24.

Accordingly, AAUS considers that drone detection capability should generally be available to industry, infrastructure operators and the broader community, subject to compliance with any existing laws relating to privacy, surveillance, spectrum use or data handling. Broad access to detection capability may in fact improve situational awareness, support security outcomes, assist infrastructure protection and encourage responsible drone operations.

However, AAUS strongly supports regulation of **active counter-drone technologies** that interfere with, disrupt, disable, take control of or otherwise mitigate drone operations.

Unlike passive detection systems, active counter-drone measures may create significant risks relating to:

- aviation safety,
- radiofrequency interference,
- GNSS disruption,
- communications interference,
- cyber security,
- unintended impacts on lawful operators,
- emergency services operations, and
- broader public safety.

Accordingly, AAUS considers that only appropriately trained, authorised and accountable entities should be permitted to deploy active counter-drone technologies.

This should include:

- clearly defined approval pathways,
- nationally consistent authorisations,
- competency and training requirements,
- operational limitations,
- reporting and audit requirements,
- appropriate spectrum and aviation safety oversight, and
- clear governance regarding when and where such technologies may be used.

AAUS supports a framework where active counter-drone authorities are generally limited to:

- law enforcement,
- Defence,
- border protection agencies,
- approved critical infrastructure operators, and
- specialist providers operating under appropriate government approvals or supervision.

What concerns do you have with expanded or additional counter-drone measures being introduced for authorised groups in Australia?

AAUS recognises the need for Australia to strengthen its counter-drone capabilities to address legitimate security, safety and critical infrastructure protection concerns. However, AAUS also considers that expanded counter-drone powers and technologies introduce a range of important risks and unintended consequences that must be carefully managed.

A key concern is ensuring that counter-drone measures do not create greater safety, security or operational risks than the threat they are intended to address.

One of the most significant concerns relates to the potential impact on lawful and compliant drone operations. Improper use of counter-drone technologies could unintentionally disrupt authorised operations, including those supporting critical or time-sensitive activities.

AAUS is particularly concerned about the potential for:

- false identification of threats,
- inaccurate detection data,
- unintended interference with compliant operators,
- disruption of emergency service operations,
- overreach in operational decision-making, and
- inconsistent application of counter-drone powers across jurisdictions.

AAUS also notes that many active counter-drone technologies may interfere with:

- radiofrequency spectrum,
- GNSS services,
- communications systems,
- navigation systems, and
- other safety-critical technologies.

Poorly controlled deployment could therefore have broader impacts extending beyond the targeted drone itself.

There are also important aviation safety considerations. Mitigation measures that disable, jam or take control of drones may create:

- uncontrolled aircraft behaviour,
- loss of navigation capability,
- falling aircraft hazards,
- airspace conflicts, or
- unintended consequences in populated environments.

These risks become increasingly significant as drone operations become more integrated into shared airspace and critical infrastructure environments.

AAUS is also concerned about the possibility of fragmented or inconsistent authorisation frameworks emerging between jurisdictions or sectors. A nationally consistent framework is essential to ensure:

- clear governance,
- operational interoperability,
- appropriate oversight,
- consistent training standards, and
- legal clarity for operators and authorised users.

Another important concern relates to accountability and transparency. Expanded counter-drone powers should be accompanied by:

- clear thresholds for use,
- documented decision-making processes,
- audit and reporting obligations,
- complaint and review mechanisms, and
- safeguards against misuse or disproportionate application.

AAUS further notes the importance of protecting innovation and sovereign capability development. Overly restrictive or uncertain counter-drone regulatory settings may discourage investment, testing and development of legitimate Australian drone and counter-drone technologies.

Finally, AAUS considers that passive drone detection technologies should not be unnecessarily restricted. Passive detection systems generally improve situational awareness and do not themselves create a direct safety risk. In many respects they are comparable to existing crewed aviation awareness systems, such as ADS-B data feeds and publicly accessible flight tracking platforms. The primary

regulatory focus should instead be on active counter-drone measures that interfere with aircraft or communications systems.

What role should industry and the public play in reporting or helping to identify emerging drone threats?

