



Media Operations Guidelines

Standard Operating Procedures

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Principles and strategy

The role of Media Operations

Media Operations is the central contact point between the Portfolio and the media. We are responsible for engaging with and monitoring media, supporting the media activities of our Ministers, advising the Portfolio Executive and SES of emerging reputational issues, and actively pursuing opportunities for positive exposure.

Our team manages day-to-day (24/7) media enquiries from local and international media including in relation to Operation Sovereign Borders (as part of the Joint Agency Task Force). Media Operations also coordinates the Portfolio's key messages to the media through the development of media strategies, press releases, talking points, media events and the online newsrooms of both the Department and the Service. The section also undertakes a media monitoring function, including the provision of media clips to SES, and manages the Portfolio's involvement in Channel 7's reality television programme *Border Security*.

Key tasks

Our primary task is the coordination, clearing and distribution of media responses and releases. We also:

- ensure the Secretary, Chief Executive Officer, Executive Division, other relevant senior executives and the Ministers' offices are aware of potentially sensitive or controversial media issues
- · respond directly to enquiries from the media
- provide strategic and tactical advice on media issues, including providing input into Hot Issue Briefs
- liaise with the Minister's Office and the Portfolio on media issues
- coordinate all Portfolio and where appropriate, Ministerial media releases
- · coordinate interviews and briefings with journalists
- provide media support and advice to business areas on significant events, such as Parliamentary and Coronial inquiries, and speeches or presentations where media may be present
- identify positive media opportunities to enhance the Portfolio's reputation and promote the Portfolio's work
- · organise and manage media events and press conferences
- liaise with other agencies on WoG media issues

Key principles

MediaOps cultivates an environment where we:

- understand the media landscape and the subject matter expertise of the outlets we deal with on a day to day basis
- are immersed in the daily news cycle, absorbing issues of the day, and not only those in our Portfolio (we are across the Portfolio clips and Hot Issues)
- · respond quickly and professionally to internal and external stakeholders
- support our colleagues both domestically and internationally with media activities
- provide accurate, clean copy, with no spelling or grammatical errors
- strive to distil complex policy and operational information into plain English
- · adopt an open and accountable approach to minimise negative media coverage
- are constantly seeking opportunities to promote the positive work of our Portfolio
- promote high ethical standards and challenge behaviour which isn't in line with these standards
- openly share information and expertise within our team
- actively support each other professionally and personally

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Daily operating rhythm

It is essential that key stakeholders are briefed with timely, accurate information about the daily work of the team to ensure any issues are escalated and that the Executive has visibility of potential media issues.

Regular, daily updates and summaries include:

- Morning media clips, capturing metro and regional press, radio and tv coverage
- Daily Hot Issues update, summarising new and emerging issues for the day
- Evening media activities, summarising key media enquiries and issues, upcoming media coverage and key media coverage of the day, and media releases.

Ad-hoc, throughout the day updates include:

- Circulation of media monitoring to key stakeholders
- · Talking points and media enquiries sent to Minister's Office for visibility and noting

Monitoring the Media inbox is a crucial part of the day. All team members are expected to be working out of the media inbox, with visibility and awareness of all emails tracking across the day.

Morning media clips

Media Ops sends out a Daily Media Summary each morning, which is a summary of the overnight media coverage relevant to the Portfolio. The report is circulated to key internal stakeholders (AS and above), the Communication and Media Branch and the Minister's Office. The morning shift is responsible for compiling and issuing the DMS.

The clips are divided into two separate categories/emails:

- Metro Press Clips; and
- Electronic, Regional and Suburban Press Clips

These are distributed each workday morning. The Metro Press Clips must be issued at <u>7am</u> with the Electronic, Regional and Suburban Press Clips to follow at <u>8am</u>.

Printing of the clips is required for the Secretary, ACBPS CEO and Executive. One-sided copies are printed for the CEO and clipped and four two-sided copies are printed (one each for ACBPS CEO, Deputy Secretary Corporate, FAS Executive and Media Director).

On Friday's the Secretary requires a separate printed one-sided report which outline the Globalisation Clips for the week. These clips are taken from the Globalisation folder in the media portal.

It is important that the morning team members monitor the inbox prior/during compiling the media clips, in case urgent requests have come in overnight or early in the morning.

Hot Issues update

The Hot Issues update summarises key **media issues**, **media reporting and key events** for the coming day, including notable trends in media coverage, potential or ongoing issues which may attract media attention, and events of note. This summary is designed specifically to inform the AS CMB to brief the Secretary and CEO in their morning briefing.

The Hot Issues update is sent at 7:30am.

It is important that all Media Ops team members contribute to the Hot Issues update by adding any issues, upcoming events/compliance activities or anticipated 'hot' media coverage in the Media handover on the previous day. Make sure you put more detail than less, assume whoever is reading it knows nothing about the issue.

Evening media activities report - the 'Media Pulse'

The end-of-day report provides stakeholders with a snapshot of media activities, coverage and issues. The report aims to provide visibility of MediaOps activity, key media coverage of the day, anticipated coverage of interest, and potential issues.

<u>Updating the Media Pulse should be completed over the duration of the day</u>. You should add media activities to the Media Pulse when received/finalised, like you would the Media Log. This will make the end of day process easier for the late shift team members. Please summaries all enquiries appropriately. Proof read, we do not want any mistakes – this goes to executive remember.

The report is sent as close to <u>6:30pm</u> as possible, pending finalisation of media enquiries from the day.

Media handovers

At the end of <u>every shift</u> each Media Ops team member is required to update the handover email. Everything that is urgent or requires completion by the end of the day must be included at the top of the handover and also requires a verbal handover.

Media Ops team members are required to list other media activities they are working on under their name in the handover with a few dot points on where it is up to. This ensures other team members can pick up work if others have unexpected leave/absences.

Ongoing media awareness

As members of the Media Operations team, when 'on shift' we will maintain an awareness of key outlets – what's running for example on AM, PM, The World Today, 7.30 and Lateline.

When we return from days off or extended leave (or start an afternoon shift), we review clips, Hot issues and the Pulse – and talk to our colleagues about key issues.

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Media materials and content

Principles

Media materials (including talking points, responses and media releases):

- · Will be in plain, simple language
- Will avoid the use of technical, legal or operational jargon
- · Must not breach an individual's rights to privacy
- · Must not damage the reputation of innocent people
- Is sensitive to the rights of victims and their families to minimise distress
- Will not hamper or jeopardise investigations or operations
- · Will not prejudice the rights of the accused to a fair trial
- · Will not include classified material

In preparing media material and responding to requests from our Minsters' offices, we will ensure requests for formal advice from the Department will be directed to the appropriate line area. All responses to our Ministers' offices will be appropriately templated.

Talking points and media responses

Talking points

Talking points are the primary method used to brief the Minister's Office and spokespeople about potential media issues or for interview preparation. MediaOps is responsible for crafting and clearing TPs however the line areas are often required to submit input, and in many cases the line area will proactively prepare TPs for MediaOps consideration.

TPs should not be a written speech, or a list of stats and figures; they should instead be a dot point summary of main points and key messages which <u>can be read aloud quickly and easily</u>. Jargon, acronyms and long-winded sentences are to be avoided.

Contingency TPs are slightly different in that they are not for public consumption unless directly asked. Contingency TPs are included in the same brief however they will appear under the titles *If Asked*, and/or *If Pressed*.

The key component of defensive talking points is that they are **proactively prepared** – they are not in relation to a media enquiry. We actively identify situations where such activity is required and work with line areas to support this goal.

Media responses

Receiving Media Requests

- All media requests must be in writing and emailed to the Customs Media mailbox media@customs.gov.au or the Immigration Media mailbox natcomms@immi.gov.au.
- While on the phone, gather as much information from the journalist as possible to inform the response. Also ensure their deadline is realistic. If it is not, try to renegotiate.
- Once an email is received, apply issues management training to ascertain the level of urgency and risk, and to determine an appropriate action.
- If the media request was sent from the Minister's Office, please ensure you acknowledge receipt of this request via email.
- Make sure to capture:
 - o Their full name (first and surname)
 - o The name of the media organisation they are working for
 - o Contact details (preferably land-line, mobile and email)
 - o Record the time called if enquiry taken by phone
 - An email should be requested in all instances to clarify details of what they are asking and nature of enquiry
 - o Their deadline
 - o Advise them we will get back to them as soon as possible

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Using talking points/ media response template

Clearance boxes

In the template, use the clearance boxes to demonstrate who is in the clearance process. This means naming each of the people in the process and their position. Leave the date field blank until you have actually received clearance from that person.

All clearance boxes should be filled before sending through to a line area. If unsure, talk to another Media team member or an EA.

Background information

Include as much background as possible in the template. ESPECIALLY - other information or context we have uncovered, such as online articles, conversations with journalists. Critically analyze the context of the issue:

Where did the enquiry originate from? Why does the journalist want this information? Is there a specific event, announcement or report that we need to be aware of? What are the particular sensitivities or opportunities MediaOps is aware of? Is there a trend or other media reporting we should be aware of when preparing this response? Why are talking points necessary?

Preparing suggested response or material

Research subject matter

MediaOps is often asked to draft TPs on issues which have been dealt with before. The G/J Drive, Inbox, and other members of the team are therefore the best places to look for information before asking a line area.

Draft the TPs using whatever information you were able to find. Try to cover all angles and information that you believe might be asked by the media, as well as the main message. Once you have a working draft, seek input from specific line areas.

Be mindful that media matters are not their primary concern or area of expertise. We ask for their input into TPs to ensure our statements are accurate, however MediaOp must ensure TPs are clear, concise, and understandable to members of the public:

- Look through previous media responses to see if we have provided a similar response or developed talking points about this issue.
- The APH website has a wealth of useful information has this been answered in a QoN?
- Provide a suggested response wherever possible. Line areas will use this as their guide or as the response to clear.
- Make it clear that the suggested material has been drafted from previously cleared material and highlight any areas where there is an information gap or a question not addressed.
- Responses should be short and sharp and in plain English think, does this
 adequately answer the question asked?

 Run your template with a team manager or a colleague before sending through to the line area.

Clearance

- All information and wording must receive clearance up to ND/AS level.
- ALWAYS provide line area with a clear deadline, COB is not a deadline. Make sure you
 allow time for clearances through all appropriate levels and Minister's Office if required.
- Following clearance and being noted by Minister's Office words can then be released to the media.
- If the enquiry does not need formal noting from the MO, send as an FYI and leave a
 window for them to consider. If a media enquiry is largely operational, discuss with the
 manager if it can be sent without MO visibility.
- It is preferable to provide journalists with written responses when this can be facilitated to
 ensure that there is no misunderstanding of the agency's response and position on a
 topic.
- If a line area provides TP or a response filled with legalese, acronyms, or other technical language, discuss how appropriate there inclusion is with your supervisor or manager. A talking point is meant to be spoken out loud.
- All enquiries should receive final clearance by a team manager before being sent to the Minister's Office for noting/responding.

Sending emails to the Minister's Office

- When sending to the Minister's Office, send to the relevant media adviser/s and use the "CC" list. The "CC" list can be found on the Customs Media Contacts in Outlook.
- Send "FOR NOTING" or "FOR INFORMATION" if you send it for noting, you must WAIT for a response. Don't forget always put what is required in the subject header.
- If the email is "FOR INFORMATION" make sure you still give the Minister's Office at least half an hour to come back with any concerns, if you have any doubts ask a team manager.

Sending emails to journalists

- ALWAYS send from the Portfolio mailbox and use the Portfolio Media signature block
- ALWAYS put the below sentence in front of your response:
 Please attribute the following to a Customs and Border Protection spokesperson OR Immigration and Border Protection Portfolio spokesperson.
- Change the subject header to "RESPONSE subject matter"
- Remove surname from signature block.

Hot Issues Brief (HIB)

- MediaOps provides input/ clearance of the talking points in a HIB.
- Note MediaOps DOES NOT clear the entire HIB, only the talking points.
- As with all talking points, the HIB TPs needs to be cleared by a Media Manager/ Director. If it is out of hours duty officer to make a judgment on the clearance level required depending on the issue.

TPs should be short, sharp and in plain English.

On Call

Acting as the on call officer brings with it special privileges and responsibilities. You should be prepared at all times for a call from, and a need to brief, the Secretary, CEO or Minister. Knowledge of all issues is not crucial – but a professional response is.

