

MANUS REGIONAL PROCESSING CENTRE

EMERGENCY EVACUATION PLAN

May 2016

MANUS REGIONAL PROCESSING CENTRE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN

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Distribution List

Distribution	No of Copies
PNGISCA	1
DIBP	1
TSL	1
TSL Security	1
IHMS	1

Issue, Review and Amendment

An emergency plan must be simple, flexible, written, disseminated, tested, reviewed and be easy to use and amend.

Wilson Security is responsible to review these procedures on a recommended 12 monthly basis.

Reviews should be recorded on the table below and any amendment to the procedures should be noted on the Amendment Record Certificate.

Revision Control

Revision	Date	Description	Origin	Check	Approved
1					
2					
3					
4					
5					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					

Proposals for the amendment or addition to this plan should be forwarded to the Security Manager Wilson Security.

[illegible]

INTRODUCTION

What is evacuation?

Evacuation is a risk management strategy which may be used as a means of mitigating the effects of an emergency or disaster on the centre and local community. It involves the movement of people to a safe location. However, to be effective it must be correctly planned and executed. The process of evacuation is usually considered to include the return of the affected community.

Aim of this plan

The aim of this plan is to provide guidelines to develop Manus Regional Processing Centre (MRPC) evacuation plans in accordance with accepted emergency management principles and applicable Australia legislative requirements.

Scope of the plan

The plan incorporates guidelines and considerations for the formulation of evacuation plans at community level. These guidelines and considerations relate to both peacetime and hostility related emergencies (civil defence). They are presented within the main sections covering:

- Introduction;
- Evacuation planning;
- Evacuation planning considerations; and
- MRPC five stages of evacuation: decision to evacuate, warning, withdrawal, shelter and return.

Related documents

The plan should be read in conjunction with Emergency Management Plans (EMP), Incident Response Plan (IRP), Contingency Plans and Business Continuity Plans.

Legal protection

Effective emergency management planning may help protect organisations from litigation arising out of the 'duty of care' provisions in common law. The requirement for responsible organisations to develop, test and review emergency plans accords with their general obligation of fulfilling duty of care.

EVACUATION PLANNING—AN OVERVIEW

Introduction

A risk assessment examining the source of risks, implications of their impact and possible mitigation action is the basis for formulation of the main emergency management plan. The start point for consideration of an evacuation plan is where the risk assessment has identified evacuation as a potentially appropriate risk management strategy.

Evacuation planning principles

The following principles should be observed in evacuation planning:

- Determination of legal or other authority to evacuate;
- Establishment of a management structure;
- Clear definition of roles and responsibilities;
- Development of appropriate and flexible plans;
- Effective warning and information system;
- Assurance of movement capability;
- Establishment and maintenance of confidence and cooperation of all stakeholders and Residents;
- Appropriate welfare provision throughout all stages; and
- Exercise of developed plans.

Types of evacuation

For the purpose of planning, all evacuations may be considered to be one of two generic types:

Immediate Evacuation — an evacuation resulting from a hazard impact, that forces immediate action, thereby allowing little or no warning and limited preparation time. Hazardous materials accidents/incidents, air crash, wildfire or earthquake are examples of events that may require immediate action.

Pre-warned Evacuation (Deliberate) — an evacuation resulting from an event that provides adequate warning and does not unduly limit preparation time. Examples of this type of event may include flood, cyclone and storm surge.

In both cases planning using the principles above is essential

Alternative to evacuation

Although evacuation is considered an important element of emergency response which may be effective in many situations, there will be occasions when it may be assessed that people would be safer to stay and shelter in place. Depending on the nature of the hazard, measures such as closing windows, isolation of air conditioning systems and monitoring communications to receive information can be taken to reduce vulnerability.

Stages of the evacuation process

The evacuation process comprises the five stages of:

- Decision to evacuate;
- Warning;
- Withdrawal;
- Shelter; and
- Return.