AAUS considers that industry and the public have an important role to play in supporting Australia's awareness of emerging drone-related threats. However, this role should be clearly defined, appropriately supported and carefully balanced to avoid unintended consequences such as misinformation, unnecessary public alarm or inappropriate interference with lawful drone operations.

The overwhelming majority of drone operations in Australia are conducted safely and lawfully. As such, reporting frameworks should focus on genuinely suspicious, reckless or malicious activity rather than encouraging broad public reporting of all drone use.

Role of Industry

Industry is well placed to support early identification of emerging threats, operational trends and vulnerabilities due to its technical expertise and day-to-day operational experience.

Industry can contribute through:

- sharing operational intelligence and emerging risk information;
- participating in government-industry information sharing forums;
- supporting development of detection and reporting standards;
- identifying technological vulnerabilities and misuse trends;
- assisting with education and awareness initiatives;
- contributing to development of proportionate security frameworks; and
- supporting trials and validation of detection and counter-drone technologies.

Manufacturers, operators, software providers, training organisations and infrastructure operators may also provide valuable insight into:

- evolving drone capabilities,
- autonomy trends,
- cyber vulnerabilities,
- spoofing or jamming risks,
- geofencing limitations,
- remote identification systems, and
- patterns of suspicious behaviour.

AAUS believes Government should establish trusted and ongoing engagement mechanisms with industry to support two-way sharing of information and threat awareness.

Role of the Public

The public also has a role in identifying genuinely suspicious or unsafe drone activity, particularly around:

- critical infrastructure,
- airports,
- prisons,
- emergency incidents,
- major public events, and
- restricted areas.

However, public reporting frameworks should be supported by:

- clear guidance,
- public education,
- practical reporting pathways, and
- realistic expectations regarding what constitutes suspicious behaviour.

AAUS notes there is currently significant public misunderstanding regarding lawful drone operations. Many legitimate operations are incorrectly perceived as unlawful or threatening. Poorly informed reporting mechanisms could therefore generate:

- high volumes of false reports,
- unnecessary enforcement responses,
- reputational harm to lawful operators, and
- increased tension between the public and industry.

Accordingly, public education should accompany any reporting framework to help distinguish between:

- lawful and authorised operations,
- nuisance concerns,
- aviation safety issues, and
- genuinely suspicious or malicious activity.

AAUS does not support members of the public attempting to physically interfere with drones or operators, nor attempting to deploy counter-drone measures themselves.

3. Electronic Conspicuity and Remote Identification

AAUS broadly supports improved electronic conspicuity and remote identification capabilities as an important enabler for both safety and security outcomes.

AAUS has previously supported the principle that:

“If it flies, it should be electronically visible.”

However, implementation must be practical, proportionate and internationally aligned.

AAUS recommends that any Remote ID or electronic conspicuity framework:

- be interoperable with international standards,
- support future UTM/FIMS integration,
- recognise different operational risk categories,
- minimise cost burden for low-risk users,
- avoid unnecessary retrofitting obligations for legacy fleets,
- support privacy and cyber security protections, and
- include realistic transition timelines.

Responses to Consultation Questions

Consultation Question in blue

AAUS response in black

What level of real-time visibility (e.g., location, altitude, or operator attribution) should authorities have to detect, track and identify drones operating near sensitive or high-risk environments?

AAUS supports a risk-based and proportionate approach to real-time drone visibility and identification requirements, particularly in sensitive or high-risk environments.

Authorities should have access to sufficient real-time information to enable:

- detection of potentially unsafe or malicious operations,
- timely threat assessment,
- appropriate operational response,
- protection of critical infrastructure and public safety, and
- differentiation between lawful and unlawful activity.

Should drone detection equipment only be available to law enforcement and security agencies only, or extended to new user groups such as emergency services, prison operators, critical infrastructure operators and event organisers?

AAUS does not believe that drone detection equipment should be limited solely to law enforcement and security agencies.

AAUS considers that passive drone detection capability should be broadly available to organisations with legitimate operational, safety, security or infrastructure protection requirements. This should include appropriately authorised:

- emergency services organisations,
- prison and correctional facility operators,
- airport and port operators,
- critical infrastructure operators,
- major event organisers,
- transport infrastructure operators,
- utilities providers, and
- specialist security providers.

