



19 December 2025

Dr Jill Slay AM
Independent Review of the Security of Critical Infrastructure (SOCl) Act 2018
Department of Home Affairs

Submitted online: <https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/>

Dear Dr Slay,

Independent Review of the SOCl Act

Origin Energy Limited (Origin) welcomes the opportunity to provide feedback on the Independent Review of the SOCl Act.

Questions 1 & 2: Is the SOCl Act achieving its intended objectives? Is it functioning as intended?

We consider that the Act is largely fulfilling its objectives in safeguarding Australia's cyber and national security and generally operates effectively. Nevertheless, certain SOCl obligations present ambiguity and complexity, resulting in implementation challenges.

Our observations indicate that these issues are particularly evident within the foreign ownership, control, and influence (FOCI) requirements. The current FOCI framework lacks clarity, leading to uncertainty during implementation. For instance, insufficient detail and prescription within guidance materials compel organisations to rely on their own risk tolerance, including in areas outside their primary expertise, such as intricate geopolitical considerations, when interpreting the framework. This organisational risk appetite may differ from the Department's own level of risk tolerance, thereby creating further ambiguity in decision-making.

A more prescriptive approach to the FOCI framework should be considered, including providing additional detail within the Act where needed. Furthermore, the Review should prioritise identifying other sections of the Act that could benefit from enhanced guidance or clarification to facilitate more effective implementation and the achievement of the Act's intended aims.

Questions 3 & 4: Are there any unintended consequences? Are there new or emerging threats the Act does not address?

Origin has not identified any specific gaps in the Act. We note that the Department is currently consulting on proposed changes to the critical infrastructure risk management program (CIRMP) rules to address increasing threats to all hazards. Some of the proposed changes may be difficult to implement. As an example, the proposed supply chain hazard changes may be impractical if no suitable commercially or operationally viable alternatives exist that can meet the requirements. This could delay and increase the costs of the energy sector transition, without reducing risks to critical infrastructure assets. Recommendations to address new and emerging threats through this Review should carefully consider sector-specific realities to prevent unintended outcomes such as these.

Should you have any questions or wish to discuss this submission further, please contact me at [REDACTED] or on [REDACTED].

Yours sincerely,

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
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