EVACUATION PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

Introduction

As a result of a hazard impact or threat, evacuation of affected people may need to be considered. This may involve a complex operation that has the potential to place evacuees at some risk during its execution. Careful planning can minimise the risks associated with the process of evacuation and planning committees must take account of the following:

The decision to evacuate

Making the decision as to whether to evacuate or not will be assisted by the availability of timely and relevant information. If the decision is made too early and the hazard recedes, the evacuated community may have been exposed to unnecessary risk, inconvenience and cost. If the decision is made too late, the affected community may be forced to either evacuate under high-risk conditions or to shelter in place and accept the effects of the hazard impact.

While the nature of the hazard impact will be a primary consideration, an effective evacuation plan supported by an education program will facilitate decision making. Due to the complex nature of an evacuation operation it must not be regarded as a secondary reaction to other risk management strategies. The evacuation should be treated as a discrete response operation.

The authority to evacuate

Evacuation planning must establish the legal basis for evacuation and any conditions which apply. For example, in some countries there is no authority to force evacuation of people from properties. Factors such as this must be taken into account during the planning process as they may have a significant effect on how an evacuation is implemented. Authority to evacuate Manus Regional Processing Centre will be by Papua New Guinea Immigration and Citizenship Services (PNGICSA).

The importance of community awareness and education

Community awareness and education are critical to the successful implementation of an evacuation plan. A program should be instituted which covers hazard information, the need to evacuate under certain prescribed circumstances and specific action to be taken. The evacuation plan should allocate responsibility for community awareness and education programs. Raising awareness and educating the community should be done well before hazard impact. For example, before the start of the hazard season in the case of flood, cyclone, wildfire etc.

An effective community education program should be designed to establish:

- Community awareness of the hazards which may lead to a requirement to evacuate;
- Individual awareness of conditions, both pre-existing and hazard-related, which would support a decision to either evacuate or shelter in place; and
- Community awareness of the need to heed warning and public information messages.

Effective public information should:

- be complemented by the community education program;
- employ a variety of media (print, electronic, community announcement, word-of-mouth,

- etc) to disseminate information;
- carry authoritative, credible, simple, direct and unambiguous information, instructions and directions; and
- provide timely and constant reinforcement.

Community awareness and education aspects are applicable to all stages and should be continually reviewed to ensure appropriateness and effectiveness.

Need for security of evacuated premises

Perception of security may have considerable influence on the decision by individuals to evacuate or not. Hence, adequate security arrangements need to be made for residents being vacated and possessions left behind. This will involve security securing premises as well as an active program of security checking.

Potential risks in moving people in hazardous situations

Dislocation and the potential hazard-related dangers people may be facing are likely to place them under considerable stress. Under these circumstances people may not act as rationally as might normally be anticipated and they will need to be treated with a greater deal of compassion and understanding. The implications of this will need to be considered in the planning of all stages of evacuation but particularly in the withdrawal.

Need for control/coordination

Each stage of an evacuation may be the responsibility of a different agency. The activities of each involved agency must be coordinated to ensure that the overall process works efficiently. Control/coordination of evacuation responsibilities is specified, it is important for the evacuation plan to clearly reflect roles and responsibilities of all agencies involved. Control/Coordination cannot be effectively achieved without good communication between agencies.

Media

Communication with media will require skilled liaison and a system for the authorised release of current information. Planning should include identification of any agency media responsibilities in accordance with Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) arrangements. A media strategy should be developed and be in place prior to activation of evacuation plans.

Special-needs groups in the community

The plan must take the social implications of special-needs groups into account. For example, people with disabilities, people from non-English-speaking background may react differently during an evacuation. They may also have a range of differing needs. Critical aspects include problems of communication, mobility and culture.

Time management in large scale evacuation

Where large population (complete centre) need to be evacuated, it will be desirable to have calculated the time taken for certain functions to be performed. These timings (detailed below) can be incorporated into the plan:

Transport resources

Community analysis should define the level of transport resources required in different areas. Planning should be based on information such as the number of residents and the number of buses and vehicles required for the evacuation. The time required to marshal these resources will be an important planning factor.