Passive drone detection systems generally improve situational awareness and do not themselves create a direct risk to public safety or aviation safety. In many respects, these systems are analogous to existing situational awareness tools already widely available in crewed aviation, such as ADS-B data feeds and publicly accessible flight tracking platforms like Flightradar24.

Accordingly, AAUS does not support unnecessary legislative restrictions on the deployment or use of passive drone detection technologies.

Currently only aerial drones used for commercial purposes must be registered. What drones should be subject to registration or other forms of enhanced identification requirements?

AAUS supports a risk-based and proportionate approach to drone registration and identification requirements rather than a blanket requirement applied uniformly across all uncrewed systems.

Registration and enhanced identification measures should be targeted toward operations, platforms and environments that present elevated safety, security or operational risks, while avoiding unnecessary burden on very low-risk users and activities.

AAUS does not support imposing disproportionate registration or identification obligations on very low-risk recreational or micro-drone operations where the administrative burden may outweigh the practical security or safety benefit.

The framework should also recognise that malicious actors are unlikely to voluntarily comply with registration or Remote ID obligations. Accordingly, registration systems should be viewed as one element of a broader security and safety ecosystem rather than a standalone security solution.

AAUS strongly encourages alignment with internationally recognised standards and frameworks where practical, particularly regarding:

- Remote ID interoperability,
- electronic conspicuity,
- UTM/FIMS integration,
- cyber security protections, and
- data governance arrangements.

AAUS also recommends that any future registration or identification framework:

- protect operator privacy and commercially sensitive information;
- minimise unnecessary compliance burden;
- include realistic implementation timelines;
- avoid unnecessary retrofitting requirements for legacy fleets where possible;
- support innovation and sovereign capability development; and
- remain adaptable to future technologies including maritime, ground-based and autonomous systems.

What other enhanced identification and electronic conspicuity technologies are available that could support security outcomes?

Left unanswered

4. Enforcement and Compliance

AAUS supports stronger enforcement capability against deliberate misuse of drones.

However, enforcement should focus primarily on:

- malicious actors,
- repeated non-compliance,
- reckless operations, and
- intentional operations in restricted environments.

AAUS strongly encourages Government to avoid overly punitive approaches toward inadvertent or low-risk non-compliance, particularly where regulatory complexity contributes to operator confusion.

Education and awareness remain critically important.

Responses to Consultation Questions

Consultation Question in blue

AAUS response in black

What penalties or consequences would most effectively deter unauthorised or unsafe drone operations near sensitive locations while remaining fair and proportionate?

AAUS supports a risk-based, proportionate and graduated enforcement framework for unauthorised or unsafe drone operations near sensitive locations.

Penalties and consequences should be designed to:

- deter genuinely reckless or malicious behaviour;
- encourage voluntary compliance;
- support education and behavioural improvement;
- distinguish between intent and inadvertent error; and
- avoid disproportionately penalising low-risk or unintentional non-compliance.

AAUS considers it critical that enforcement frameworks clearly differentiate between:

- deliberate malicious activity,
- reckless disregard for safety or security,
- repeated non-compliance,
- negligent operation, and

- inadvertent or low-risk breaches arising from confusion or complexity.

A one-size-fits-all punitive approach is unlikely to achieve the best long-term safety or security outcomes.

What reporting obligations should apply when abnormal or unauthorised drone activity is detected (e.g., mandatory incident reporting by infrastructure operators), and how should information be shared with authorities?

Left unanswered

5. Drone Classifications and Operating Areas

AAUS supports a more risk-based approach to drone classifications and operating environments.

AAUS believes Australia should avoid creating parallel security frameworks disconnected from aviation operational risk management systems.

Responses to Consultation Questions

Consultation Question in blue

AAUS response in black

Should specific no-use or enhanced-monitoring zones be designated around certain assets (e.g., hospitals, correctional and energy facilities)?