Prior to going on call, you must seek a verbal briefing from either a team leader or colleague on afternoon shift in Portfolio HQ.

Any significant overnight media activity or inquiry is to be reported verbally to the morning shift for inclusion in the 0730 Hot Issues report. It is important you always update the handover email when you finish on call with any information that will assist the person/people taking over next.

When clearing materials, follow the same process outlined above. TPs/ media responses do not require duty manager clearance unless controversial or sensitive – use your judgment to appropriately brief up.

All duty work must be logged in the Media On-Call Register saved in the drive under Admin. This is way for you to keep track of the enquiries/work you have dealt with while on call and also the number of hours worked during this time.

Recording media activity - the log

The media enquiries log should be updated as soon as possible after you receive an enquiry from a media outlet.

Any contact with media outlets should be recorded. This included enquiries referred to other departments or agencies, or informal responses.

Any follow-up contact received by media outlets, or any follow-up contact you make to media outlets should be recorded.

Updating the log should be an ongoing part of the process every time a media enquiry is received and the log must be completed as soon as practicable – particularly when on call and you alone are aware of the inquiry and response provided.

You MUST also log/update media activity in the Media Pulse. It is not the sole responsibility of the late shift workers to search for finalised work.

The log is an essential tracking mechanism to ensure we can quickly capture everything on hand.

Escalation of critical issues/media enquiries

When a Media Officer receives a media enquiry or is alerted to a potential media issue, they should quickly ascertain the level of urgency and risk, and action accordingly.

Media Officers should assess the enquiry on:

- The prominence of the media outlet
- The significance of the issue/ allegations
- The novelty of the issue/allegations is this fresh information?

When being alerted to a **significant** media issue by an internal line area, MediaOps should ask if the issue is being separately escalated to the Secretary. If a Media Officer does not feel that the line area is adequately briefing the Secretary, they should immediately escalate to the Media Director or Communications and Media Assistant Secretary.

When MediaOps receives the enquiry/issue directly from the media, they are responsible for escalating to the Secretary.

The Media Officer receiving the enquiry should alert the Media Manager (or when on call, the Duty Media Manager) who will escalate to the Media Director or Communications and Media Assistant Secretary.

If the Media Officer is unable to reach a Media Manager or the Media Director they should directly escalate to the AS Communication and Media, or FAS Executive Division.

If the Media Officer is unable to contact a member of the Executive Division to brief, they have the authority to contact the Secretary and CEO (via their offices in work hours, or directly after hours) to provide awareness of a hot issue.

Media releases

MediaOps will often field requests for development of a media release from the Minister's Office, from the line area to progress to the Minister's Office, or to support broader business initiatives such as Cabinet Submissions

The Media Officer should discuss the request with a Media Manager the appropriateness of the request and how it should be prioritized – some requests from line areas will not require a media release but will be covered by other communications products.

Media strategies and events

The MediaOps team develops media strategies, ranging from routine media releases and talking points to assisting with critical communication situations at major incidents and operational resolutions with high media and/or political impact.

Media strategies can include, but are not limited to:

- Objectives
- Identification of critical issues and sensitivities

- Key messages for a wide audience and those targeting any particular groups
- Identifying and delivering the key messages to the media
- Identification of controlled footage and photographs for release
- Talking points
- Media releases
- Flexibility to allow the strategy to be easily updated over time (first 24 hours,
 48 hours and beyond) to meet the changing media environment
- Flexibility for the strategy to be delivered in phases
- Chain of command approval to ensure consistency is maintained in the dayto-day release of information
- Identifying an appropriate spokesperson, including alternatives
- Briefings/preparation of spokespersons for live or pre-recorded radio/camera interviews
- Resources needed to deliver the strategy and other line area responsibilities, including Program Communications, Ministerial and Online.
- Processes for liaison, and the timely flow of information, between operational members, the Executive, Media Team and other emergency services or key stakeholders as required (e.g. government ministers and departments)
- Evaluation of the strategy and capture of media results

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Operation Sovereign Borders

Media Handling Arrangements

Operational security

Operational security regarding OSB activities is paramount, especially with regard to onwater operations. We are obliged to protect the sensitive official information used to professionally perform the work the government directs us to achieve. It is an offence to give sensitive official information to people who do not have a need to know. All instances of unauthorised release of information are taken seriously and are

Media enquiries

investigated.

All media enquiries relating to OSB should be referred in writing to MediaOps at media@customs.gov.au.

This includes media enquiries directed at, or relating to the work of, the three Joint Agency Task Force (JATF) OSB task groups: the Disruption and Deterrence Task Group (AFP-led); the Detection, Interception and Transfer Task Group (BPC-led); and the Offshore Detention and Returns Task Group (DIBP-led).

In some cases there will be overlap between matters which are definitively part of OSB and matters which are less clearly so. In these cases MediaOps will liaise with relevant department/agency media teams.

Multi-agency responses

MediaOps has a facilitation and coordination role in preparing multi-agency responses to media enquiries. Where required, MediaOps will source input from the three JATF OSB task groups and/or other supporting agencies to incorporate into a whole-of-government response.

OSB relies on each task group to provide subject matter advice and clearance, however all responses are also run through the JATF OSB, either 'for clearance' or 'for information' depending on the topic. If JATF OSB clearance is required, this is normally the last step in the clearance process, after an agreed response has been developed between contributing agencies.

Initial triaging and allocation of media enquiries is completed by MediaOps.

Any media enquiry requiring ministerial involvement will be coordinated and cleared through MediaOps before being referred to the MIBP's office.

Requests from other ministerial offices should also be coordinated through MediaOps.

OSB monthly operational updates

JATF OSB operational updates detailing any illegal maritime arrivals and transfers are issued monthly. A media statement and associated operational update fact sheet are published online each month:

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http://newsroom.customs.gov.au/channels/Operation-Sovereign-Borders

MediaOps coordinates the input for the statement and fact sheet with the relevant JATF OSB task groups.

Additional media briefings may be given about significant events, such as a suspected illegal entry vessel sinking or a Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) incident. These will also be coordinated by MediaOps.

Media releases

OSB-related media releases, including those to be distributed offshore, are to be coordinated and cleared by MediaOps. Once cleared, releases will be issued to media outlets and/or distributed to overseas posts by the JATF OSB.

Whole-of-government talking points

MediaOps will develop and maintain OSB whole-of-government talking points.



Australian Border Force – 2015-16 Governance Arrangements and Supporting Operational outputs

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Purpose

This document outlines the proposed governance arrangements for the Australian Border Force (ABF) for the 2015-16 financial year. It also includes the operational planning cycle which shows how the strategic priorities developed by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) will translate into operational plans applied by the ABF. In particular, this document summarises:

- The proposed governance structure for the ABF including the interaction with the DIBP
- The responsibilities and scope of each governance group
- An overview of the operational planning cycle and planning tools including responsible bodies and timeframes.

Background

From 1 July 2015, the functions of the DIBP and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service will be integrated. Additionally, a new front-line operational agency, the ABF, will be established within the new Department. The ABF, as the operational enforcement entity within the Department, will focus on the investigations, compliance and detention operations offshore and onshore, across air and seaports, and land and maritime domains.

To ensure a successful transition to the DIBP and ABF, governance arrangements have been revised to align with the new structure and organisation functions. These governance arrangements will be reviewed annually.

Governance arrangements

In 2015-16, the ABF will maintain governance arrangements involving three primary decision making groups:

- The Strategic Command Group (SCG)
- The Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group (STCG)
- The Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group (TTCG)

The governance structure and its connection to the wider DIBP are shown in Figure 1.

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


Figure 1 - 2015-16 Governance Structure for the ABF

Each of the three groups will be supported by a Secretariat provided by Border Management Division. To maintain effective and efficient Governance arrangements, the timeframes shown in Table 1 will apply for the submission of documents to and from the Secretariat.

Group	Secretariat to request submissions from members	Secretariat to provide agenda and previous minutes to Chair (or delegate) for approval	Members to provide submissions to the Secretariat	Secretariat to distribute agenda and papers to members	Secretariat to distribute approved minutes to members
Strategic Command Group	No later than four weeks prior to scheduled meeting	No later than two weeks prior to scheduled meeting	No later than three weeks prior to scheduled meeting	No later than one week prior to scheduled meeting	No later than one week prior to scheduled meeting
Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group	No later than three weeks prior to scheduled meeting	No later than one week prior to scheduled meeting	No later than two weeks prior to scheduled meeting	No later than 48 hours prior to scheduled meeting	No later than 48 hours prior to scheduled meeting.

ABF Governance Arrangements and supporting operational outcomes 2015/16

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Group	Secretariat to request submissions from members	Secretariat to provide agenda and previous minutes to Chair (or delegate) for approval	Members to provide submissions to the Secretariat	Secretariat to distribute agenda and papers to members	Secretariat to distribute approved minutes to members
Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group	NA – Standing Agenda	No later than 48 hours prior to scheduled meeting	No later than 48 hours prior to the scheduled meeting	No later than 24 hour prior to scheduled meeting	Only action items taken. Provided before next scheduled meeting.

Table 1: Timeframes for the movement of documents to and from the Secretariat

The role and purpose of each group

Strategic Command Group

From 2015-16, the SCG will be responsible for setting the strategic direction for the ABF. This role is enabled by input from the Minister, the DIBP Executive Committee, and other areas of the DIBP as required. The Chair of the SCG will be the ABF Commissioner.

The primary responsibility of the SCG is to develop the operational and intelligence priorities for the subsequent financial year. The SCG is also expected to monitor and address changes in the strategic intelligence picture, operational risks and issues, and any trends which might require Department-wide action or intervention. Further, the SCG will resolve issues escalated by the Chair of the STCG.

The SCG will meet on a quarterly basis. The high level timeframes for the quarterly SCG cycle are shown in Figure 2.



Figure 2: High level timeframes for the quarterly Strategic Command Group cycle

ABF Governance Arrangements and supporting operational outcomes 2015/16

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The products of the SCG will be submitted to the STCG Chair and members as a basis to undertake their responsibilities.

The Terms of Reference for the SCG are at Attachment A.

Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group

From 2015-16, the STCG will be responsible for using the Operational Priorities endorsed by the SCG as a basis to provide direction to Strategic Border Command (SBC), Maritime Border Command (MBC), Investigations and Status Resolution Programmes, and Operations Divisions for operational output. Additionally, the STCG will be responsible for ongoing operational performance review; and the consideration of any issues escalated by the Chair of the TTCG.

To complete this role, the Chair of the STCG will direct the completion of Enforcement Strategies and Intelligence, Disruption, Enforcement and Compliance (IDEC) Delivery Plans. The chair will allocate the responsibility/ownership of each Enforcement Strategy and IDEC Delivery Plan to the relevant members for the activities within their span of accountability. The STCG members will maintain ownership of the documents but can delegate the completion of the documents to their staff members as they see fit. Once complete, all STCG members will have the opportunity to review the Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans in order to provide advice to the Chair to suggest changes. The Chair will have the authority to endorse each document or request further work is undertaken. These documents must be reviewed each time a change is made to the Operational Priorities, or as directed by the Chair of the SCG. The Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans will be used as input into the TTCG as a basis to undertake their responsibilities.

The STCG will meet on a monthly basis or more frequently if directed by the Chair of the SCG. Figure 3 shows the high-level timeframes for the monthly STCG cycle.



The Terms of Reference for the STCG are at Attachment B.

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Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group

The TTCG will be responsible for setting and applying operational activities that will deliver the outcomes of the Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans. Additionally, the TTCG will discuss operational issues as they arise for resolution or escalation to the STCG.

To undertake this role, the Chair of the TTCG will be responsible for directing the completion of operational Action Plans. Each Regional Commander will be responsible for the completion of an Action Plan each month for the activities within their span of accountability. The group members will have the opportunity to review each Action Plan and the Chair will have the authority to endorse the Plans or request further work is undertaken. Weekly meetings will be used to discuss the progress of operational activities and to consider issues as they arise.

The TTCG will meet weekly and will report to the Chair of the STCG. Figure 4 shows the high level timeframes for the weekly TTCG cycle.




Figure 4 - The high level timeframes for the weekly Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group cycle

The Terms of Reference for the TTCG are at Attachment C.