Time required clearing the evacuation area

After evacuees have been advised of the need to leave, there will be a finite time before movement actually occurs. In addition, there will be time taken to move from accommodation to a point of safety, for example, assembly area/muster point to evacuation points. Calculation of these times is important and may require security command post (SCP) to identify locations of possible bottle-necks and assess potential vehicle flow-rates along required routes.

Testing and evaluation plan

The Emergency Evacuation Plan should be part of the annual exercising of EMP in conjunction with other plans and arrangements. All agencies involved in the execution of this plan must be familiar with their roles and responsibilities.

MANUS REGIONAL PROCESSING CENTRE

Manus Island

Manus Island is part of Manus Province in northern Papua New Guinea and is the largest island of the Admiralty Islands. It is the fifth largest island in Papua New Guinea with an area of 2,100 km², measuring around 100 km × 30 km. According to the 2000 census, the whole Manus Province had a population of 43,387, rising to 50,321 as of 2011 Census. Lorengau, the capital of Manus Province, is located on the island. Momote Airport, the terminal for Manus Province, is located on nearby Los Negros Island. A bridge connects Los Negros to Manus Island and the province capital of Lorengau. In addition to its resident population, asylum seekers have been relocated here from Australia between 2001-2004 and since 2012.

Manus Island is covered in rugged jungles, which can be broadly described as lowland tropical rain forest. The highest point on Manus Island is Mt. Dremsel 718 metres (2,356 feet) above sea level at the centre of the south coast. Manus is volcanic in origin and probably broke through the ocean's surface in the late Miocene, 8–10 million years ago. The substrate of the island is either directly volcanic or from uplifted coral limestone.

Manus Island Regional Processing Centre is an immigration detention and offshore asylum processing centre located on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea, operated by BROADSPECTRUM on behalf of the Australian government. The centre is located on the PNG Navy Base Lombrum (previously a Royal Australian Navy base called HMAS Tarangau).

Approved Evacuation Points

The Commanding Officer, PNG Navy Base Lombrum approves the evacuation areas throughout his base. There is a regular requirement to re-confirm locations due to construction works and changeover of Commanding Officers. Evacuation points are located at Annex A.

Emergency Area of Operations

Area of Operations (AO) is an operational area defined by the base commander for the conduct of emergency evacuation activities such as a natural disaster. Within the AO there is a Main Supply Route (MSR) along which vehicles, personnel and supplies will be transported.

Area of Operations (AO) AO identified is the eastern area of the base. Also identified is an area appropriate for placement of adequate emergency logistics and stores (prepositioned) to accommodate 1300+ residents and staff at Annex B.

Use of Safe Zones

Safe zones are located within the confines of the centre and may be utilised prior to an evacuation or under any civil disturbance incident;

Safe Zones are designated locations within the Regional Processing Centre (RPC) where those residents that indicate their intention to not participate in the disturbance of the peace will be escorted to. This will allow for a reduction of residents involved in an incident and reduce the complexity of the situation. Command and control will ensure one of the designated **safe zones** is nominated depending on circumstances and location of disturbance.

Safe Zones Locations are shown at Annex C.

Gates Numbering Systems

External and internal gates to the Manus Regional Processing Centre have been numbered for ease of recognitions and extraction of individual during an evacuation at Annex D.

Evaluation Sheets

Evaluation is the process of observing and recording exercise activities, comparing the performance of the participants against the objectives, and identifying strengths and weaknesses ensuring the continuous improvement cycle. See Annex G for evacuation evaluation sheet.

Contact Details

Refer to Annex H for the local emergency contact details.

FIVE STAGES OF EVACUATING MRPC

STAGE ONE: DECISION TO EVACUATE

Authority to evacuate Manus Regional Processing Centre

There are often many complex issues to be taken into account in making this decision and it may need to be made in the absence of the desired information. Once the decision to evacuate is decided the authority to evacuate must be obtained from Papua New Guinea

Immigration and Citizenship Services (PNGICSA). This normally requested through the Emergency Control Organisation (ECO).