AAUS supports the use of targeted, risk-based no-use or enhanced-monitoring zones around certain sensitive or high-risk assets where there is a clearly identified safety, security or operational need.

However, AAUS does not support broad or excessive blanket restrictions that unnecessarily limit legitimate drone operations or create disproportionate operational burden without clear evidence of risk reduction.

Any restricted or enhanced-monitoring zones should be:

- proportionate to the risk environment;
- operationally justified;
- nationally consistent where possible;
- clearly defined and publicly accessible;
- supported by practical digital mapping tools; and
- subject to regular review.

AAUS considers that enhanced protections may be appropriate around certain categories of sensitive infrastructure and operations, including:

- correctional facilities;
- defence installations;
- critical energy infrastructure;
- major transport hubs;
- airports and aviation infrastructure;
- nationally significant government facilities;

- certain emergency response operations; and
- high-profile public events where specific threat assessments justify additional controls.

AAUS also recognises that hospitals and emergency medical facilities may warrant enhanced protections in some circumstances, particularly where:

- helicopter emergency medical services operate,
- critical emergency response activities are occurring, or
- drone operations may interfere with time-critical patient care or aviation activities.

However, care should be taken to avoid unnecessarily restricting legitimate and beneficial drone operations associated with hospitals and healthcare facilities themselves, including:

- medical logistics,
- infrastructure inspection,
- emergency response,
- future healthcare delivery applications, and
- Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) operations.

Accordingly, AAUS recommends that restrictions around healthcare facilities be carefully designed and operationally focused rather than applying broad permanent exclusion zones by default.

What areas should be completely restricted from drone operations (unless approved)?

AAUS considers that completely restricted drone operating areas should be limited to locations where there is a clear, demonstrable and ongoing safety, national security or critical infrastructure protection requirement that cannot be appropriately managed through lower-level mitigations, enhanced monitoring or controlled operational approvals.

AAUS does not support unnecessary proliferation of blanket exclusion zones, as excessive restrictions may:

- create operational complexity,
- reduce compliance,
- increase inadvertent breaches,
- unnecessarily constrain beneficial operations, and
- inhibit innovation and sovereign capability development.

Accordingly, permanent no-fly or highly restricted zones should be reserved for a relatively limited category of environments presenting the highest consequence risks.

AAUS considers that complete restriction zones may be appropriate around:

- active airport movement areas and critical aviation infrastructure;
- certain Defence installations and military operational areas;
- nationally significant security and intelligence facilities;
- specific correctional facilities where there is demonstrated ongoing misuse risk;
- selected critical infrastructure assets where compromise could have severe national consequences;
- temporary emergency response exclusion zones where aviation safety or operational integrity requires protection; and
- temporary security zones associated with nationally significant events or identified threat environments.

AAUS also acknowledges that temporary restricted areas may be appropriate during:

- emergency response operations,
- major public events,
- declared security incidents,
- disaster management activities, or
- high-profile government or international events.

However, AAUS recommends that such restrictions:

- be time-limited;
- be clearly communicated;
- be digitally accessible through common flight planning tools;
- include practical notification mechanisms; and
- be proportionate to the identified threat or operational requirement.

[How should 'no-drone-zones', or enhanced-monitoring zones be communicated, including to ensure proper coordination between enforcement entities and authorised operators?](#)

AAUS considers that effective communication of “no-drone-zones” and enhanced-monitoring zones is critical to achieving both safety and security outcomes. Restrictions that are difficult to identify, inconsistent across jurisdictions or poorly integrated into operational systems are unlikely to achieve high levels of compliance.

AAUS recommends that restricted and enhanced-monitoring zones be communicated through a nationally consistent, digitally integrated and operationally practical framework that supports both enforcement agencies and lawful operators.

AAUS recommends that Australia adopt a centralised national drone information platform, published through Airservices Australia or through a similar nationally authoritative aviation information framework consistent with how operational airspace information is already managed in crewed aviation.

The drone sector should not rely on fragmented information sources spread across multiple agencies, websites or applications.

6. Public and Industry Awareness

AAUS strongly supports improved education and awareness initiatives.