The Operational Planning Cycle

The operational planning cycle includes the development and application of planning tools by the groups as well as ongoing performance review. The ABF operational planning cycle will be instigated with the development of DIBP Strategic Priorities by the Executive Committee. The endorsed Strategic Priorities will be translated into operational planning tools by the groups who will then undertake ongoing performance monitoring.

The Operational Planning Cycle is available at *Attachment D*.

The planning tools to be produced as part to the Operational Planning Cycle in 2015-16—will include:

- The ABF Operational Priorities endorsed by the SCG
- Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans endorsed by the STCG

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The Australian Border Force Operational Priorities

The Operational Priorities set the focus for the ABF for the subsequent financial year. The list of priorities can include commodities, geographic locations, planned events or any combination of those. For example, priorities may include high risk countries such as imports s. 37(2)(b) or specific commodities coming through a particular domain such as s. 37(2)(b) imported through s. 37(2)(b)

The ABF operational priorities are developed annually within the first SCG meeting after the Executive Committee develops the DIBP Strategic Priorities. The SCG Chair has the authority to schedule an additional meeting for the development of the Operational Priorities if no meeting is scheduled at an appropriate time.

Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans

Members of the STCG will have ownership of the Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Plans. Individual Enforcement strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans are completed for each identified operational priority. Enforcement Strategies include context on why the commodity/geographic location/ event is considered to be a priority and the desired outcomes of ABF activity. The Enforcement Strategy also includes a number of performance measures to be monitored throughout the financial year.

IDEC Delivery Plans list the specific intelligence, disruption, enforcement and compliance activities that need to be undertaken to address the risks within the Enforcement Strategies. These activities are categorised as pre-border, at the border or post border activities.

Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans are completed using a template reviewed annually.

Attachment F shows a more detailed view of the development and endorsement timeframes for Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans.

Operational Action Plans

Action plans outline the specific operational activities that will be undertaken to achieve the outcomes listed in the Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans. Operational Action Plans will be completed on a monthly basis by each of the Regional Commanders SBC, Deputy Commander MBC and Investigations Commanders. Action Plans are endorsed by the TTCG.

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Attachment A - Terms of reference for the Strategic **Command Group**

Strategic Command Group

Terms of Reference

These terms of reference set out the Strategic Command Group (SCG)'s role, responsibilities, membership and decision making, reporting and administrative arrangements.

Role

The Strategic Command Group (SCG) is responsible for endorsing input into the Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) Strategic Plan, and setting the Australian Border Force (ABF) Operational Priorities for the financial year.

The SCG will operate in accordance with the principles of:

Transparent and open decision-making in delivering its responsibilities

Clearly defined roles and responsibilities including accountability and delegation for decision-making

Adopting evidence-based decision-making and submit to appropriate scrutiny

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- Requiring collaboration across the Portfolio including the effective and timely communication of decisions and actions to all relevant stakeholders, and
- Working with stakeholders to build organisational capability and resilience.

Responsibilities

The primary responsibilities of the SCG are to:

- Support the Chair to set the direction for the ABF Operational Priorities annually
- Support the Chair to set the annual intelligence collection requirements
- Review operational priorities six monthly
- Review performance against operational priorities
- Review progress of New Policy Proposal implementation into operational areas
- Review alignment of resources and capability to deliver against priorities
- Consider issues of operationally strategic significance
- Resolve/note issues escalated by the Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group
- Discuss the strategic intelligence picture, operational risks and issues, and any trends which might require Department-wide action or intervention
- Where necessary, review strategic reports and intelligence assessments provided for decision
- Provide executive level leadership, direction, advice and guidance to Programmes as required, and
- Ensure the ongoing strategic alignment and relevance of operations to Programme plans and with the DIBP Strategic Plan and Capability Plan.

The role of the Chair is to:

- Be the responsible officer for the decisions and directions of the SCG, and
- Conduct each meeting in accordance with the agenda and organisational requirements to enable participation, discussion, problem solving and resolution of issues.

Membership

The membership of the SCG is:

- ABF Commissioner (Chair)
- DIBP Secretary
- Deputy Commissioner Operations Group
- Deputy Commissioner Support Group
- Chief Operating Officer/ Deputy Secretary Corporate
- Deputy Secretary Visa and Citizenship Services
- Deputy Secretary Policy
- Deputy Secretary Intelligence and Capability
- Assistant Commissioner Strategic Border Command (SBC)
- Commander Maritime Border Command (MBC)

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- Deputy Secretary Client Services Decision Support Review
- Deputy Secretary Detention Capability Review Taskforce

The following positions will attend as advisors to the SCG:

- **Assistant Commissioner Border Management**
- Assistant Commissioner Border Force Capability
- **Assistant Commissioner Investigations**
- First Assistant Secretary Children, Community and Settlement Services
- First Assistant Secretary Detention Services
- First Assistant Secretary Community Protection
- First Assistant Secretary Executive
- First Assistant Secretary Intelligence
- First Assistant Secretary Integrity, Security & Assurance
- First Assistant Secretary Major Capability
- First Assistant Secretary Strategic Reform Programme

Other Subject Matter Experts may be invited by the Chair to provide specialist advice or subject matter expertise to support the SCG in consideration of a particular matter.

The Chair will issue invitations to these officers on a case-by-case basis.

The committee is supported by a secretariat.

Quorum

Subject to the agreement of the Chair, a Committee Member may send a proxy if they are unable to attend a meeting. This is based on the principle that good governance requires continuity and as such members must maintain consistent attendance at meetings and keep abreast of committee activities.

For a meeting to take place, a minimum of five substantive members must be available to attend.

Decision Making

The Chair of the SCG is the final decision-maker on all matters brought before the SCG.

Members are present to advise the chair on decision making matters. Members do not hold voting rights.

Total consensus is not required for a decision to be taken by the Chair. The Chair of the SCG must consider issues for resolution and either report decisions, or escalate issues SCG must consider issues for resolution and either report decisions, or escalate issues as required.

Meetings

The SCG will meet once a quarter. Out-of-session considerations may also apply when

necessary.

The Chair or members will sponsor items for each agenda.

The Chair will approve each agenda.

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Secretariat

Secretariat services will be provided by Border Management Division.

The Secretariat will be responsible for:

- Requesting submissions (as directed by the Chair) no later than four weeks prior to a scheduled meeting
- Drafting and providing the agenda to the Chair or their delegate for approval, no later than two weeks prior to a scheduled meeting
- Distributing the approved agenda to committee members no later than one week prior to a scheduled meeting
- Drafting and distributing minutes and action items to the Chair and members prior to the succeeding meeting, and
- Monitoring the completion of action items.

The Secretariat will report directly to the Chair.

The Chair may direct the Secretariat to review and reject submissions prior to acceptance and/or to seek additional information or consultation where required.

The Chair may also direct the Secretariat to develop and submit addendum papers to the SCG which expose any differing views and risks not fully canvassed in submissions.

The Chair will decide the level and scale of distribution of all meeting records with due consideration to openness and transparency of decision-making.

Submissions and Consultation

Submissions must be provided as per the template and endorsed by a minimum SES Band 2.

The Secretariat will request submissions (as directed by the Chair) no later than four weeks prior to a scheduled meeting.

Submissions must be provided to the Secretariat no later than three weeks prior to the scheduled meeting.

Submissions must include clear recommendations to facilitate good decision-making.

Wide and thorough consultation across all internal and external stakeholders must be undertaken prior to the submission of papers, with resulting risks and sensitivities clearly documented.

Submissions must clearly articulate any shortcomings, deficiencies and challenges and describe any disparate views.

Where the Chair decides that submissions are not relevant to the SCG, or for any other reason, they may be referred for consideration by another committee or be instructed to be dealt with outside of committee processes as part of normal management decision-making.

Sub-Committees and Working Groups

The SCG may establish sub-committees and/or working groups to assist the SCG in meeting its responsibilities. The responsibilities, membership and reporting

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arrangements for each sub-committee or working group shall be documented and approved by the SCG.

The Chair of a sub-committee will have the delegated authority to make decisions within defined parameters set by the SCG and will provide regular reports back to the SCG Chair on his/her exercise of the delegated authority, and refer matters upwards when he/she judges that to be necessary.

The Chair of a working group will not have final decision-making authority, but has defined responsibility to review issues, proposals or options and develop advice for the SCG.

Review of the Terms of Reference

The Secretariat will undertake a review of these Terms of Reference at least once per year to determine whether the committee is still required and if the purpose and strategic direction remain the same. The Secretariat will report to the Chair on the outcomes of this review.

Any amendments to the Terms of Reference must be submitted to the SCG for endorsement before they come into effect.

Attachment B - Terms of Reference for the Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group

Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group

Terms of Reference

These terms of reference set out the Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group (STCG)'s role, responsibilities, membership and decision making, reporting and administrative arrangements.

Role

The STCG supports the work of and reports to the Strategic Command Group (SCG) and is responsible for developing, implementing and monitoring the Operational Priorities authorised by the SCG and used as a basis to provide direction to all organisational units

responsible for Australian Border Force (ABF) operational output.

The STCG is responsible for ensuring the completion and monitoring the implementation of Enforcement Strategies and Intelligence, Disruption, Enforcement and Compliance (IDEC) Plans for the Operational Priorities that are set by the SCG.

The STCG is responsible for monitoring the synchronisation and performance effectiveness of operational areas and providing guidance and direction.

The STCG will operate in accordance with the principles of:

Transparent and open decision-making in delivering its responsibilities.

- Clearly defined roles and responsibilities including accountability and delegation for decision-making.
- Adopting evidence-based decision-making and submit to appropriate scrutiny.
- Requiring collaboration across the ABF including the effective and timely communication of decisions and actions to all relevant stakeholders.
- Working with stakeholders to build organisational capability and resilience.

Responsibilities

The primary responsibilities of the STCG members are to:

- As directed by the Chair, take responsibility for the completion of specific Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Plans for one or more Operational Priorities annually.
- Support the Chair to endorse the Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans annually.
- Consider operational updates and issues escalated by the Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group for resolution or escalation to the SCG.
- Consider intelligence updates and forecasts, operational risks and issues, and any trends which might require Department-wide remedial action or intervention by the Commissioner or Secretary.
- Where necessary, review strategic reports provided for decision.

The role of the Chair is to:

- Be the responsible officer for the decisions and directions of the STCG.
- Assign responsible officers for the completion of the Enforcement Strategy and IDEC Plans for each Operational Priority on an annual basis.
- Conduct each meeting in accordance with agenda and organisational requirements to encourage participation, discussion, problem solving and resolution of issues.

Membership

The membership of the STCG is:

- Deputy Commissioner Operations Group (Chair)
- Deputy Commissioner Support Group
- Assistant Commissioner Strategic Border Command (SBC)
- Commander Maritime Border Command (MBC)
- Assistant Commissioner Border Management
- Assistant Commissioner Border Force
- Assistant Commissioner Investigations
- First Assistant Secretary Children, Community and Settlement Division
- First Assistant Secretary Community Protection
- First Assistant Secretary Detention Services
- First Assistant Secretary Intelligence
- First Assistant Secretary Trade, Customs and Industry Policy Division

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Subject Matter Experts (non-members) may be invited by the Chair to provide specialist advice to support the STCG in consideration of a particular matter.

Quorum

Subject to the agreement of the Chair, a Committee Member may send a proxy if they are unable to attend a meeting. The proxy member must be a direct report to the absent member. This is based on the principle that good governance requires continuity and as such members must maintain consistent attendance at meetings and keep abreast of committee activities.

For a meeting to take place, a minimum of six substantive members must be present.

Decision Making

The Chair of the STCG is the final decision-maker on all matters brought before the STCG. Members are present to advise the chair in relation to relevant matters.

The Chair of the STCG must consider issues, the views of the STCG and make and report decisions to the SCG as required.

Total consensus is not required for a decision to be taken. The Chair of the STCG must consider issues, make decisions and report decisions to the SCG as required.

Meetings

The STCG will meet once a month. Out-of-session considerations may also apply when necessary.

The Chair will approve the agenda and the Chair and Committee Members will sponsor items for the agenda.

Secretariat

Secretariat services will be provided by Border Management Division.

The Secretariat will be responsible for:

- Requesting submissions (as directed by the Chair) no later than two weeks prior to a scheduled meeting.
- Drafting and providing the agenda to the Chair or their proxy for approval no later than one week prior to a scheduled meeting.
- Distributing the approved agenda to committee members no later than 48 hours prior to a scheduled meeting.