Roles and responsibilities

Given the gravity of the decision in terms of saving lives and preventing injury, it is imperative that roles and responsibilities be clearly identified and comprehended.

- Request approval to evacuate – security
- Approving authority to evacuate – PNGICA
- Responsible for evacuating – security

Considerations

The following planning considerations relate to decision-making to evacuate:

- Vulnerability may indicate that, for certain hazards and under certain conditions, sheltering in place could well be the best protective strategy. Typically, this could be the case for some toxic chemical release incidents or in a wildfire situation. The success of this strategy will depend, to a large extent, on the degree to which premises have been prepared to withstand the impact and also the level of community awareness about the nature of the hazard and appropriate protective actions to be taken to reduce vulnerability.
- Because of the **potential for risk to evacuees during movement**, special attention should be paid to planning of this aspect. All appropriate risk control measures should be considered.
- **Available lead time** may influence the decision to evacuate. If there is sufficient time to warn and evacuate before the impact of the emergency (eg floods, fire) the risk during the movement may be greatly reduced. If time is not available or the hazard has already impacted it may be a case of rescuing those affected rather than evacuation.
- Evacuation can be a **time-consuming and resource-intensive process**. As the number to be evacuated rises, so does the time and resources it will take to carry out the evacuation. Movement of evacuees may cause congestion on roads in large-scale evacuations and unless the movement of people is properly planned and managed, congested conditions could defeat the purpose of the evacuation. This could be reduced by implementing a phases approach to evacuation (staggering departure times).
- **Egress routes** must be capable of handling the requirements of the evacuation. Roads usually available or safe may not be available during evacuation. Access routes will also be required by responding emergency vehicles. For instance, consider the potential for problems caused by flooding, driving rains and debris; or fire, smoke and fallen trees.
- Identification of **available resources** (including transport and personnel) to move the evacuees will influence the decision to evacuate.
- Depending on the type of hazard impact experienced, the requirement to provide **temporary accommodation** will need to be assessed. This will become an issue in some situations when there may be a choice between either evacuating an area or to shelter in place.

STAGE TWO: WARNING

Introduction

Warning is the second of five stages of the evacuation process and comprises the activation of the emergency evacuation sirens. These are strategically placed throughout the centre and are a three tone alarm systems.

- First tone indicate 'Code Yellow' – prepare to evacuate, all non-essential staff move to their muster points and residents move to assembly areas.
- Second tones indicate 'Code Orange' – movement of personnel from either the muster points or assembly areas to evacuation points.
- Third tone indicates all clear and is identified with a voiceover 'All Clear'

The effectiveness of the evaluation will largely depend on the quality of the warning process. Factors which may influence the effectiveness of the warning include time, distance, visual evidence, threat characteristics and sense of urgency demonstrated by the emergency services. For example, the more immediate the threat, the greater the readiness of people to accept and appropriately react to the warning.

Roles and responsibilities

It is essential that all agencies involved in the warning stage have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities. Formulation of warnings should involve the participation of some or all of:

- The community (including special-needs groups);
- The emergency services (ERT, FRT);
- The government agencies (all levels); and
- The non-government organisations.

Responsibility of initiating the warning

The sirens are initiated from the MRPC Control Centre. Located in the control centre are two remote controls (primary and backup) that activate the sirens, if for some reason these are not functioning the alternative is the use of audible handheld foghorns located in each gatehouse and at the control centre.

Relocation to Muster Points and or Assembly Areas

Signage identifying muster points and assembly areas are located throughout the Centre. There are at least two assembly area located in each Area. On activation of the first siren:

- All non-essential staff inside RPC 1 will be removed and directed to the muster point by security elements and report to the Department Muster Point Coordinator;
- All non-essential staff located in admin areas are to make their way to the muster point by the most direct route and report to the Department Muster Point Coordinator; and
- Residents are to be directed to their respective assembly areas by security elements. At the assembly area, head counts will be conducted to ensure all personnel are accounted for and if required a search party formed to locate missing personnel.