Many security-related drone incidents are likely driven by:

- lack of awareness,
- misunderstanding of operational limitations,
- inconsistent information sources, and
- increasing accessibility of consumer systems.

AAUS recommends:

- national awareness campaigns,
- point-of-sale education,
- retailer obligations to provide safety/security information,
- school and community engagement initiatives,
- multilingual education materials,
- improved onboarding within drone applications, and
- stronger integration between Government and industry communication channels.

AAUS and its member network are willing to support collaborative education initiatives.

Responses to Consultation Questions

Consultation Question in blue

AAUS response in black

What information would help the public better understand risks associated with drones across land, air, and maritime domains?

AAUS considers that improving public awareness and understanding is a critical component of Australia's future drone security and safety framework. Effective education can help reduce unsafe behaviour, improve compliance, support community confidence and assist in identifying genuinely suspicious activity without unnecessarily discouraging legitimate drone use.

Importantly, public information should be:

- practical,
- easy to understand,
- nationally consistent,

- digitally accessible, and
- proportionate to the actual risks involved.

AAUS also considers it important that public messaging avoids unintentionally portraying all drone activity as inherently dangerous or suspicious. The overwhelming majority of drone operations in Australia are conducted safely and lawfully and deliver significant economic, environmental and public benefit outcomes.

What communication channels or resources would make it easiest for operators to understand their responsibilities under a future all-modes framework?

AAUS considers that the success of any future all-modes uncrewed systems framework will depend heavily on how clearly and consistently operator responsibilities are communicated.

Operators should be able to quickly and easily understand:

- where they can operate;
- what rules apply;
- what approvals may be required;
- what security obligations exist; and
- how requirements differ across air, land and maritime environments.

A future framework should therefore prioritise:

- simplicity,
- accessibility,
- national consistency,
- digital integration, and
- operational practicality.

Single National Information Platform

AAUS recommends establishment of a single authoritative national uncrewed systems information platform, ideally managed through or aligned with Airservices Australia or existing aviation-style information systems.

Operators should not be required to navigate multiple government websites, agencies or fragmented jurisdictional systems to determine their obligations.

This framework should operate similarly to the way operational information is already managed in crewed aviation through systems such as:

- AIP;

- NAIPS;
- NOTAM systems; and
- future digital airspace management services.

Integrated Digital Mapping and Real-Time Information

AAUS considers digital mapping and geospatial awareness tools essential.

Operators should be able to:

- view restricted and monitored zones;
- identify temporary operational restrictions;
- understand local operating conditions;
- access approval pathways; and
- receive real-time updates where practical.

These tools should integrate:

- airspace restrictions;
- maritime operational zones;
- land-based operational restrictions;
- emergency operational areas;
- critical infrastructure overlays; and
- temporary security restrictions.

AAUS strongly recommends API-enabled systems so manufacturers, software developers and service providers can integrate authoritative information directly into their own applications and flight planning tools.

Industry and Association Engagement

Industry bodies, manufacturers, training providers and operators will play an important role in communicating future requirements.

AAUS recommends ongoing:

- industry consultation;
- advisory groups;
- webinars;
- workshops;
- regulator-industry forums; and

- collaborative education initiatives.

This is particularly important as technologies and operational models continue to evolve rapidly.

Avoiding Fragmentation Across Domains

AAUS considers it important that air, land and maritime requirements are communicated through a harmonised framework wherever practical.

Operators should not face:

- inconsistent terminology;
- conflicting operational guidance;
- duplicated systems; or
- significantly different communication approaches between domains without clear justification.

While operational differences will exist between air, land and maritime systems, the user experience for understanding obligations should remain as consistent and intuitive as possible.

[What public communication or education would help recreational and commercial operators avoid entering restricted airspace and understand their responsibilities?](#)

Refer previous question.

About AAUS

Founded in 2009, AAUS is Australia's leading advocacy group for drones and AAM. Representing 4,800 members across industry, academia, and government, AAUS drives policy, regulation, and safety standards for the sector.

Contact:

Andrew Crowe, President (president@aaus.org.au)

Greg Tyrrell, Executive Director (greg.tyrrell@aaus.org.au)