 Drafting and distributing minutes and action items to the Chair and member prior to the succeeding meeting.

 Monitoring the completion of action items.

 Eariat will report directly to the Chair.

 may direct the Secretariat to review and reject submissions prior to Distributing the approved agenda to committee members no later than 48

The Secretariat will report directly to the Chair.

The Chair may direct the Secretariat to review and reject submissions prior to acceptance and/or to seek additional information or consultation where required.

The Chair may direct the Secretariat to develop and submit addendum papers to the STCG which expose any differing views and risks not fully canvassed in submissions.

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The Chair will decide the level and scale of distribution with due consideration to openness and transparency of decision-making.

Submissions and Consultation

Any formal submissions to be considered by the STCG must satisfy the following conditions unless prior agreement has been received by the Chair:

- Submissions must be provided as per the template and be endorsed by a minimum of a SES Band 1.
- Submissions must be provided to the Secretariat at least two weeks prior to the scheduled meeting.
- Submissions must include clear recommendations to facilitate good decision-making.
- Wide and thorough consultation across all internal and external stakeholders must be undertaken prior to the submission of papers, with resulting risks and sensitivities clearly documented.
- Submissions must clearly articulate any shortcomings, deficiencies and challenges and describe any disparate views.
- Where the Chair decides that submissions are not relevant to the STCG, or for any other reason, they may be referred for consideration by another committee or be instructed to be dealt with outside of committee processes as part of normal management decision-making.

Sub-Committees and Working Groups

The STCG may establish sub-committees and/or working groups to assist the STCG in meeting its responsibilities. The responsibilities, membership and reporting arrangements for each sub-committee or working group shall be documented and approved by the STCG.

The Chair of a sub-committee will have the delegated authority to make decisions within defined parameters set by the STCG and will provide regular reports back to the STCG Chair on his/her exercise of the delegated authority, and refer matters upwards when he/she judges that to be necessary.

The Chair of a working group will not have final decision-making authority, but has defined responsibility to review issues, proposals or options and develop advice or recommendations for the SCG.

Review of the Terms of Reference

The STCG Secretariat will undertake a review of these Terms of Reference at least once per year to determine whether the committee is still required and if the purpose and strategic direction remain the same. The Secretariat will report to the Chair on the outcomes of this review.

Any amendments to the Terms of Reference must be submitted to the SCG for endorsement before they come into effect.

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Attachment C- Terms of Reference for the Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group

Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group

Terms of Reference

These Terms of Reference (TOR) set out the Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group (TTCG)'s role, responsibilities, membership and decision making, reporting and administrative arrangements.

Role

The TTCG executes operational priorities, considers tactical responses to emerging threats and ensures the appropriate allocation of resources against the operational priorities.

The TTCG directs the completion and application of operational activity and plans to meet the objectives of the Enforcement Strategies and Intelligence, Disruption, Enforcement and Compliance (IDEC) Delivery Plans developed by the Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group (STCG).

The TTCG will operate in accordance with the principles of:

- Transparent and open decision-making in delivering its responsibilities
- Clearly defined roles and responsibilities including accountability and delegation for decision-making
- Adopting evidence-based decision-making and submit to appropriate scrutiny
- Requiring collaboration across the ABF including the effective and timely communication of decisions and actions to all relevant stakeholders, and
- Working with stakeholders to build organisational capability and resilience.

Responsibilities

The primary responsibilities of the TTCG are to:

- Inform members on what is happening across the operational environments, seek clarification, agree on tactical changes to posture and to discuss areas for improvement and resolution.
- Ensure tactical operational plans and activities align with the operational priorities
- Review operational outcomes against performance measures in order to report back to STCG.

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- Consider operational issues for resolution or escalation to the STCG.
- Governance over profile and alerts in portfolio systems.

The role of the Chair is to:

- Be the responsible officer for the decisions and directions of the TTCG.
- Ensure that each Commander within the ABF that is responsible for operational activity maintains responsibility for the completion of operational plans and activities within their span of accountability.
- Conduct each meeting in accordance with the agenda and organisational requirements to enable participation, discussion, problem solving and resolution of issues.
- Ensure any items that are considered important are escalated to **STCG**
- Ensure that the ABF has clear direction on operational activities based on sound advice using the best strategic data.

Membership

The membership of the TTCG is:

- Assistant Commissioner Strategic Border Command (Chair)
- Commander Operations, Strategic Border Command
- Commander Detention Operations, Strategic Border Command
- Deputy Commander Maritime Border Command
- Commander Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Investigations
- Assistant Secretary Operational Intelligence Branch, Intelligence
- Assistant Secretary Tactical Intelligence Branch, Intelligence
- Band 1 SES from Border Management
- Regional Commanders (via secure video link)

Quorum

Subject to the agreement of the Chair, a Committee Member may send a proxy if they are unable to attend a meeting who is empowered to make decisions in the absence of the substantive Committee Member. This is based on the principle that good governance requires continuity and as such members must maintain consistent attendance at meetings and keep abreast of committee activities.

The Chair will have the authority to decide if there are a sufficient number of available members for a meeting to take place.

members for a meeting to take place.

Subject Matter Experts may be invited by the Chair to provide specialist advice or subject matter expertise to support the TTCG in consideration of a particular matter.

The committee will be supported by a Secretariat.

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Decision Making

The Chair of the TTCG is the final decision-maker on all matters brought before the TTCG.

Total consensus is not required for a decision to be taken. The TTCG must resolve issues, make decisions and report decisions to the STCG as required.

Meetings

The TTCG will meet every week. Out-of-session considerations may also apply when necessary.

The Chair will approve the agenda and the Chair and task action items to members.

Secretariat and Support

Secretariat services will be provided by Border Management Division.

Support and input for the National Operations Overview agenda item will be provided by the relevant operational support areas.

The Secretariat will be responsible for:

- Maintaining the agenda as directed by the Chair or their delegate
- Ensuring the status of action items are followed up no later than 24 hours prior to any scheduled meeting.
- Ensuring the agenda, all meeting documents and action items are made available to members and the Chair or their delegate no later than 12 hours prior to any scheduled meeting.
- Monitoring the completion of action items.

The Secretariat will report directly to the Chair.

SBC Operations will be responsible for:

- Developing the 'National Operations Overview' presentation for each TTCG meeting with input from relevant operational areas and Intelligence Division.
- Ensuring the 'National Operations Overview' is provided to Secretariat for upload to the TTCG SharePoint site no later than 12 hours prior to any scheduled meeting
- Leading the 'National Operations Overview' during scheduled TTCG
- Leading the 'National Operations Overview' during scheduled TTCG meetings
 Analysing operational performance against the priorities, including identified areas for improvement.

 The Chair may direct the Secretariat or operational support areas to develop and submit

additional papers to the TTCG.

The Chair will decide the level and scale of distribution with due consideration to openness and transparency of decision-making.

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Working Groups

The TTCG may establish working groups to assist the TTCG in meeting its responsibilities. The responsibilities, membership and reporting arrangements for each working group shall be documented and approved by the TTCG.

The Chair of a working group will not have final decision-making authority, but has defined responsibility to review issues, proposals or options and develop advice for the TTCG.


Review of the Terms of Reference

The Secretariat will undertake a review of these Terms of Reference at least once per year to determine whether the committee is still required and if the purpose and strategic direction remain the same. The Secretariat will report to the Chair on the outcomes of this review.


Any amendments to the Terms of Reference must be submitted to the STCG for endorsement before they come into effect.

Attachment D - The Operational Planning Cycle

OPERATIONAL PLANNING CYCLE



Attachment E - Timeframes for the development and endorsement of ABF Operational Priorities.




Attachment F - Timeframes for the development and endorsement of Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Plans.

Meeting

	APRIL week one	APRIL week two	APRIL week three	APRIL Week four	MAY Week one	MAY Week two	MAY week three
crategic Command Group	ABF Operational Priorities are endorsed by Chair						
Secretariat		Secretariat provides STCG members with endorsed Operational Priorities				Secretariat distributes the draft documents to all members for consideration	
Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group		Members consider Operational Priorities (out of session)	Chair allocates the responsibility for each Enforcement Strategy and IDEC Delivery Plan to relevant members	undertake enforcemen	rs delegate / completion of at strategies and elivery Plans	Responsible members provide draft enforcement strategies / IDEC Delivery Plans to the Secretariat	Members raise any concerns regarding draft documents. Chair endorses Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans or requests further work be

Attachment G – Timeframes for the development and endorsement of operational Action Plans.





ABF Operational Planning Framework

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Authorisation

Authority for Release

Authority

Michael Outram, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Border Operations Group, Australian Border Force

The Operational Planning Framework is endorsed by the Department of Immigration and Border Protection. Distribution of the Operational Planning Framework is at the discretion of the authorising Officer listed in the Table above.

1. Glossary

1.1 Acronyms

Acronym	Description			
ABF	Australian Border Force			
ACK	Acknowledgement	Acknowledgement		
AC SBC	Assistant Commissioner Strategic Border Command			
AFP	Australian Federal Police			
ВВ	Back Brief			
BFD	Border Force Division			
BMD	Border Management Division			
BOG	Border Operations Group			
C2	Command and Control			
COA	Course of Action	Course of Action		
DC	Deputy Commander			
DIBP	Department Immigration and Border Protection			
GP	Group			
IDEC Delivery Plans	Intelligence, Disruption, Enforcement and Compliance Delivery Plans			
ISRG	Immigration Status Resolution Group			
NBTC	National Border Targeting Centre	82		
No.	Number	198		
OAP	Operational Action Plan	ar th Act		
OGA	Other Government Agency	tion		
OPF	Operational Planning Framework	3P u		
OPORD	Operational Order	DIE		
OSB	Operational Strategies Branch	d by		
PBS	Portfolio Budget Statement	ase		
		reec		
		R II		

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Acronym	Description
RC	Regional Command
SBC	Strategic Border Command
SBCC	Strategic Border Command Centre
SCG	Strategic Command Group
SITREPS	Situation Reports
STCG	Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group
TTCG	Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group

1.2 Definitions

Definition	Description		
ABF Operational Priorities	The ABF Operational Priorities give effect to the strategic priorities for the Department and the ABF set out in the DIBP Strategic Plan. The Operational Priorities drive the delivery of ABF operational activities.		
Command	The lawful authority that a commander exercises over portfolio resources. Command includes the authority and responsibility for planning, coordinating, directing and controlling the effective employment of portfolio resources.		
	It also includes responsibility for operational, discipline, technical, health and welfare, management and administration of assigned personnel and resources.		
Control	Control refers to the system of measures put in place to aid supervision, synchronisation, de-confliction and the monitoring of progress. Control is about the support provided to enable a commander to exercise their command – that is, to ensure that the force remains 'under control'. Put simply, command is an individual cognitive function exercised vertically through a hierarchy and is primarily about formulating and communicating intent. Control is a function distributed across a large number of actors and agencies and supports the implementation of the commander's intent.		
Coordination	Coordination is a supporting function to enable command and control. It is the liaison or directed synchronisation of two or more resources to achieve the same tasks or priorities. Coordination allows re-prioritisation of resources, redirection of tasks, multi-jurisdictional control, and synchronisation to ensure economy of effort across the ABF's finite resources.		
DIBP Strategic Plan	The DIBP Strategic Plan articulates the Department's key priorities and goals for the year ahead. The DIBP Strategic Plan outlines the Department's vision to build Australia's future through the well-managed entry and settlement of people.		
Enforcement Strategy	A Enforcement Strategy includes context on why the commodity geographic location / event is considered to be a priority, and clearly state the desired outcomes of ABF activity. It includes defining specific requirements for intelligence, prevention, regulation, compliance and enforcement that the ABF will detive to achieve the desired outcome.		
Entity Rules (Traveller & Cargo)	A mechanism used to identify known entities such as, individuals, addresses, consignments, telephone numbers, etc.*		
Generic Rules (Traveller & Cargo)	A mechanism used to identify entities who match a set of risk indicators.*		
	Release		

Definition	Description		
Intelligence-Led	DIBP is an intelligence-led organisation. Intelligence assists the Department fulfil its function in protecting and managing Australia's borders. Intelligence assists the Department perform its vital role in supporting and protecting the safety, security and commercial interests of Australia. Being intelligence-led enables DIBP to focus resources and reduce the potential impact the intervention may have on legitimate international trade and travellers.		
Intelligence, Disruption, Enforcement and Compliance Delivery Plan	A IDEC Delivery Plan list the specific intelligence, disruption, enforcement and compliance activities that need to be undertaken to achieve the stated desired outcome within the over-arching Enforcement Strategy. These activities are categorised as preborder, at border or post border activities.		
Operational Action Plan	The Operational Action Plan provide an analysis of the implications / influence on the operational activities from the Enforcement Strategies and the IDEC Delivery Plans, provide a prioritisation of the operational activities and provide advice and guidance to tactical commanders on what priorities and desired effects that needs to be achieves and the associated coordination measures. The Operational Action Plan will inform the planning at the tactical level (i.e. inform the Tactical Action Plans).		
Risk Based Approach	The identification and response to threats and opportunities, seeking to mitigate and manage threats and ensuring that maximum advantage is taken of any opportunities arising. A risk-based approach will be followed when identifying and planning for all risks to the border and this approach will inform planning, decision-making and resource allocation.		
Tactical Action Plan	The Tactical Action Plan provides the detail of how the priorities and desired effects will be achieved as set out in the Operational Action Plan. The Tactical Action Plans will be informed by the Operational Action Plan.		
Traveller Alert	A mechanism used to identify persons of interest on their arrival to and/or departure from Australia.*		
Traveller PNR Alert	A mechanism used to identify a travel booking for a person of interest.*		
* These definitions are evolving wi	Released by DIBP under Freedom of Information A		

^{*} These definitions are evolving with further refinement to processes and may change.