Simultaneously security elements will be clearing all buildings to ensure everyone had been evacuated. The Muster Points and Assembly Area diagram is at Annex E.

Actions at muster point by non-essential staff

All non-essential staff once accounted may be utilised as required by site manager.

Vehicles and Vehicle Keys; Vehicles are a critical enabler to the relocation and evacuation plan, and an identified risk area. It will be requested that all vehicles (less plant keys) are handed over to Wilson Security.

Where possible all vehicles within the Area are to be relocated to the vicinity of Muster Points and all keys are to be handed over to Access Control personnel at the Gate House/s.

If the vehicle is unable to be moved the keys are to be handed over to Access Control personnel at the Gate House/s, and the location and description of the vehicle.

Water Access; Water is stored in blue containers throughout the MIPRC and its surrounds. These water points are the main source for personnel water. As the situation allows water will also be located at the Assembly Area.

Fuel; All vehicles are to be maintained with full tanks on receipt of Warning Order if time allows. The fuel point will be secured by Wilson Security.

Communications; Communications will be maintained through Mobile Phone and Satellite Phone link between Operational and Strategic levels. Routine radio link at tactical level will be maintained.

STAGE THREE: WITHDRAWAL TO EVACUATION POINT

Introduction

Withdrawal is the third stage of the evacuation process and involves the removal of people from a dangerous or potentially dangerous area to a safer area.

Once the approval to evacuate the Centre has been received by ECO, Incident Command Post (IPC) will facilitate the movement coordination. Some evacuations may need to be phased to avoid congestion and/or mingling of residents. There will also be occasions when it may be assessed that residents in specific areas would be safer to stay and shelter in place or be transferred to a safe zone rather than an external location.

Roles and responsibilities

Security elements (ICP) have the responsibility for management of each of the elements of withdrawal. It is essential that all agencies involved in the 'withdrawal' stage have a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

Considerations

Some of the key considerations during the planning for withdrawal are:

Control/Coordination – PNGICSA is the agency that has the authority to order an evacuation and the security element is responsible to carry out the physical evacuation.

Phasing—some evacuations will need to be phased to avoid congestion or to ensure that residents where possible are not mixed into staff head-counts. Phasing may be by Areas, where the plan specifies the sequence of evacuation of specific elements of the population (i.e. Mike Area followed by Delta etc).

Resources - (transport personnel and communications) – to pool the limited resources all agencies need to assist.

Access/egress routes – these are clearly identified gates and/or sally ports that access and egress to the north and south of the centre to facilitate an orderly evacuation and are able to provide access for incoming personnel and resources.

Assembly areas - Although assembly areas will usually only be a temporary holding point prior to moving residents to evacuation points (or alternative accommodation), it will be necessary to provide basic welfare facilities while residents are waiting.

Security of the evacuated area — initial security and setting up of the evacuation point including water etc is the responsibility of **Romeo 2.**

Briefings to ECO - the mechanisms are in place for the Security Command Post (SCP) to brief the ECO (Incident Controller and stakeholders) of the plan.

Briefings should include the following:

- Details of the decision and reasons for the evacuation, including:
- The hazard, impact and effects;
- Areas to be evacuated;
- Current conditions; and
- Predicted conditions.
- Allocation of tasks and priorities.
- Access/egress routes - route markings, traffic control and vehicle recovery (if required).
- Location of assembly areas and evacuation points utilised.
- Records made of persons evacuated.
- Reporting of the completion of evacuation, thus allowing for the redeployment of resources.
- How the area is to be secured following evacuation, including road closures, and security patrols.

STAGE FOUR: SHELTER

Shelter is the fourth stage of the evacuation process and involves provision of the basic needs for affected people away from the immediate or potential effects of the hazard. Shelter provides for the temporary respite of evacuees. It may be limited in facilities, but must provide protection from the elements as well as accommodate the basic personal needs which arise at an individual level in an emergency.

Roles and responsibilities

Broadspectrum have the responsibility for management of each of the elements of shelter. Coordination of the separate task areas is usually directed by Broadspectrum Site Manager who is located at the Security Command Post.

Considerations

Important planning considerations to be addressed during this stage include the following:

- **Identification of appropriate shelter areas** - this should be based on safety, availability of facilities, capacity and numbers.
- **Shelter location**—this will be dependent on the type and severity of the hazard impact, possible sites have been identified.
- **Access/egress** - Vehicular access and egress must be planned to accommodate contingencies arising from the incident.
- **Vehicle assembly areas** -These should be identified in accordance with needs. Consideration should be given to changed conditions due to the hazard itself, the volume of traffic and weather.
- **Existing facilities and utilities** -These must provide for:
 - sanitation;
 - water;
 - electricity;
 - communications (for example telephone, computers, faxes); and
 - storage.
- **Catering services** -These should be mobile and multi-functional, able to provide various forms of refreshment and/or meals to all affected people, including emergency service personnel.
- **Medical support** - medical advice and emergency evacuation (medivac) is provided by IHMS.
- **Security**—Store and equipment (include telephones, computers and office material and equipment) will require secure accommodation depending on hazard (tsunami).

STAGE FIVE: RETURN

Introduction

Return is the fifth and final stage of the evacuation process. It will be necessary to assess the disaster area to determine if return is possible and identify any special conditions which may need to be imposed.

Roles and responsibilities

As the return process is complex and may be protracted, it is imperative that the ECO clearly identifies roles and responsibilities of the many agencies involved.

Considerations

Once the hazard which necessitated the evacuation no longer exists, return to MRPC can be considered. There are a number of considerations which need to be taken into account in this stage.

Affected area assessment

A detailed assessment of the affected area must be completed before a decision is made to return evacuees. The assessment should include consideration of:

- The presence of the hazardous condition;
- The possibility of the hazard impact recurring;
- The safety of the structures including:

- accommodation;
- utilities; and
- security;
- Availability of suitable facilities including:
 - accommodation—permanent or temporary;
 - utilities—permanent or temporary; and
 - Hygiene facilities—permanent or temporary.

Evacuees return criteria

Assessment of residents' mental state and physical health should be undertaken prior to their return.

Annexes

- A. Evacuation Points
- B. Emergency Area of Operations
- C. Safe Zones
- D. Gate Numbering System
- E. Assembly Area Diagrams
- F. Area Maps
- G. Evacuation Evaluation Check Sheets
- H. Contact Details

Evacuation Points



EMERGENCY EVACUATION AREA OF OPERATIONS




-  Out of Bounds Area (magazines and armoury)
-  Laydown Area

SAFE ZONES



EXTERNAL GATE NUMBER SYSTEM




ASSEMBLY AREA



OSCAR AREA




CHARLIE & BRAVO AREA






AREA



MIKE AREA



EVALUATION SHEET - AREA SIERRA

TASK:			Observation/Comment	Recommendations
No.	Scale	Prepare to Evacuate (Code Yellow)		
01	Yes/No	Did he recognize alarm to evacuate?		
02	Yes/No	Did he determine nature and location of incident, wind direction and any other relevant information?		
03	Yes/No	Did he assess incident situation and investigate relevant procedures		
04	Yes/No	Did he predict probable changes/escalation to incident?		
05	Yes/No	Did all SSA's RV at the designated location?		
06	Yes/No	Were the orders issued precise and detailed enough (situation, grouping and tasks)?		
07	Yes/No	Were all residents accounted for in the transferee's assembly area?		
08	Yes/No	Did he maintain communications channel with relevant personnel		
Evacuate (Code Orange)				
09	Yes/No	Did he identify hazards associated with evacuation?		
10	Yes/No	Did he identify and communicate any change in situation.		