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2. Preliminary

The Operational Planning Framework outlines the principles and methodology for the conduct of operational planning within the Australian Border Force (ABF). The document consolidates operational and planning concepts obtained from SBC to provide a structured approach to planning of operational activities. The Operational Planning Framework was designed in consideration of existing DIBP planning practices and operational functions within the ABF. This structured approach is essential to facilitate considered analysis, coordination, conduct and review of ABF operations.

The framework has been specifically designed to be scalable in order to be employed across all levels of command. The framework has the flexibility to adapt to the different ABF work environments and breadth of tasks performed through the Portfolio. The document is structured to provide a logical flow through the phases of the planning process. Therefore, the document aims to provide commanders and planners with a considered and transparent approach to decision making.

This document provides the planning process to establish a consistent approach to the planning for ABF operations. The planning framework applies a measure of consistency to the decision-making or advisory process. This approach enables the understanding of threats, coordination of options and shared methodology consistent across all areas of the ABF. It will demonstrate the clear progression of analysis, concept development and why decisions were made.

The Operational Planning Framework uses a decentralised planning model. Commanders provide guidance or direction, and subordinate planners (and subordinate commanders) use the planning cycle to develop plans to achieve the Commander's guidance.

Note. The Operational Planning Framework is a developing document that will evolve over time as the ABF matures. Further development will need to be conducted to reflect changes as the ABF integrates and further formalise the concepts of operations and governance (some of these aspects are identified within the Operational Planning Framework). This document should be used as an starting point for further development to formalise the ABF doctrine – Command and Control, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Planning, Training and Governance.

2.1 Intent

The intent of the Operational Planning Framework is to provide a structured approach to the conduct of planning necessary to facilitate considered analysis, coordination, conduct and review of ABF operations.

2.2 Related Instructions and Guidelines

Related Instructions and Guidelines to be provided – encapsulate (define) related Instructions and Guidelines and describe superseding arrangements.

2.3 Related Policies and References

Related Policies and References to be provided – encapsulate (define) related Policies and References and describe superseding arrangements.

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3. Context

The ABF forms part of the broader Department of Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP). The ABF is responsible for the protection, integrity and security of Australia's borders through the conduct of law enforcement operations. The portfolio includes operational functions to protect Australia's border and maritime approaches through the conduct of investigations, compliance, enforcement and detention before, at and after the border.

The ABF operating approach is built upon a series of operational principles that form part of the vision for DIBP and the ABF. The primary amongst these are:

- The ABF is an intelligence-led and risk-based organisation.
- The ABF operational spectrum includes the pre, at and post border environment.
- The ABF will operate under Command and Control (C2) principles.

3.1 Command and Control

The principles of C2 provide a hierarchal approach to the analysis, planning, coordination, authorisation and conduct of operations. This provides the ABF with clear line of direction and authorisation to streamline processes and expedite responses. C2 functions are performed through the functions of resources, personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling resources and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.

Command. Command is the lawful authority (under Commonwealth Acts) that a Commander exercises over their respective portfolio. Command includes the authority and responsibility to plan, direct, coordinate, and control the effect of employment of portfolio resources, personnel and assets. It also includes responsibility for strategies that determine the operational use, discipline, technical guidance, health and welfare, management and administration of assigned resources and personnel. Put simply, command is an individual cognitive function exercised vertically through a hierarchy and is primarily about formulating and communicating intent.

Control. Control (in command and control) refers to the system of measures put in place to aid supervision, synchronisation, de-confliction and the monitoring of progress of command guidance. Control is about the support provided to enable a commander to exercise their command. Put simply, the functions that ensure that the resources and stakeholders remain 'under control'.


C2 is applied on three recognised levels of command – strategic, operational and tactical. The authority and application of C2 is hierarchal from commander to subordinate commander across the levels. An understanding of the levels of command is essential to a commander's (or planner's) grasp of the inherent limitations of their authority.

 Strategic Level. The strategic level of command refers to the planning and direction of operations and activities to meet national objectives within a whole of government approach. This is concerned with DIBP dimension of national activities, both domestically and internationally. ABF strategic planners define political objectives and provide the overall direction for operational level planners. Commissioner and Deputy Commissioners are responsible for setting the strategic end states, objectives, desired effects, critical coordination activities and the broad approach to be taken.

- Operational Level. The operational level of command is the primary
 responsibility of area and divisional commanders (i.e. Strategic Border
 Command and Maritime Border Command). This level of command plans,
 directs and coordinates operations to achieve strategic objectives. The
 operational level rationalise strategic direction into useable tactical direction
 (direction and resources) that enables the tactical level to conduct operations
 that support strategic objectives. The focus of the Commander at this level is
 to coordinate portfolio resources to achieve strategic priorities and
 sustainment.
- Tactical Level. The tactical level of command plans and conducts activities to achieve operational objectives and strategies.

Figure 1 shows the general relationship of command to the three levels. The correlation of C2 to each level of ABF command is not straightforward due to the overlap of responsibilities between levels.

Coordination. Coordination is a supporting function to enable command and
control and reinforced in the planning cycle. It is the directed synchronisation
or liaison of two or more resources to achieve the same tasks or priorities.
Coordination allows reprioritisation (or reallocation) of resources and / or
tasks, and synchronisation to ensure economy of effort and best use of the
ABF's finite resources. Coordination can be provided formally through
directed measures (i.e. formally in OPORDs) or informally through
cooperation and liaison.



3.2 ABF Operations

The ABF is responsible for the operational functions of managing Australia's border and maritime approaches. The ABF enforces Australia's border laws, investigates potential breaches of these laws and, if a potential offence has been committed, detain persons or seize goods. The ABF is responsible for all operational functions in Australia's land, maritime and air environments before, at and after the border.

Operational Activities¹. The protection of Australia's Border through land, maritime and air operations are focused on the following operational activities:

- Intelligence.
- Disruption (Deterrence).
- Enforcement.
- · Compliance.

3.2.1 Intelligence Activity¹

Intelligence activities coordinate specific collection and analysis of information deemed of significance. Intelligence activities are used to satisfy information gaps and influence the conduct of other activities. These may take the form of (*not limited to*) investigations, surveillance, data / trend / operations analysis, operational monitoring or inter-agency information. They play an integral role in focusing the ABF's understanding to enable educated planning for enforcement, disruption and / or compliance activities.

3.2.2 Disruption Activity¹

Disruption activities are intelligence-based to deny the freedom of action and deter illegal activity or criminal networks. They may take the form of inspections (P1 – P3), interdiction and / or presence operations (i.e. detector dog unit).

3.2.3 Enforcement Activity¹

Enforcement activities are specific or continual operations against illegal activity. These activities are threat based (typically profiles, alerts or watch lists) to target suspect and / or criminal activity within the powers of the Commonwealth Acts and supporting Customs, Immigration and Maritime regulations. These may take the form of issuing and serving warrants, issuing infringement notices, interdiction and detention of suspects or seizure operations.

3.2.4 Compliance Activity¹

Compliance activities ensure the public and industry are complying with Commonwealth Customs, Immigration and Maritime regulations. These activities are typically conducted as quality assurance operations to validate public or industry compliance. This can include Non-Discretionary Activities such as border processing, business immigration spot checks, public awareness and education campaigns.

¹ These definitions were defined through workshop with SBC, Intelligence, Investigations and Immigration representatives, and subject to further development and changed with the implementation of the ABF post 1 July 2015.

Operational Planning

Operational Planning offers a mechanism for approaching the complexity of ABF operations. This is achieved through the conduct of Commander guided decentralised planning. Operational planning, at all levels, enables a progressive rationalisation of the Commander's direction, and organisational policies, priorities and strategies to ensure efficient use of ABF resources to achieve objectives.

This process enables areas to analyse and refine guidance to develop options. Operational planning allows the progressive process to:

- Outline strategic direction identify national threats, priorities and guidance.
- Refine strategic direction to operational guidance refine this direction against area specific issues (i.e. resource / resource availability and threats specific to ABF areas) to provide guidance and coordinate options.
- Use operational guidance to develop tactical plans and conduct implementable operational activities.

4.1 Intelligence-led Planning

Intelligence is identified broadly as Strategic, Operational and Tactical Intelligence. All intelligence activities should be based on the strategic threats with respective consideration for how these threats will manifest within the operational and tactical domains.

	Strategic Intelligence	Operational Intelligence	Tactical Intelligence
Definition	Strategic level intelligence assists the DIBP / ABF to make decisions related to the overall direction and development of the entire portfolio. It provides a contextual framework for operational intelligence. Strategic intelligence is future focused; from six months or beyond. This is captured and released through the Portfolio Threat Assessment.	Operational level intelligence supports operational managers in making effective decisions regarding resource allocation and prioritisation. Operational intelligence provides more detailed information than strategic intelligence and provides the framework for tactical level intelligence. Operational assessments forecast implications for threat activity over a timeframe of approximately one to six months.	Tactical level intelligence informs decision-making often in 'real-time' regarding direct activity against identified threats. Tactical intelligence supports decision-making regarding direct activity against defined persons or items of interest, or defined profiles of persons or items. Tactical intelligence is focused on supporting interventions and is immediately actionable intelligence directly supports the targeting process.
Informs planning	Providing a holistic assessment of the	Identifying and assessing organisations	Informing ABF officers in tactical roles involving

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	Strategic Intelligence	Operational Intelligence	Tactical Intelligence
by:	portfolio threat environment and likely future developments. Providing global context and development Identifying strategically significant events. Providing a collective context about trends or vectors for each threat, commodity and type of activity.	or networks involved in border threat activity. Identifying criminal organisations and methodologies used (with details of methodologies further furnished in tactical intelligence). Identifying connections with other organisations, networks or commercial entities. Identifying any seasonal or other cyclic effects on types of border threat activity. Identifying area where threats could manifest.	potential contact with threat entities. Identifying specific persons of interest and their role within organisations. Providing advice on specific entities or items (including vessels, aircraft, vehicles, containers or parcels) of interest. Details of techniques (including concealment of goods, concealment of identities, communication means) identified or likely to be encountered. Identifying behaviours associated with threat activity.

Intelligence-led planning enables the ABF to focus resources against emerging or habitual threats, and to identify risks. Intelligence-led planning does not only refer to the use of intelligence products, (threat assessments, environmental scans, etc.) but may include planning assessments, assumptions, doctrinal facts, assessments of political / media issues, and internal / post operation reporting. Consideration is also given on how to find or source information that is not currently available through identifying intelligence gaps and allocation of/requesting assists to answer in collection plans.

Planners at all levels require regular up to date intelligence to inform the planning process. Strategic, Operational and Tactical level planners will incorporate and analyse intelligence into all planning activities to shape the understanding of threats.

Whilst specialist intelligence and analytical expertise exists within Intelligence Division of DIBP, the collection and rational analysis of critical information is a responsibility of every command within the ABF.

4.2 Risk-Based Approach to Operations

A risk-based approach to operations is the identification and response to threats and opportunities in relation to the mission. This approach seeks to develop strategies against threats in order to mitigate or manage risk. A risk-based approach will be followed when identifying threats against

mission, targetable priorities and essential tasks. This informs the planning cycle, including decision-making and resource allocation, conduct and review.

5. Operational Planning Cycle

The planning cycle is a six-phase cycle. The first four phases are proactive planning phases to enable a decision based on educated analysis, viable development of options, coordination and enabled decision-making tools. The last two phases enable and influence the subsequent planning cycle (this document will focus on how these phases affect planning, not how they are physically conducted).

The planning cycle is depicted in Figure 2 below and is described in the subsequent paragraphs.

Figure 2 - Planning Cycle

The planning cycle phases (primarily output driven) can be applied flexibly depending on time constraints and the urgency for action. If applied in a deliberate manner, the process can support the development of very large and complex plans over a significant period of time – timeframes can be undertaken over months for very large, complex problems. However, if required, the steps can be shortened or elements removed to expedite decisions.

5.1 Phase 1 - Analyse

Analysis is the key initial step in the planning cycle. This phase ensures a full understanding of area contribution to higher-level operations and strategic objectives. This is developed through analysis of task, resources, risk and environment. During this phase, planners will continually identify, refine and develop their understanding of the changes in the threats, priorities, commander's guidance or ABF direction.

The key aims of the analysis are to:

- Identify what you know and what you need to know.
- Identify limitations and opportunities.
- · Determines and defines risks.

Analysis is necessary to shape considered development of options in the next phase.

Inputs	Considerations	Outputs
 Your immediate Commander's guidance – orders, directives, plans and / or strategies. The higher Commander guidance – plans, guidance, strategies and priorities (two command levels up). 	 Task Analysis: What time is available for the operation/s? What tasks are directed to my portfolio? What tasks are implied or non-discretionary from this direction? What are the organisational priorities two command levels up – can my portfolio directly influence or enhance outcomes within this intent / priorities? What are the priorities of my immediate commander and their end-state requirements? 	Task Analysis Back Brief (includes all other analysis outputs).
iovois up _j .	 Can the tasks (specific, implied or non-discretionary) achieve the requirements of priorities / Enforcement Strategies, i.e. do I have resources or resources that can influence these priorities? What are the critical task that would lead to success – essential tasks? 	under the

Are there any other portfolios, OGAs

interested in this area?

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	Resources Analysis	Capacity Reporting		
	Does my area have resources that can influence or achieve priorities and directed tasks – determines whether priorities are targetable?			
	What are the capacity issues / risks / prioritisation requirements?			
	Do I need external / specialist support?			
Initial incident reports.	Threat and Risks:	Collection Plan.		
IDECs. Intelligence	Environmental scan – what are the developing threats – is this a game changer?			
products.	Profiles or Alerts for Command analysis			
OGA reporting.	against priorities and resources (as fidelity and integrity Watch Lists are not considered in operational planning –			
Media and / or public reporting.	these will be sent to targeting cells for processing and allocation to relevant subordinate commands).			
Reviews, PARs, ABF	Post Operation Reporting.			
reporting.	Geographical Analysis:	Geographical Risk / Threat Assessment (or		
	Where is this likely to manifest (environmental scan - Geo Enforcement and Political)?	Overlay).		
	What areas have I concentrated on recently – have we missed/neglected somewhere?			
Determine (may be issued in the higher-level guidance or derived in the planning process):				

- Timeframe for the operation / s.
- Tasks that need to be completed.
- Targetable priorities.
- Other Law Enforcement Agency or OGA interest / lead.
- Political, cultural, economic and commercial sensitivities.
- Identified locations, including OGA, issue motivated groups and threat / s.
- Funding / resource constraints.
- Threats and risks (reputation, mission, personnel, equipment, etc.).

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5.1.1 Task Analysis Back Brief

The task back brief captures the initial assessment of tasks, facts (information that is confirmed as true), identifies assumptions (information not confirmed – but used as basis for planning) and determining information gaps (what we do not know). The back brief is the initial confirmation to the commander of analysis prior to further planning and development of courses of action.

This should be briefed as follows:

- · Confirmation of tasks.
- · Identify possible threats and risks.
- Highlight resource capacity constraints and implications Capacity Reporting.
- · Outline assumptions to be used in planning.
- Seek confirmation and guidance.

5.1.1.1 Capacity Reporting

Capacity reporting is the final portion of task analysis back brief. It is a subjective initial assessment of the potential tasks and current resource constraints. This needs to consider:

- Current operations.
- · Non-discretionary activities.
- New direction and priorities.

5.1.2 Collection

Collection activities determine or assess the information required to shape further operational planning. These inputs of information (which rely upon both the collection of useful information and proper reporting) are continually developed, monitored or refined throughout the entire planning cycle. Information collection sources available to ABF include:

- Passenger / crew processing. This means that information on a traveller's means of arrival, their travel documentation and declarations on their arrival / departure cards are routinely captured. Information that can be drawn from this source that may directly feed into the intelligence function include:
 - o traveller flows across the border;
 - contributions to building traveller profiles; and
 - the opportunity to identify specific traveller of interest or travellers matching identified profiles of interest (when matched with existing alert systems – in turn informed by intelligence analysis).
- Inspections. ABF (in conjunction with other agencies) inspects luggage, cargo, mail, vessels
 and aircraft entering Australia. Information that can be drawn from this source that may directly
 feed into the intelligence function includes:
 - understanding of commodity flows associated with various border threats and concealment techniques;

- preferred transportation means or distribution strategies associated with particular threats or specific entities within the border environment; and
- identification of consigners, locations, brokers and freight companies of interest in the overseas and domestic areas.
- Capabilities associated with investigative role. DIBP has the capability to conduct
 investigations of suspected violations of the Customs Act and supporting regulations. The
 investigative role can contribute to the intelligence function by providing information (including,
 but not limited to):
 - o criminal activity or entities in the domestic environment as well as in border areas; and
 - links between border threats and criminal activity across all areas of the border continuum.
- Maritime capabilities. The fleet of maritime patrol vessels and contracted aircraft give the ABF
 a surveillance capability in the maritime area. Examples of types of information that may be
 collected by the maritime capabilities that feeds into the intelligence function include:
 - information on vessel and aircraft detections in the maritime zone;
 - reporting from ship boarding and inspection activity;
 - o interviews of crew or detained personnel; and
 - o information gathered from incidental contacts in the maritime zone.
- Industry Legislated Reporting Requirements. Border-related industries are required by legislation to report numerous types of information to DIBP regarding the movements of people, goods, vessels and aircraft into and out of Australia. This reporting constitutes an invaluable base of data relevant to border activity. Information collected from industry reporting that feeds into the intelligence function includes:
 - o data related to all purchases of flight tickets into Australia;
 - o passenger manifests for each flight prior to departure for Australia; and
 - o advance notification on all ship arrivals and incoming cargo consignments.
- Community Participation Programs. DIBP maintains community participation programs that
 allow threat reporting directly from the community. These consist of awareness activities and
 telephone reporting systems. The types of information received from these programs that feed
 into the intelligence function include:
 - o information related to threat activity; and
 - o information on commodities detected in the border and domestic areas.
- Liaison. Liaison relationships are maintained as a part of DIBP's operational role and include
 working with other government and foreign agencies (through diplomatic posts) with direct
 interest in the border enforcement operations, regulation and compliance, and foreign border
 management services. Information collected from these relationships / posts can directly feed
 into the intelligence function.
- Presence at border entry and exit points. ABF have personnel able to observe and report on activity at entry and exit points. Information collected and reported from this presence can contribute information to the intelligence function on:
 - suspicious behaviour;

- criminal activity, or the presence of specific individuals at the border; and
- a comprehensive understanding of the border environment.

Information collected through ABF roles directly feeds into the intelligence function. All personnel have an important role in information collection. Personnel must proactively use their experience, training, expertise and professional judgement to identify and report incidents or entities that they consider to be potentially suspicious. Without this focus and ownership across the agency, important opportunities to collect pieces of information relevant to border threats will be lost.

Vital to the collection phase is the accurate and timely reporting of collected information. If an entity or incident is identified by an officer as potentially suspicious but it is not reported appropriately, it cannot be considered for further analysis by the intelligence system.

There are numerous mechanisms available for collected information to be reported. These include:

- transaction reporting systems (for passengers, cargo, etc.);
- · detection / seizure reporting systems;
- · operational reports;
- · information reports; and
- · other databases or information systems that ABF contribute to.

5.1.2.1 Collection Plan

During this process, planners (at all levels) should identify gaps in the information, articulate what additional information needs to be gathered and determine who will be responsible to gather this information. It is unlikely that all the relevant information will be immediately available, but available information must be shared to cross-level understanding across all planners and different perspectives considered. The collection plan identifies information gaps and plans for the acquisition of the required information. The collection plan template can be found at Attachment G.

5.1.3 Geographical Risk / Threat Assessment (or Overlay)

Geographical Risk / Threat Assessment (or Overlay) represents risk to geographical area of concern. This will enable the planners to identify location of threats in respect to resources, highlight possible jurisdictional / C2 issues and identify potential correlation between risk (i.e. detections of illegal firearms at Port X have also seen decrease in frequency of firearms at Air Terminal X; therefore, highlighting a shift in illegal methods – this could be considered across jurisdictions).

The outcome of this analysis should focus operational tasks in development of courses of action.

5.2 Phase 2 - Develop

Course of actions are how the directed result may be achieved. Whilst the initial command guidance will shape the basis of any option, the development of a range of options ensures that the planning process considers other ways of achieving the response objectives. There are many aspects to be considered when planning a response.

While planners may be tempted to make an early decision on the preferred option (implicit favourite), they must refrain from doing this as it results in the predictability of ABF operations and may not fully mitigate risks or target threats. It is important in this process to develop a number of COAs (each must be different approaches to the problem) in order to provide decision makers with a range of alternatives.

Inputs	Considerations	Outputs
Collection outcomes.	Tasks and targetable priorities. Risk profiles.	COA Development Tool (2 – 3 options).
Developing Intelligence.	Information updates.	Concept of Operations Back- brief.
Task analysis.	Resources available.	blief.
Resource analysis.	Specialised resource requirements.	
ariarysis.	Level of support required.	
	Availability of these resources or resources – capacity.	
	Timeframes.	
	Coordination requirements.	

5.2.1 Course of Action Development Tool

The Course of Action Development Tool is a means of brainstorming options. Targetable priorities and essential tasks (determined in analyse phase) are represented on the top of the table. Resources available (or allocated) are considered and represented in the left hand column. Resource options (2 – 3 different options) are then identified to target the respective priority. These options will be analysed for potential effectiveness and a determination for which options will be developed further into COA's development.

COA development then considers:

- Type of activity.
- Timeframe.
- Conduct of the options to identify:
 - Stages to the conduct.
 - Task and implied tasks.
 - Resource allocation, synchronisation and coordination.

If options do not emerge for priorities this highlights that the respective command does not have the resources available to target these directed priorities or tasks. Therefore consideration should be made for additional (or specialist resources); rationalisation of resource against other current (or planned) activities; reprioritisation of priorities; or removal of a directed priority.

		Targetable Priorities and Essential Tasks				
		i.e. serious crime (particularly how it will manifest within the jurisdictional of the Command).				
	i.e. resources under command or assigned.	Ways to use the resource to target the priority (i.e. brainstorm) – minimum 2 – 3 ways.				
/ailable						
Resources available						

Figure 3 - Course of Action Development Tool

5.2.2 Concept of Operations Back-Brief

The ABF Concept of Operations (CONOPS) back-brief format captures the facts and identifies potential options to be used in coordination forums or, as operationally required, endorsed by higher commanders

SITUATION

- · Outline any assumptions that your planning was based on.
- Define your threats and display threat overlays.

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- · Confirm your information gaps and brief your collection plan.
- · Identify your resource constraints and capacity.
- Confirm (or identify your refined) targetable priorities and essential tasks.
- Identify your potential operational risk with preliminary mitigation measures.

MISSION

• Confirm (or request endorsement of your refined) mission.

EXECUTION (conceptual intent)

- Outline intent (purpose, method and end state) of each resource potential COAs (targetable priorities).
- If required, identify plan to synchronise operations coordination measures.

ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS (conceptual support requirements)

- Identify key or specialised administrational requirements.
- If required, request additional or specialist resources / support.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- · Any coordination requests to informally or formally coordinate with external resources.
- If required, outline new internal C2 arrangements.
- · If required, confirm control arrangements.
- If required, request primacy direction and operational lead.
- If required, outline reporting arrangements.

SEEK COMMANDER ENDORSEMENT (or additional guidance if required)

5.3 Phase 3 – Coordinate

Coordination enables the opportunity for CONOPS to be rationalised at coordination groups, command forums, planning working groups to assess COAs against other portfolio COAs. This coordination ensures the efficient and synchronised use of ABF resources to address directed priorities.

For example, support requirements from other areas or strategic resource. Additional external resource capacity that may be available to support operational plans (requires Commander prioritisation), jurisdictional or inter-agency synchronisation requirements – all of which may impact the final decision and identify issues relating to operational lead and primacy for conduct – for further contingency planning.

5.3.1 Coordination Groups

The ABF coordination groups play an important role during planning. These groups are responsible for providing direction, advice and guidance during planning, overseeing or developing certain guidance documents, endorsing guidance documents, resolving escalated issues, etc.

The ABF has established three primary coordination groups, namely:

- Strategic Command Group.
- · Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group.
- · Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group.

The planning inputs, role, responsibilities, outcome and expectations of these coordination groups are depicted in Figure 4 and explained in Attachment A. Planning timeframes are attached at Attachment B.

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5.3.2 Targetable Priorities and Resources Synchronisation Matrix

The details for the targetable priorities and resource synch matrix are obtained through subordinate capacity reporting and COAs for operations presented in portfolio forecasts (3 – 6 months). This synch enables the Commander to proactively coordinate effort, identify potential multi-jurisdictional / OGA issues, reprioritise task and / or redirect portfolios based on the Commander's priorities for that period, prior to expenditure of effort or resources.

		Targetable Prio	rities (weighted a ord	and in the Comma ler)	nder's prior	ity
		i.e. Serious organised crime.				
rations	i.e. RC Central and capacity for the period.	Identified potential COAs against this priority.				
Tactical groups, strategic resource or known OGA operations		i.e. Land patrol – surveillance operation of a specific port.				
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5.4 Phase 4 - Decide

Respective Commanders retain the authority to control resources assigned to their area as per existing arrangements. Hence, planning regarding the tasking, dispositions, timings and limitations relevant to activities need to be rationalised at all command levels. Planners need to seek a decision on advice provided at the conclusion of phase 3. Planners will need to identify who is the decision-maker (commander); what are the options achieving; and what resources do they have / need to achieve the required outcomes.

Input/s	Considerations	Outputs
Targetable Priorities and Resources Synchronisation Matrix. Peer (or external) review from the perspective of threats – ABF action, threat reaction and ABF counter- action.	Weighted decision making based on priorities, risks and synch matrix What are the C2 arrangements – who is the decision-maker (commander)? What are the options achieving? What resources do they have / need to achieve the required outcomes?	Commander Instructions (authorisation to conduct) Priorities Plans Strategies Documents IDECs OPORD Directives.

5.4.1 Command Guidance Documents

The outputs from the planning cycle are Command Guidance Documents to respective or assigned resources. This may be in the form of tasking orders, plans, strategies or instructions. Command Guidance Documents will need to be analysed and rationalised at all levels to determine what are the applicable priorities, resourcing implications, associated timeframes are achievable within respective portfolios. These documents also provide the authority to conduct operational activities.

The Command Guidance Documents derived from the planning process are summarised in Figure 5 below. Example templates are provided at Attachments C – J.

The DIBP Strategic Plan articulates the strategic priorities and goals for the year ahead. The DIBP Strategic Plan outlines the Department's vision to build Australia's future through the well-managed entry and settlement of people. Set by the Secretary the DIBP Strategic Plan encompasses the strategic priorities for DIBP and the ABF. It is developed from Ministerial Direction in consideration of the strategic Environmental Scan (which incorporates Strategic Intelligence Assessments), policy analysis and departmental requirements. The DIBP Strategic Plan shapes the context for all other supporting operational plans from strategic to the tactical level.

5.4.1.2. ABF Operational Priorities

The ABF Operational Priorities give effect to the DIBP Strategic Plan and outline the ABF Commissioner's strategic priorities for planning and conduct of operations. The ABF Operational Priorities are set by the SCG, and are used to drive the delivery of ABF operational activities. The Operational Priorities for the ABF can include commodities, geographic locations, planned events or a combination of these factors. The Operational Priorities for the ABF form the basis for the development of Enforcement Strategies, which in turn inform the IDEC Delivery Plans. They also drive the development of divisional business plans and action plans. The ABF Priorities are endorsed at the SCG.

5.4.1.3. Enforcement Strategies

Individual Enforcement Strategies are completed for each identified Operational Priority, and are developed by Border Management Division. A Enforcement Strategy must include context on why the commodity / geographic location / event is considered to be a priority, and clearly state the desired outcomes of ABF activity. It will include (but is not limited to) defining specific requirements for intelligence, prevention, regulation, compliance and enforcement that the ABF will deliver to achieve the desired outcome. The Enforcement Strategy also includes a number of performance measures to be monitored throughout the financial year.

5.4.1.4. IDEC Delivery Plans

The IDEC Delivery Plan will list the specific intelligence, disruption, enforcement and compliance activities that need to be undertaken to achieve the stated desired outcome within the over-arching Enforcement Strategy. These activities are categorised as pre-border, at border or post border activities. IDECs are delivered through of operational and tactical actions plans.

5.4.1.5. Operational Action Plan

Operational level commanders (Divisional Commanders) within the ABF are responsible for the completion of an Operational Action Plan for each month, covering the activities within their scope of authority. The Operational Action Plan provides an analysis of the implications / influence on the operational activities from the Enforcement Strategies and the IDEC Delivery Plans, provides a prioritisation of the operational activities and provides advice and guidance to tactical commanders on priorities and desired effects that need to be achieved and the associated coordination measures. The Operational Action Plan will inform the planning at the tactical level (i.e. inform the Tactical Action Plans). Operational Action Plans will be cyclically completed on a monthly, quarterly and bi-annual basis. Operational Action Plans are endorsed and coordinated at the STCG.

5.4.1.6. Tactical Action Plan

Tactical Commanders within the ABF are responsible for conducting operational activities and completion of evolving and cyclical Tactical Action Plans. The Tactical Action Plan provides the detail of how the priorities and desired effects will be achieved as set out in the Operational Action Plan. The Tactical Action Plans will be informed by the Operational Action Plan. Tactical Action Plans will be completed to maintain a quarterly operational forecast. Tactical commands will update the plans monthly to maintain scheduled operations for a month and projected operational forecast out to three months (based on trends, resource concerns and potentially highlight opportunities). Tactical Action Plans are coordinated at the TTCG.

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5.4.1.7. Operational Orders

Operational Orders resulting from planning include Operational Orders (OPORDs), Directives or tasking requests. These Operational Orders describe the activity to be undertaken, who is involved, indication of resources commitment and associated costs.

5.4.2 Operational Information Management

Operational information management outlines the critical information requirements specific to the operational requirements. This provide Commander's the opportunity to clearly define what they want to know, who needs to find it (including requests), how it is expected to be received and in what timeframe. This may also identify what the Commander considers to be a Category 1-3 notifiable incident. A proposed information management system template is detailed in Figure 6.

Note. This is a developing concept and may be developed into a live document in the future. Groups, Divisions and / or Tactical Commands may control request / responses through their respective headquarters or this may be delegated throughout the ABF C2 levels (and selected OGAs) to create an all informed system.

	Group / Division / Portfolio / (OGA)	POC	Critical Information Requirement (s)	Assigned to / requested (if known / required)	Timeframe	Comments
Request						
Response(s)						

Figure 6 - Operational Information Management

5.5 Phase 5 – Conduct

The conduct of operations phase enables the validation, monitoring and adaption of planning. It is unlikely that all aspects of the planning cycle were fully considered or effectively implementable against ever evolving vent and / or emerging threats. During the conduct phase, planners and commanders should be prepared to re-engage phases of the planning cycle to re-develop plans.

5.6 Phase 6 - Review

Post Operational Reviews analyse the completion of tasks, incident or activity during conduct. A Post Operational Review should be conducted as soon as possible after the completion of the operation. Reviews provide the opportunity to:

- Analyse results of the operation were they successful or unsuccessful in targeting priorities.
 On conclusion of the activity or operation, analysis should be conducted to compare the performance against the objectives.
- Analyse how the planning processes and procedures affected the conduct.
- · Capture this analysis as lessons in the form of sustain, improves and fixes.

5.6.1 Reporting

Reporting is a compulsory part of every role within the ABF. It is the responsibility of each officer to ensure reporting is consistent and of a high standard. The achievement of outcomes relies upon clear and timely reporting to enable inputs to the decision making process. It is important to both the internal aspects of operations but also to the ABF compliance and reputation and relationships with partner agencies and other external entities.

5.6.1.1. Post Operational Reporting

Operational activities will require Post Activity Reporting. The Post Activity Reports must clearly measure the effectiveness of operation, identify areas to be improved or sustained, and / or identify residual / emerging risks. They can also capture the key observations, findings, treatment options or recommendations based on the information gathering during the operation.

The recording, reporting, analysis should identify strengths (sustains), weaknesses (improves) in the planning and conduct in order, and determine how these can be incorporated into the planning and conduct of future operations (fixes). The operational analysis should be consolidated at the operational level to determine overall effeteness, establish divisionally specific threat trends, rationalise against PBS and identify potential enhancements for strategic direction and capability analysis.

5.6.1.2. Notifiable Incident Reporting

All reporting within the Immigration and Border Protection Portfolio is to be categorised and prioritised in accordance with the Report Categorisation Framework as described in the *Policy Instruction – Report Categorisation Framework in the Immigration and Border Protection Portfolio* dated May 2015.

6. Conclusion

The Operational Planning Framework provides a methodical and structured approach to operational planning within the ABF. This structured approach facilitates considered analysis, coordination essential for the effective conduct (and review) of ABF operations.

The Operational Planning Framework is a developing document, which may evolve over time as the ABF matures. Further development will need to be conducted to reflect changes as the ABF integrates and further formalise the concepts of operations and governance (some of these aspects are identified within the Operational Planning Framework). This document should be used as an inception point for further development of a formalised ABF doctrine – Command and Control, Intelligence, Operations, Logistics, Planning, Training and Governance.

7. Attachments

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7.1 Attachment A - Coordination Groups

7.1.1 Strategic Command Group

The Strategic Command Group (SCG) is responsible for setting the strategic direction and the Operational Priorities of the ABF. The SCG will monitor the health of the ABF including operational outputs and outcomes, resource and budgetary position. It will consider operational performance, operational resource allocation, operational capability and its alignment with priorities.

Through the articulation of the ABF Operational Priorities, the ABF will give effect to Ministerial Directions issued and the strategic priorities set by the DIBP Strategic Plan. This role is enabled by the Strategic Threat Assessment developed by Intelligence Division, in conjunction with governmental objectives. The SCG monitor and address changes in the strategic intelligence picture, operational risks and issues, and anticipate trends, which might require Department-wide action or intervention. Further, the SCG will resolve issues escalated by the Chair of the Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group (STCG).

The Chair of the SCG is the ABF Commissioner, and is the responsible officer for the decisions and directions that come from the meetings of the SCG. The SCG members include all Deputy Commissioners and invited other department Secretaries. The Assistant Commissioner may be coopted to represent / discuss specific issues.

The SCG meet on a quarterly basis or more frequently (as required) if directed by the Chair. The guidance documents of the SCG are provided to the STCG as a basis to undertake its responsibilities.

7.1.2 Strategic Tasking and Coordination Group

The STCG is a subordinate committee of the SCG. The STCG is responsible for using the ABF Operational Priorities set by the SCG as a basis to provide direction to operations delivered by Operations Group and other operations divisions. The STCG requires situational awareness of ABF operations, operational posture, emerging threats and risks to enable the co-ordination of responses to those risks and any critical incidents as they arise.

The Chair of the STCG will direct the completion of Enforcement Strategies and Intelligence, Disruption, Enforcement and Compliance (IDEC) Delivery Plans. The Chair allocates the responsibility of each Enforcement Strategy and IDEC Delivery Plan to the relevant members for the activities within their span of accountability. Border Management Division (BMD) is responsible for developing the Enforcement Strategy for each Operational Priority. The STCG member nominated as the responsible officer by the Chair will be responsible for the development of the IDEC Delivery Plan related to each Operational Priority.

The STCG member responsible for each Enforcement Strategy and IDEC Delivery Plan is responsible for the timely review and submission to the STCG. Once submitted, all STCG members will have the opportunity to review the Enforcement Strategy and IDEC Delivery Plans in order to provide advice to the Chair. The Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans are used as input into the Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group (TTCG) as a basis to undertake its responsibilities.

The Chair has the authority to endorse each Enforcement Strategy and IDEC Delivery Plan or request further work is undertaken. These documents must be reviewed each time a change is made to the Operational Priorities.

The ABF Deputy Commissioner Border Enforcement is the Chair of the STCG and includes all ABF Assistant Commissioners.

The STCG meet on a monthly basis or more frequently (as required) if directed by the Chair.

7.1.3 Tactical Tasking and Coordination Group


The TTCG is a subordinate committee of the STCG. The TTCG ensures a common understanding of operational activity being undertaken across the ABF. The TTCG is responsible for applying operational activities that will deliver the outcomes of the Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans. The TTCG also endorses any new operational activity or the finalisation of ongoing operations and investigations where higher priority activities demand additional resources.

The Regional Commanders and the SES Band 1 Commanders within the ABF are responsible for operational activity delivered as part of the Enforcement Strategies and IDEC Delivery Plans for each Operational Priority. This includes depicting how they are going to achieve the objectives set out in the Enforcement Strategies by developing Operational Action Plans.

The group members have the opportunity to review each Operational Action Plan and the Chair has the authority to endorse or request further work is undertaken. Meetings will be used to discuss the progress of operational activities and to consider issues as they arise. Additionally, the TTCG will discuss operational issues as they arise for resolution or escalation to the STCG.

CSBC is the Chair of the TTCG and membership includes Band 1 SES officers representing each branch involved in operational activity delivered by the ABF.

The TTCG meet weekly or more frequently (as required) if directed by the Chair.



Meetings

- ★ SCG meet quarterly (out-of-session considerations may also apply when necessary).
- * STCG meet once a month (out-of-session considerations may also apply when necessary).
- ★ TTCG meet every week (out-of-session considerations may also apply when necessary).

Attachment B - Planning Timeframes

7.2 Attachment C - Enforcement Strategy Template

The following provides a Enforcement Strategy template.

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

XXXXX – Enforcement Strategy 2015

Version 1.0 dated xx XXXX 15

Background

Assumptions

The following assumptions have been used to develop this plan:

XXXXX.

Mission

The Department of Immigration and Border Protection is to immediately implement measures to prevent, deter, detect, and (or) disrupt attempts to XXXX.

Outline of Activities

This Enforcement Strategy will focus on:

XXXX.

Intelligence Gaps

As at XXXX 2015, the following intelligence gaps exist:

XXXX.

Allocation of Responsibilities

XXXX will be responsible for the overall implementation of activities to XXXX. Specific responsibilities for:

National Director - Border Management Division.

Commander Strategic Border Command.

Commander Maritime Border Command.

National Director Intelligence Division – Operational Intelligence.

National Director Investigations Division.

National Director Border Force Capability Division.

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Review of Activities and Performance

Note. BMD will coordinate a comparative monthly report to DCEO BO based on inputs from SBC, INTEL, INVEST and BFCD activity reporting. BMD report will cover resourcing, coordination and administrative aspects.

These plan are to be reviewed every six months or sooner if any assumptions change.

All aspects of this plan are to be classified.

Drafted by:

Approved by:

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

7.3 Attachment D – IDEC Delivery Plan Template

The table below provides an example of the IDEC Delivery Plan Template.

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Intelligence, Disruption, Enforcement and Compliance Delivery Plan for *insert operational priority here*

Non-Discretionary Activ	ities		
Intelligence Activity Description	Disruption Activity Description	Enforcement Activity Description	Compliance Activity Description
			000
Pre Border Activities			er the
At Border Activities			under
Post Border Activities) JBP form
	INSERT SECURITY	CLASSIFICATION	Released by DIBP unde

7.4 Attachment E – Operational Action Plan Template

The Operational Action Plan guides tactical planning by defining what are the Command's targetable priorities (in the Commander's priority order) for that period. This is dependent on a number on variables including (but not limited too) threat and movement trends; the tactical resource available and ability to influence / or act; and / or suspected geographical threat locations / networks.

The Commander's summary provides an overview regarding. The table below provides an example of the Operational Action Plan Template.

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

		Priority		Reso	urces	Effects		Stakeholders		
Period	Priority	Enforcement Strategy	IDEC	Group / Resource assign	Additional assets	Desired effects	Measure of effectivenes s	ABF	OGA	C2 / Coord
Identify period (dates / times) i.e. discrete , 1 month, 3 months, 6 months	Priority to be targeted-listed in the Commander's priority order.	Related Enforcement Strategy with link to document. Including ABF lead, SS, PS.	Related IDEC with link to the document.	Tactical Group assigned to the elements of the IDEC (may be multiple of multi- jurisdictional, etc)	If required, Attachment or detachments of assets (strategic or tactical) for operations tasks, with C2 arrangement s and period attached / detached identified.	The commanders desired effect to be achieved against the priority.	What success looks like to the Commander.	Any jurisdictional, other ABF stakeholders interested, to be consulted and / or involved. This is also the opportunity to identify Lead / Spt.	Any OGA stakeholders interested, to be consulted and / or involved. This is also the opportunity to identify OGA Lead / Spt / and access.	Commanders identified C2 / coord requirements.

Note – this is not prescriptive, if required provide additional information; or if no information is required, then leave blank or N/A.

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

7.5 Attachment F – Tactical Action Plan Template

The Tactical Action Plans (including Quarterly Forecast) deliver the following functions:

- Tactical Plans consisting of a one-month view of all tactical activity aligned to the IDE references. This must include (but is not limited to) operations, campaigns, projects, activities, interventions, patrols and saturation activities.
- Quarterly Forecasts project operational activity for the preceding three months based on suspected trends, resource capacity and emerging threats.

The Tactical Action Plan to represent:

- All planned operational activity including (but not limited to) designated Operations, Campaigns, Projects, Patrols, Saturation and Intervention activity for the upcoming month.
- Any major / sporting / political / cultural events; and training / peak / surge events which could affect resource levels.
- The intent of the operation addressing why the activity is being planned a short sentence with suffices.
- Description of the activity to convey what the activity is targeting where the planned activity does not have an Operation name or Operational Order.
- An intelligence reference number linking the proposed operational activity to specific intelligence This could be in the form of a NIS reference number or intelligence product reference number.

The table below provides an example (Microsoft Excel exert) of the Operational Action Plan Template.

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

											\U
Date	Operation Name	Activity Description:	Target:	IDE Ref:	Precincts:	District:	Assets:	Events:	Operational I	nt <u>ent</u>	H
Input date when activity begins. If activity	If the activity has a designated	Description of what	Free text field -	Insert the	Precinct refers	If applicable	Consider what	Please use this field to populate	Please use this	feld to	explain
is being conducted over multiple days	Operation / Campaign / Project /	primary activity will be	specify what the	applicable DE	to the stream	please include	assets will be	with any Major	for what purpos	e <mark>ithe</mark> act	Mty
please input into a separate row for each	Activity name in NIS.	undertaken.	activity is targeting.	reference. One	where the	where the activity	required for the	Events/Sporting/Cultural/Political	has been planr	ed_For-	2
day the activity is being conducted.				DE reference	activity is to	will be occuring	planned	events which may impact on	example: To ex	cantine m	ail from
				per cell. There	occur. There	i.e. Sydney,	operational	resourcing on this date. This field	high risk illicit f	irearms	2
				may be a	may be a	Caims,	activity. One	can also be used to capture any	countries and g	gather	5
				number of	number of	Gladstone,	asset per cell.	training or surge activity i.e. any	intelligence.	as,	8
				references.	precincts.	Adelaide,	There may be a	activity that does not require an		(D)	G
						Northern	number of	IDE reference.		T	(J)
						Command.	assets.			M I	I

under the nation Act 1982

The Tactical Plans and summary are provided to SBCC for incorporation into the Daily Operations Brief as projected activity. In addition, SBC Operational Planning provides forward projections of planned operational activity from the Tactical Plans to Executive forums such as the Tactical Tasking Command Group to support discussion upon request.

SBC Operational Planning uses the information provided by each Regional Command pre and post operation to analyse the progress of ongoing operations, assess the balance of priorities and identify operational gaps. This ensures planned activity is balanced across all operational priorities. Opportunities to develop a regional operation into a national operation are considered as part of this process.

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

7.6 Attachment G - Collection Plan Template

The table below provides an example of the Collection Plan Template.

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Collection Plan

Information requirements	Resource allocated	External intelligence, products or resources request	Time information is required	Reporting
				rthe
				under the
				y DIBF
	INSER	L RT SECURITY CLAS	SIFICATION	Released by

7.7 Attachment H – OPORD Template

The following provides an OPORD template.

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Operation Order

"OPERATION XXXX" Insert Operation Name Here

Copy 1 of X (Insert copy number here)

Issued by (Insert Title here)

References:

- Insert references name here.
- B. Insert references name here.
- C. Insert references name here.

Attachments:

- A. Insert attachment name here.
- B. Insert attachment name here.
- C. Insert attachment name here.

Time Zone used throughout this order: *Insert Time Zone here*.

1. SITUATION

- a. General
 - (1) Topography
 - (2) Background Information
- b. Threats New intelligence (profiles / alerts) and potential Person of Interest (Watch List / suspects).
- c. Own Forces Any other operations within the Area (ABF and OGA if known).
- d. In Support arrangements.
- e. Potential Issue Motivated Groups (Social, Political and Media)

MISSION

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

3. EXECUTION

- a. Commander's or CoS / OP Chief's Intent
- b. General Outline
- c. Group (repeated as required for grouped resources)
 - (1) Resources attached and detached Other Officers and In Support.
 - (2) GPCOMD
 - (3) Mission.
 - (4) Tasks.
- d. Co-ordinating Instructions
 - (5) Timings.
 - (6) Control and synchronisation measures with external ABF/OGA agencies tangible mechanisms.
 - (7) Security.
 - (8) Integrity measures.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

- a. Logistical resource allocation and plan.
- b. Resource management plan.
- c. Dress Requirements and/or PPE.
- d. Safety and Medical plan.
- e. Sustainment plan.
- f. Legislation impact and compliance plan.

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL

- a. Command OP Lead, Primacy and / or Direct Liaison Authorisation approved.
- b. Location of Commander.
- c. Communication Plan Reporting (frequency and how) and allocation of communications resources, including frequencies / call signs.
- d. Emergency or notifiable incident management plan and contact Phone numbers.

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

OPCOMD Authorisation (release authority)

Insert Date: DD MM YYYY

Distribution: Copy No.

Insert Insert Copy No. here
Insert Insert Copy No. here
Insert Insert Copy No. here

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

7.8 Attachment I - Directives Template

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

File: Insert File Number Here.

From: Insert senders details here (Example: Commander Strategic Border Command).

Insert Directive number here (Example: Directive # 12 / 2015).

To: Insert target audience here (Example: Regional Commander NSW).

INSERT DIRECTIVE TITLE HERE (Example: ALERTS IN THE CRUISE SHIP ENVIRONMENT).

- a) Introduction
- b) Background
- c) Commander Intent
- d) Procedure to be undertaken
- e) Tasks

Signature

Insert Authorisation Officer Name Here

Insert Authorisation Officer Here

Insert Date here (Example: 20 April 2015).

DISTRIBUTION	COPY	ACK
Insert Title here	Insert copy number here	Acknowledgement
Insert Title here	Insert copy number here	Acknowledgement
Insert Title here	Insert copy number here	Acknowledgement

ATTACHMENTS

- A. Insert Attachment name here
- B. Insert Attachment name here
- C. Insert Attachment name here

INSERT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

7.9 Attachment J – Operational Information Management Systems

Under development based on a priority information requirements systems (extension of the collection plan methodology) – tiered at all levels.