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under the Freedom of Information Act 1982

11	Yes/No	Did he monitor head count, conduct sweep and/or appropriate action as required?		
12	Yes/No	Did he initiate phased evacuation when appropriate or on command (Assemble and Evacuation Points).		
13	Yes/No	Did he maintain security watch throughout?		
14	Yes/No	Did he occupy allocated area at evacuation point?		
15	Yes/No	Did he arrange and coordinate the first aid, welfare and other needs of evacuated persons.		
16	Yes/No	Did he arrange for/provide assistance to the incident controller as required		
17	Yes/No	Did he maintain communications channels with relevant personnel?		
18		Did he move evacuees to new location, or return to centre?		
Post Activity				
19	Yes/No	Did he debrief and seek possible improvements.		
20	Yes/No	Did he complete all required records and reporting.		
21	Yes/No	Arrange for suggested improvements to be incorporated into procedures as appropriate.		

Observer Details

Name:

Date:

Initial:

EVALUATION SHEET – MUSTER POINT COORDINATOR

TASK:			Observation/Comment	Recommendations
• Prepare for Response to Emergency • Respond to Emergency • Conduct Head Count, Maintain Control and Respond to Instructions				
No.	Scale	Preparation to Response to an Emergency		
01	Yes/	Did he ensure the readiness of the muster point is maintained?		
02	Yes/	Did he contribute to drills and exercise?		
Respond to Emergency				
09	Yes	Did he respond to emergency alarm?		
10	Yes	Did he make personal preparation for emergency (grab bag)?		
11	Yes/	Did he identify assigned muster point?		
12	Yes	Did he uplift grab bag, attire PPE?		
13	Yes/	Did he maintain communications channel with relevant personnel?		
Conduct Head Count and Maintain Control.				
18	Yes	Did he monitor active and/or passive headcount process?		
19	Yes	Did he confirm muster point status to Security Control Room?		

20	Yes/	Did he maintain Control at muster point?		
21	Yes/	Did he update mustered point personnel as required?		
Respond to Instructions.				
22	Yes/	Did he receive information to move to alternative position?		
23	Yes/	Did he communicate proposed route to SCR?		
24	Yes/	Did he inform Mustered personnel of plans and route?		
25	Yes	Did he confirm arrival at alternative location and muster status		
26	Yes	Did he respond to SCR commands?		

Observer Details

Name:

Date:

Initial:

EVALUATION SHEET – ROMEO 2

TASK:			Observation/Comment	Recommendations
- Preparation of Evacuation Area - Control the occupation of the evacuation point. - Implement control measures as directed from the Security Control Room.				
No.	Scale	Preparation of Evacuation Point (Code Yellow)		
01	Yes/No	Did he recognize alarm or other signals to prepare to evacuate?		
02	Yes/No	Did he determine nature and location of incident, wind direction and any other relevant information?		
03	Yes/No	Did he assess incident situation and investigate relevant procedures?		
04	Yes/No	Did he predict probable changes/escalation to incident?		
05	Yes/No	Did he uplift grab bag?		
06	Yes/No	Did he issue orders that were concise and workable (situation, grouping and tasks).		
07	Yes/No	Did he prepare evacuation point for reception of residents		
08	Yes/No	Did he maintain communications channel with relevant personnel.		
Control Evacuation Point (Code Orange)				

09	Yes/No	Did he identify hazards associated with evacuation?		
10	Yes/No	Did he identify and communicate any change in situation.		
11	Yes/No	Did he arrange for guides to direct residents to their respective allocated areas or have?		
12	Yes/No	Did he maintain security watch throughout?		
13	Yes/No	Did he arrange for/provide assistance to the incident controller as required		
14	Yes/No	Did he maintain communications channels with relevant personnel?		
Post Activity				
18	Yes/No	Did he refurbish area on completion		
19	Yes/No	Did he debrief and seek possible improvements.		
20	Yes/No	Did he complete all required records and reporting?		

Observer Details

Name:

Date:

Initial: